Why did Germany lose WW2?

[BritinBritain]

It should not be thought that the German radio intercept services, intelligence organizations, were totally unable to "read" the secret encrypted messages of the allied forces during the Second World War. "The B-Dienst (Beobachtungsdienst) was a German naval code breaking organisation. During World War II, B-Dienst solved British Naval Cypher No. 3, providing intelligence for the Battle of the Atlantic, until the British Admiralty introduced Naval Cypher No. 5 on 10 June 1943."

German U-Boat success during the early part of the Battle of the Atlantic was due in large measure to the ability of B-Dienst to "read" the British naval and merchant marine encoded messages and do so with relatively impunity, providing Doenitz with real-time action-able intelligence! Until the TYPEX cipher machine was widely adopted by the British navy, the movement of the Royal Navy were literally an "open book"! For all that meant!

With the Allies reading Enigma, were they aware that Doenitz was reading Royal Naval coded messages? If they were, someone somewhere needed a boot up his/her jacksy.

 

[Der Alte]

Prior to America’s entry into the war in 1941, Germany’s Naval B-Dienst was reading a number of American encoded communications systems. This capability essentially ceased after April of 1942 when the U.S. adopted a new system; but before the U.S. switched systems.

B-Dienst was very successful in compromising the Royal Navy’s secure communications for most of the war; specifically, B-Dienst compromised the 5-digit Royal Navy code. The British 4-digit naval code was harder to break, but in time, it too was compromised by the German Navy’s B-Dienst. Of note is that Germany was never able to break secure British diplomatic communications.

In addition to the above, B-Dienst was able to compromise five French naval communications systems, and three Danish systems by 1939.

Of note is that the Deutsche Reichspost was able to break the scrambled voice transmission of the American-British transatlantic telephone system. Specifically, German technical experts built a de-scrambling device, set up shop in the town of Noordwijk in the Netherlands and by 1940/1941, were routinely listening to classified telephone conversations between U.S. President Roosevelt and PM Churchill. Most of the intercepted telephone conversations did not yield the Germans optimally suitable intelligence primarily because the Allies knew their system was not secure and most individuals did practice good security measures when talking.

But in the end, very little really mattered. The Germans lost the “cipher” and “code” war. American and British efforts to compromise German secure communications were far better than German efforts to compromise Allied efforts. Among the major reasons for failure (in the field of cryptography or code-breaking), one can cite the fact that the Germans were overly arrogant in their beliefs, they were pre-occupied with petty political infighting and they were subservient to a bizarre political structure, a political system which wanted to see only what it wanted to see and which truly neglected to invest in a good intelligence service when it should have - in 1933.

 

[Der Alte]

It just shows how "compartmentalised" Allied intelligence was.
We were so aware how important it was to read Axis codes, and we knew that Enigma, and Lorenz were among the most complicated code machines available at the time, but the Allied codes and ciphers were very vulnerable.
It makes you wonder why they didn't use their expertise in breaking codes to help develop a more secure system for themselves.
It was probably due to them not wanting too many people knowing that they could break Axis codes.

They did.
The British equivalent (actually an improved copy) to Enigma was TYPEX. The American equivilent was ECM Mark II, which was more secure than Enigma, but not as portable. TYPEX and ECM Mark II traffic was not compromised during the war.

With the Allies reading Enigma, were they aware that Doenitz was reading Royal Naval coded messages? If they were, someone somewhere needed a boot up his/her jacksy.

The British knew that 80 percent of the intercepted radio messages were read and they have probably used that knowledge to send false information to the Germans. However, only 10 percent of the intercepted radio messages were decrypted in time to take effective action.

 

[Trooper1854]

The British knew that 80 percent of the intercepted radio messages were read and they have probably used that knowledge to send false information to the Germans. However, only 10 percent of the intercepted radio messages were decrypted in time to take effective action.

This was done on numerous occaisions and was a well used ploy.
Leading up to the Battle of Midway, the Americans used the fact that they knew the Japanese were reading their codes to send false information, and leading up to D-Day the Allies did it with Fortitude, the decoy plan.
A whole wealth of coded radio traffic was transmitted between fake military units to make the Germans think the invasion was coming across the Pas De Calais.

