Why did Germany lose WW2?

[MontyB]

About the myth of the 6 powerfull German PzD in France on DDay:
1SSPzD on 6 june :understrenght,undertrained,lacking in equipment :report on 15 may :the division is not combat ready .
Besides on 6 june,the LSSAH wat at Beverlo (near Antwerp),and it was out of the question it could be engaged on 6 june in Normandy (it took a month for the division to be present in Normandy)
2 SSPzd on 20 may,it claimed to be operational wth regard to training,but there was a severe shortage in transport;whatever,being in the South West of France,the division could not be engaged in Normandy at 6 june
12 SSPzD:considered operational for attack,but,missed its Panzerjägers,and the abilities of its leaders were doubtfull:there was an enormous shortage of officers,and,worse,of NCO
116 PzD :not operational(Afaics,it only was committed in august)
21 PzD :its tanks (French conversions) were second rate and outdated
PzLehr:a unit which never fulfilled the hopes put in it,it lacked its armoured artillery in the beginning .On 16 june,its CO(Bayerlein) wrote that lacking any more traiing possibilities,the level gained could not be bettered.
2 PzD :the only which was in good shape.
Source :Feldgrau:viewtopic.php?=45&t= 7858
The 3 SSPzD had a total of 321 tanks,1 and 2 SS had a total of 118 AG .

I would agree with this as the SS Panzer Corps had been heavily mauled in operations around the Cherkassy-Korsun pocket and during the relief of the 1st Panzer Army in the Kamenetz-Podolsk Pocket in late March which included elements of Liebstandate and Das Riech, Liebstandarte had suffered so many casualties that on the 6th of March 1944 the Division was down to 5 Panthers, 1 Tiger and 3 Assault guns.

Also as pointed out Liebstandarte did not leave Belgium until the 17th of June and began assembling in the Foret de Cinglais (between Calais and Falaise) between the 23rd of June and the 6th of July.

The fact is that most of the Panzer Divisions in France on D-Day were not in a fit state to repell an invasion.

 

[BritinBritain]

I see that again,you are giving irrelevant figures :the number of ships lost in 1940 (or in another year) are irrelevant :the important is
a) how many GRT did Britain have on 1 january 1940,and how much on 1 january 1941 (Britain had more in 1 january 1941),etc,
b) what were the needs of Britain ? =how much GRT did she need
c) was there any moment during the war she was in trouble because of the UBoats? (the answer is :no)
d) the build up of the US Army in Britain did not start after may 1943(when the UBoats definitivelywere defeated),but only 6 months later,because,in may 1943,the US Army was not ready
e)as the UBoats never had the possibility to force Britain to give up,and,as there is no mea to calculate how many GRT was saved by Enigma( if a convoy was not delayed,that does not mean that it would be sunk),the claim by the BP boys about the decisive importance of Enigma,is only propaganda .
Every one was claiming that they won the war :Enigma,the SOE,BC,FC;the Navy,the resistance,and,it only is propaganda .

Losing ships is irrelevant? You are an idiot.

In 1940 Britain was on her knee's, she needed everything she could get her hands on.

What were the needs of Britain? Your the so called expert, you tell me.

Then Churchill's statement referring to the U boats "It was the only fear I had throughout the entire war " was unfounded? You are an even bigger idiot then I thought you were.

In 1943 the U Boats were defeated?

Of 1,170 completed U-boats, 863 became operational, sinking 2,840 ships of over 14-million GRT. Included were two battleships, three aircraft carriers, five escort carriers, six cruisers, and forty-one destroyers.

By February 1944 - D-Day mere months away and the war at its most intense - the U-boat force was also at its most powerful, with 447 boats in service. And in April 1944, the first of the revolutionary Type XXI boats came into service, new torpedoes were introduced, and the schnorkel device gave the boats extended endurance and survivability. U-boats were now true submersibles. No other navy had that capability.

No one group has stated they won the war, it's your imagination running riot again.

In any war, intelligence is vital, without it men's lives, vital equipment and supplies will be lost with the possible result that the battle and perhaps the war could be lost. Cooks are vital, pay clerks are vital, truck drivers are vital, store men are vital, parachute packers are vital, aero engine and airframe mechs are vital, they all did their bit as did SOE, OSS, and the staff at Bletchley Park.

I'm surprised that Sandhurst hasn't snapped you up to lecture up and coming Ruperts with your version of events during WW2 thereby teaching them how not to fight a war.