 

[BritinBritain]

Another point to remember, the German agents in Britain had either been turned or faced the hangman's rope.

 

[VDKMS]

Securing the approaches of the port of Antwerp first,would mean
a)delaying the advance to Germany
b)delaying MG
At the end of august,the German front collapsed,but that would only be temporary ;thus,the only reasonable strategy was going eastwards,before the German front was repaired.

I disagree. Monty was chasing the Germans in Belgium but let them go because he was afraid to run out of fuel. He had still fuel for approx 200km for his tanks. He was too cautious, except for MG of course.

 

[VDKMS]

Germany lost the war because it was Germany, against the rest of the world.
They did not have the resources to fight a prolonged war.
They were not on a full war production footing until it was too late.
They relied too heavily on vanquished people to produce war goods.
They lacked essential resources.

Intelligence did play a very, very large part of their defeat.
There is nothing better in conflict than knowing what your enemy is going to do next. For example;
The Luftwaffe was a far superior force than the RAF in numbers, experience and tactics in 1940, but they were unable to defeat them because they were out maneuvered because the RAF had a better intelligence network due to Ultra and Radar.
In the Battle of the Atlantic, the U-Boats should have crippled Britain, but again due to Ultra, they were out maneuvered.
Never, ever underestimate the power of intelligence.
Historians with far more qualifications and experience than anyone here, have all agreed Bletchley Park's work shortened the war by at least two years.
If anyone wants to put down the work Station X did, they have a weak grasp on the history of WWII.

I like to add this : and without revealing they knew it. A very balancing act!

 

[lljadw]

the LW was not superior in numbers,experience and tactics :the pilots of FC were as good and as numerous as the Germans .The British tactics also were as good as the German ones .
And about the battle of the atlantic :Britain was loosing LESS GRT BEFORE Ultra(june 1941) than after Ultra .Thus,it seems that the deciding role of Ultra is a postwar invention by the BP boys .

 

[BritinBritain]

the LW was not superior in numbers,experience and tactics :the pilots of FC were as good and as numerous as the Germans .The British tactics also were as good as the German ones .
And about the battle of the atlantic :Britain was loosing LESS GRT BEFORE Ultra(june 1941) than after Ultra .Thus,it seems that the deciding role of Ultra is a postwar invention by the BP boys .

LOL I knew he'd try and contradict people who had actually been in military intelligence.

I don't know what makes you so stupid lljadw, but it really works!

Its better to keep quiet and let people think that you are an idiot rather then opening your mouth and confirming it.

 

[MontyB]

LOL I knew he'd try and contradict people who had actually been in military intelligence.

I don't know what makes you so stupid lljadw, but it really works!

Its better to keep quiet and let people think that you are an idiot rather then opening your mouth and confirming it.

Then how do you equate your response to the fact that what he said is correct?

The reality is that the influence of ULTRA in the Atlantic campaign can not be quantified due to the span of time over which the campaign was fought unlike for example Operation Luttich or the Battle of Midway where you can see the immediate effect of intelligence work.

I have no doubt that ULTRA helped the allied cause in some specific instances but you can't quantify its success or failure for example Freyberg was given the German plans for the invasion of Crete through ULTRA and he still lost, ULTRA like most intelligence gathering gives you and insight into what is going to happen but it does not win the battles for you.

Now is there any chance we can all stop getting angry when people disagree with us?

 

[Der Alte]

Enigma messages that were intercepted and decrypted at Bletchley Park were by this time (1940) known by their codeword “Boniface,” a name designed to make the Germans believe that source was an agent, not a deciphering system, an early attempt to keep Ultra and its decrypts a secret.​

By June, cryptanalysts were reading German messages in “real time.” These breakthroughs came at a desperate time for Great Britain, for in Spring of 1941, the total number of shipping losses from all causes, including U-Boats, aircrafts, mines, and surface raiders averaged over half a million tons a month. In May alone, U-Boats alone managed to sink 324,550 tons British shipping. ​

Once Bletchley Park’s cryptanalysts broke the naval code, the impact on the tonnage sunk by the Germans was noticeable. With a 320,000 tons loss in June, the number quickly dwindled to 98,000 tons in July, and 84,000 tons in August.

Sinkings of Allied merchant ships also dropped abruptly. In June, sixty-eight ships had been sunk, but only twenty-five ships were sunk in August and only ten in November. Unbeknownst to Dönitz, the British were successfully breaking the naval Enigma codes. By reading the messages between headquarters and the submarines, the Admiralty in London could determine the position of every U-Boat and their patrol lines and could reroute convoys around wolf packs. At the same time, Ultra decrypts alerted the Admiralty to the position of German surface raiders. For example, in November of 1941, the German raider Atlantis, while on her way back to Europe, was ordered to refuel U-Boats in the South Atlantic. Through Ultra intercepts, British intelligence was alerted to the ship’s change in course and could identify her new location. On November 22, a seaplane accompanying the British cruiser Devonshire identified the Atlantis, which was disguised as a Dutch ship. While the U-Boat dived, the Devonshire opened fire on the German raider, eventually sinking her. The crew of the Atlantis radioed for help, and the radio signals were intercepted and deciphered to reveal the location of the rescue and U-Boat supply ship. Days later the ship, Python, would also be sunk by the Devonshire’s sister ship, HMS Dorsetshire, while attempting to refuel U-Boats on her way to the wreck of the Atlantis.​

Ultra intelligence lay at “the hub of the whole Atlantic Battle,” because it gave the Allies knowledge of the positions of U-Boats at sea.​

 

[MontyB]

Enigma messages that were intercepted and decrypted at Bletchley Park were by this time (1940) known by their codeword “Boniface,” a name designed to make the Germans believe that source was an agent, not a deciphering system, an early attempt to keep Ultra and its decrypts a secret.​

By June, cryptanalysts were reading German messages in “real time.” These breakthroughs came at a desperate time for Great Britain, for in Spring of 1941, the total number of shipping losses from all causes, including U-Boats, aircrafts, mines, and surface raiders averaged over half a million tons a month. In May alone, U-Boats alone managed to sink 324,550 tons British shipping. ​

Once Bletchley Park’s cryptanalysts broke the naval code, the impact on the tonnage sunk by the Germans was noticeable. With a 320,000 tons loss in June, the number quickly dwindled to 98,000 tons in July, and 84,000 tons in August.

Sinkings of Allied merchant ships also dropped abruptly. In June, sixty-eight ships had been sunk, but only twenty-five ships were sunk in August and only ten in November. Unbeknownst to Dönitz, the British were successfully breaking the naval Enigma codes. By reading the messages between headquarters and the submarines, the Admiralty in London could determine the position of every U-Boat and their patrol lines and could reroute convoys around wolf packs. At the same time, Ultra decrypts alerted the Admiralty to the position of German surface raiders. For example, in November of 1941, the German raider Atlantis, while on her way back to Europe, was ordered to refuel U-Boats in the South Atlantic. Through Ultra intercepts, British intelligence was alerted to the ship’s change in course and could identify her new location. On November 22, a seaplane accompanying the British cruiser Devonshire identified the Atlantis, which was disguised as a Dutch ship. While the U-Boat dived, the Devonshire opened fire on the German raider, eventually sinking her. The crew of the Atlantis radioed for help, and the radio signals were intercepted and deciphered to reveal the location of the rescue and U-Boat supply ship. Days later the ship, Python, would also be sunk by the Devonshire’s sister ship, HMS Dorsetshire, while attempting to refuel U-Boats on her way to the wreck of the Atlantis.​

Ultra intelligence lay at “the hub of the whole Atlantic Battle,” because it gave the Allies knowledge of the positions of U-Boats at sea.​

I would at this point like to recommend a 1980 study by Commander Jerry C. Russell (United States Navy) and the subsequent paper "ULTRA AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE U-BOATS IN WORLD WAR II".

Here is his conclusion:

CONCLUSION
It is without doubt valid to state that Ultra was to some degree an effective tool for the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. Whether or not the war was shorter because of it can only be speculated.