 

[Korean Seaboy]

I see that again,you are giving irrelevant figures :the number of ships lost in 1940 (or in another year) are irrelevant :the important is
a) how many GRT did Britain have on 1 january 1940,and how much on 1 january 1941 (Britain had more in 1 january 1941),etc,
b) what were the needs of Britain ? =how much GRT did she need
c) was there any moment during the war she was in trouble because of the UBoats? (the answer is :no)
d) the build up of the US Army in Britain did not start after may 1943(when the UBoats definitivelywere defeated),but only 6 months later,because,in may 1943,the US Army was not ready
e)as the UBoats never had the possibility to force Britain to give up,and,as there is no mea to calculate how many GRT was saved by Enigma( if a convoy was not delayed,that does not mean that it would be sunk),the claim by the BP boys about the decisive importance of Enigma,is only propaganda .
Every one was claiming that they won the war :Enigma,the SOE,BC,FC;the Navy,the resistance,and,it only is propaganda .

Ah, so I guess the British rationed everything from nylon to bread just for fun eh? They were so short of energy that TV programs were all cut off until 1948 which is 3 years after the war, and many rationing continued until 1950, which was 5 years after the war was finished

 

[lljadw]

Rationing started immediately on 3 september 1939,when Enigma was not active,and BEFORE the start of the UBoatWar .Thus,your post is of topic

 

[lljadw]

Losing ships is irrelevant? You are an idiot.

In 1940 Britain was on her knee's, she needed everything she could get her hands on.

What were the needs of Britain? Your the so called expert, you tell me.

Then Churchill's statement referring to the U boats "It was the only fear I had throughout the entire war " was unfounded? You are an even bigger idiot then I thought you were.

In 1943 the U Boats were defeated?

Of 1,170 completed U-boats, 863 became operational, sinking 2,840 ships of over 14-million GRT. Included were two battleships, three aircraft carriers, five escort carriers, six cruisers, and forty-one destroyers.

By February 1944 - D-Day mere months away and the war at its most intense - the U-boat force was also at its most powerful, with 447 boats in service. And in April 1944, the first of the revolutionary Type XXI boats came into service, new torpedoes were introduced, and the schnorkel device gave the boats extended endurance and survivability. U-boats were now true submersibles. No other navy had that capability.

No one group has stated they won the war, it's your imagination running riot again.

In any war, intelligence is vital, without it men's lives, vital equipment and supplies will be lost with the possible result that the battle and perhaps the war could be lost. Cooks are vital, pay clerks are vital, truck drivers are vital, store men are vital, parachute packers are vital, aero engine and airframe mechs are vital, they all did their bit as did SOE, OSS, and the staff at Bletchley Park.

I'm surprised that Sandhurst hasn't snapped you up to lecture up and coming Ruperts with your version of events during WW2 thereby teaching them how not to fight a war.

I see that you are not capable to read a post :I never said that losing ships was irrelevant :I said that giving the number of ships that were sunk,is irrelevant .
And,Britain was not on her knees in june 1940 :she was in a better position than Germany :Germany was incapable to defeat Britain .
In may 1943,it was over for the UBoatsönitz had no other option than to withdraw his UBoats .

 

[BritinBritain]

Rationing started immediately on 3 september 1939,when Enigma was not active,and BEFORE the start of the UBoatWar .Thus,your post is of topic

No its not off topic, its spot on. His only error was that rationing didn't stop until 1954.

As for rationing lijadw, get your facts straight. as usual you prattle on without knowing the full facts.

Meat wasn't rationed until March 1940, Cheese May 1941, Tinned tomatoes February 1942, Rice Jan 1942, Jam Mar 1941, Biscuits Aug 1942, Tea Jul 1940, Cheese May 1941, Eggs June 1941, Tinned tomatoes Feb. 1942, Peas Feb. 1942, Dried fruit Jan 1942, Cooking fat Jul 1940

Other foods were rationed immediately.

Some foods such as potatoes, fruit and fish were not rationed.

And of course cigarettes, petrol and clothing was rationed

I see that you are not capable to read a post :I never said that losing ships was irrelevant :I said that giving the number of ships that were sunk,is irrelevant .
And,Britain was not on her knees in june 1940 :she was in a better position than Germany :Germany was incapable to defeat Britain .
In may 1943,it was over for the UBoatsönitz had no other option than to withdraw his UBoats .

I did read your post, any ship sunk no matter the number is not irrelevant.

Britain wasn't on her knee's? Are you serious??? The British Army was well below strength, it was issued with outdated equipment, civilian trucks were commandeered they were so short of transport. Thankfully the USA supplied Britain with guns, tanks, aircraft, ammunition, food and so on, which gave Britain at least a fighting chance.

So the ships lost after May 1943 were sunk by mermaids or deep sea monsters or a figment of the Admiralties imagination?

Jan (49) Feb (88) Mar (131) Apr (57) May (49) Jun (27)
Jul (59) Aug (30) Sep (25) Oct (31) Nov (16) Dec (17)
579 ships hit in 1943.