Had it not been for the British and the fact that they were involved against the U-boat long before the United States entered the war, progress toward ultimate victory would have been far slower. Without a doubt the capture of the Enigma machine from U-110 by the British was the big break in Ultra in the early war years. The British efforts at Bletchley Park and at the Admiralty Tracking Room gave the United States a head start in organizing at C0MINCH and must have influenced the internal workings of OP-20G.

The cooperation that was evident at all other levels and in all other endeavors between the United States and the British during the war must have existed between OP-20G and Bletchley Park. No evidence to substantiate the degree of cooperation was found during this research. It is know that a secure link via trans-Atlantic cable existed between the Admiralty Operations Intelligence Center Tracking Room and COMINCH Combat Intelligence Atlantic Section. Each of these tracking rooms was securely linked with their own code breakers respectively. Thus, the communication links were available for tremendous amounts of cooperation. Moving convoys and sinking submarines are not simple tasks under the best of circumstances and it would appear logical that the greater the cooperation between Allies, the better. Agreement on the locations, numbers and dispositions of the U-boats would facilitate coordinated efforts to sink them. It would not appear logical to no longer
worry about a convoy because it had crossed the "chop" line into another country's responsibility area. Therefore, it must be assumed that agreement was reached at all levels, at least in a general way, as to the numbers and operating area of the U-boats.

Cracking the Triton code obviously gave the Allies some difficulties. It took ten months to do it and even then, large gaps and time delays were encountered in reading the traffic. As was seen, even if the basic cypher is broken, daily or periodically changing codes can cause difficulties in decryption. However, the Allies by the fall of 1943 had the system solidly in hand and read the U-boat message traffic currently the remainder of the war.

Ultra was as effective a tool as it was because of a conscious decision taken by Admiral Doenitz. In prosecuting the war with his submarine force he decided that the U-boat command ashore would control every event. This tight control was only possible by high frequency radio and this was his weak point. High frequency radios designed to transmit long distance omni-directionally can be received by anyone with a receiver tuned to the right frequency and within range. In this case, that was both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Doenitz did not have a Wolf Pack Commander at sea who was allowed to run the group tactics. All attacks on the convoys were directed from Headquarters ashore. Doenitz was relying on the experience possessed by him and his staff.

Any scheme of detailed direction from command ashore to units at sea requires the commander to have massive amounts of detailed knowledge which must be constantly updated. This means lots of high frequency radio traffic going both ways. This was the success of Ultra and the failure of Admiral

Doenitz. He may have suspected that his messages were being read by the Allies, but he must not have been convinced as he did nothing about it.

Ultra was closely held by the Allies, and even among the higher levels in both the Admiralty and COMINCH headquarters only a few people were aware of its existence. The United States perhaps used it more boldly than the British but there were always other sources that could account for the Allies' knowledge. For example, even the drubbing that the Hunter-Killer groups gave the U-tanker system could be rationalized. HFDF, though not terribly accurate, could proscribe a small enough area that it could be searched by aircraft, if you had enough available. In the case of some of the supply and refuel rendezvous, there was more than one carrier in the area. Thus there was usually sufficient radar equipped aircraft to cover fairly large ocean areas. Further, the German intelligence service seems to have been extremely recalcitrant about seriously considering that the German encryption system could be broken.

 

[Der Alte]

IMHO there is no doubt that the breaking of the German Enigma code was the one that gave the Allies the greatest strategic advantage in the war.

And as with so much else in life there will always be differing opinions on this topic. So the conclusion must be that we are some who believe in ULTRA and some who doubt its significance in the outcome of WWII.

All in all, a good discussion, gentleman. :cheers:

 

[BritinBritain]

Then how do you equate your response to the fact that what he said is correct?

Correct? He tries to contradict people who have served in Military Intelligence, he attributes the various historians on the importance of ULTRA as boasting. The idiot still insists (despite evidence to the contrary) that ULTRA played no or very little part in the Battle of the Atlantic or anywhere else for that matter.

The reality is that the influence of ULTRA in the Atlantic campaign can not be quantified due to the span of time over which the campaign was fought unlike for example Operation Luttich or the Battle of Midway where you can see the immediate effect of intelligence work.

Despite the fact that the Admiralty diverted convoys away from U Boat Wolf Packs not once but on many occasions, the German raider Atlantis was sunk because of ULTRA. Sorry I don't agree with you or your numbnut mate

I have no doubt that ULTRA helped the allied cause in some specific instances but you can't quantify its success or failure for example Freyberg was given the German plans for the invasion of Crete through ULTRA and he still lost, ULTRA like most intelligence gathering gives you and insight into what is going to happen but it does not win the battles for you.

The loss of Crete cannot be blamed on ULTRA, as is well known was the fault of poor command. The failure of Market Garden also cannot be laid at the feet of ULTRA, evidence was there from ULTRA and the Dutch Resistance that there was a SS Panzer unit in the area, but all the warnings were ignored by senior officers. One senior officer stated, "The operation took on a life all of it's own and couldn't be stopped.

I agree ULTRA on it's own doesn't win battles, its up to the various military commanders what they do with the information. Many commanders made excellent use of ULTRA, without ULTRA I can well believe WW2 could have gone on for another two years.

 

[MontyB]

IMHO there is no doubt that the breaking of the German Enigma code was the one that gave the Allies the greatest strategic advantage in the war.

And as with so much else in life there will always be differing opinions on this topic. So the conclusion must be that we are some who believe in ULTRA and some who doubt its significance in the outcome of WWII.

All in all, a good discussion, gentleman. :cheers:

Wohoo, two agree to disagree's in one week we have set an internet record.

I have very little doubt ULTRA and the breaking of Enigma saved allied lives but I do not believe it changed the outcome of the war.

 

[BritinBritain]

Wohoo, two agree to disagree's in one week we have set an internet record.

I have very little doubt ULTRA and the breaking of Enigma saved allied lives but I do not believe it changed the outcome of the war.

Without ULTRA Britain could have for example, lost Suez and a lot more besides.

As I have said before, reliable intelligence is vital in war time, without it an army can not only lose the battle, but lose the war.

 

[MontyB]

Without ULTRA Britain could have for example, lost Suez and a lot more besides.

As I have said before, reliable intelligence is vital in war time, without it an army can not only lose the battle, but lose the war.

But in reality without ULTRA Britain may not have lost the Suez or anything else, this is the point it is not something that can be determined.

The Russians seemed to do ok without ULTRA (lets face it they pretty much ignored all Western intelligence services).

 

[Der Alte]

Do you know Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rohwer? He is a German naval military historian and Professor of history at the University of Stuttgart and also a former WWII naval officer. He has has written more than 400 books. He is the leading German expert on the Battle of the Atlantic, Rohwer, does note:

I am sure that without the work of many unknown experts at Bletchley Park…the turning point of the Battle of the Atlantic could not have come as it did in May 1943, but months, perhaps many months, later. In that case the Allied invasion of Normandy could not have been possible in June 1944, and there would have ensued a chain of developments very different from the ones which we have experienced.

 

[Trooper1854]

But in reality without ULTRA Britain may not have lost the Suez or anything else, this is the point it is not something that can be determined.

The Russians seemed to do ok without ULTRA (lets face it they pretty much ignored all Western intelligence services).

Their advanced notice of Germany's upcoming offensive at Kursk was down to information given to them by Ultra.
And do not forget that Uncle Joe Stalin would not openly admit to getting help fromthe Western Allies because it just grated!
Stalin, and those who followed him, down played the West's contribution to the winning of WWII, and they were never ever officially told about Ultra because as the Soviet forces advanced, they captured Enigma Machines and started using them.
This is the main reason why Ultra, Station X and the whole thing was kept secret for so long after the end of the war.

 

[MontyB]

I have heard of him as I have about 6 of his books, I did not know he had produced 400 of them though.

I think we are arguing at cross purposes here, I don't think anyone is saying intelligence isn't important or that it didn't produce benefits for the Allies where the argument stalls is that I am saying it was not decisive in that it never affected the outcome of the war just its timeline.