1944
Jan (20) Feb (28) Mar (22) Apr (12) May (17) Jun (22)
Jul (27) Aug (37) Sep (15) Oct (10) Nov (11) Dec (25)
246 ships hit in 1944.

1945
Jan (24) Feb (24) Mar (21) Apr (23) May (6)
98 ships hit in 1945.

 

[lljadw]

The question is not what was rationed in 1939,but,why there was rationing .And,why was there rationing in september 1939? Not because of the UBoats,but because of money :before the war,Britain was importing a lot of food (and other things),and using its foreign currencies for this.During the war,imports were restricted,because the foreign currencies and the ships were needed to buy and to transport war material .
After the war,rationing continued (and,if I am not wrong,the Uboats had disappeared),because,imports were restricted:there only were few foreign currencies,and these were used to buy more important things than food :to repair the economy .

 

[lljadw]

About the fact that in may 1943,it was over for the U Boats:
in 1944,the Germans lost 249 UBoats,and were sinking 132 merchant ships .

 

[BritinBritain]

The question is not what was rationed in 1939,but,why there was rationing .And,why was there rationing in september 1939? Not because of the UBoats,but because of money :before the war,Britain was importing a lot of food (and other things),and using its foreign currencies for this.During the war,imports were restricted,because the foreign currencies and the ships were needed to buy and to transport war material .
After the war,rationing continued (and,if I am not wrong,the Uboats had disappeared),because,imports were restricted:there only were few foreign currencies,and these were used to buy more important things than food :to repair the economy .

I'd hazard a guess and say some items were rationed in 1939 so what stocks there were would last longer.

Again I'd hazard another guess and suggest that the Merchant Fleet had to be built up to replace those lost during the war, so no luxuries were imported only vital foods. Besides which Britain was virtually bankrupt.

About the fact that in may 1943,it was over for the U Boats:
in 1944,the Germans lost 249 UBoats,and were sinking 132 merchant ships .

Hmm the U Boats were in port yet managed to not only lose 249 U boats, but managed to sink 132 merchant ships. I'd call that damn clever wouldn't you?

You change the topic to try and suit your views, to quote you, "Every one was claiming that they won the war :Enigma,the SOE,BC,FC;the Navy,the resistance,and,it only is propaganda." Then you begin prattling on that the U Boats were not effective and basically Churchill was worrying over nothing, the oil in the Middle east was irrelevant.

If I were you I'd stick to knitting.

 

[Der Alte]

What exactly is Blitzkrieg?

War, suggests an overall strategic concept of war. This means that the definition used by many for Blitzkrieg suggests the need for a different word such as Blitzoperationen (lightning operations) or Blitzfeldzuege (lightning campaigns) which would define the term more properly. Blitzkrieg is a strategic term that had been used prior to World War I and can be traced to Germany’s politically defined wartime objectives in direct relation to the political environment in Germany since the 1890s. But what exactly is Blitzkrieg if the popular definition does not fit?

Blitzkrieg is not the simple tactic that many historians make it out to be. Blitzkrieg was created out of necessity and is about annihilation of the enemy. It has been a strategy that influenced the German General Staff since the 1890s because of the fear of a two front war. A quick decision or victory was necessary in the West in order to be able to fight the Russians on the Eastern Front. In order to win decisively, annihilation of the enemy was necessary and the only complete way to annihilate the enemy is through encirclement. The strategy was formed prior to the use of these tactics of World War II, and can be traced back to the decades leading to World War I. It was the propaganda machines of different countries which termed this strategy’s tactics as the infamous Blitzkrieg in today’s history books. In conclusion, Blitzkrieg was the strategy used by Germany ever since the 1890s and was a direct result from the geopolitical position of Germany. General Heinz Guderian wrote in his book Panzer Leader, that “the German nation is no more warlike than the other nations of Europe but it lives in the middle of the house and therefore in its long and varied history has seldom managed to avoid involvement in its neighbors’ conflicts. As a result of this both its statesmen and its military leaders have repeatedly been confronted with difficult, if not actually insoluble problems. In view of its limited resources Germany has always striven for a rapid end to any conflict and has of necessity done its best to avoid long wars of attrition and the danger of intervention by third parties. One of the military leaders Guderian is referring to in the above statement is Schlieffen and his idea of annihilation of the enemy. The geography of Germany was the cause for Bismarck’s statesmanship, Schlieffen’s attempted military solution, and Hitler’s drive to the East or Drang nach Osten.

According to Clausewitz, “War is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means”, meaning war is fundamentally political in character and that war must serve policy. Strategic success which is the attainment of political aims and the protection of national interests is what matters most in any war. Germany’s strategy came into existence out of the geopolitical environment of Europe. It was a question of national survival and economics which guided German political and military leaders throughout the late 19th and 20th century. Prussia and later Germany’s leaders recognized that wars had to be “Kurtz and vives” (short and lively) due to being crammed into an unfortunately tight spot in the heart of the continent, ringed by enemies and potential enemies and without the resources nor the manpower to win long, drawn-out wars of attrition. The need for a way to fight short, sharp wars which ended rapidly in a decisive battlefield victory leaving the enemy too weak or too frightened to consider a second round would become the means of Germany to guarantee its national interests and survival. Leaders assessed the strategic landscape of Europe and determined ever since the birth of Prussia and later Germany, that the only way to fight successfully is by striking the enemy with a sharp and possible annihilating blow as rapidly as possible through the use of movement of large units which was referred to as Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) This was the solution in the operational level but the overall Blitzkrieg strategy was formulated with the co-operation between the political, economic and military agencies that defined the political wartime objectives.

At the end, Blitzkrieg was the endeavor to strengthen Germany’s economy, military and political status in the world by using Blitzoperationnen which were conducted to overwhelm the enemies, one after the other, in a series of individual, successive campaigns that would only last a short time. By isolating a particular opponent and thus localizing the conflict, it would be possible to avoid the risk of a long, drawn out, multi-front war of attrition which clearly defines the foreign policy objective of Germany’s strategy. These Blitzoperationnen were further more conducted to strengthen Germany’s economy, military power and its need for raw materials which were all requirements that had to be satisfied before the next Blitzoperation against another enemy could be conducted. By conducting only localized, short and decisive campaigns, the civilian population stayed motivated and the wars would not become a strain on the endurance of the people as well as the existing economy which meant that a war economy and its restrictions on the civilian population was not put into effect. Germany’s economy had to be mobilized to some extent, especially in the beginning of the Blitzkrieg due to the indispensable prerequisite of a strategic first-strike capacity, but with the successful taking of other countries, the wartime mobilization in the homeland was downgraded tremendously due to the foreign economies which were used extensively in the following Blitzoperationnen. Another aspect of the strategy was the use of political means to gain new territory whenever possible. By finding weak points in the collective security of Europe and using economical and political infiltration tactics, new territories can be won without any rifle fire. These territories fall into the economical war machine and strengthen the overall machine in support of the next Blitzoperation.

The Germans evolved a certain pattern of war making from their culture and traditions, and especially their geographic position. This “German Way of War” is Blitzkrieg and its purpose is to maintain the survival and security of Germany; gain political, militarily and territorial power; and increase its economic stability. All these purposes are in direct relation to the geography of Germany which explains the reasons for the similarities between the two World Wars. At the end, the only difference is the means with which nations fight one another, but the national strategy stays the same.

 

[lljadw]

I'd hazard a guess and say some items were rationed in 1939 so what stocks there were would last longer.

Again I'd hazard another guess and suggest that the Merchant Fleet had to be built up to replace those lost during the war, so no luxuries were imported only vital foods. Besides which Britain was virtually bankrupt.



Hmm the U Boats were in port yet managed to not only lose 249 U boats, but managed to sink 132 merchant ships. I'd call that damn clever wouldn't you?

You change the topic to try and suit your views, to quote you, "Every one was claiming that they won the war :Enigma,the SOE,BC,FC;the Navy,the resistance,and,it only is propaganda." Then you begin prattling on that the U Boats were not effective and basically Churchill was worrying over nothing, the oil in the Middle east was irrelevant.

If I were you I'd stick to knitting.

Who said that the ME oil was vital ?
Who said that the UBoats were not defeated in may 1943?
Who said that Britain was on her knees in june 1940?(while she had a a strong navy,the Germans had none,while she had a strong RAF,the LW was very weakened,while the Home Forces were strong enough to repel a German landing)
Etc
About the UBoats,the facts are contradicting Winston's statements in his memoires:
In september 1939,Britain and the US had a merchantfleet of 26.6 million of GRT;during the war,Britain,the US and Canada did build some 47.8 million ton GRT;during the war,the allies received the aid of the merchant navies of Norway,Denmark,Belgium,Holland,Greece(some 10 million ton),during the war,the allies captured the main part of the German and Italian merchant navies (1 million ton):total:85.4 million ton.All this dwarfed the losses caused by the U Boats (14 million ton),and the allies ended the war with 70 million ton (losses by other causes not included) :
these figures prove that the U Boats never had a chance to starve Britain .
These figures also prove that the boasting by BP that,without Enigma,Overlord would be delayed for 2 years are only boastings.
Besides,already BEFORE may 1943,the U Boats were helpless :in november 1942,the US were sending thousands of men over the ocean to Morocco(operation Torch),WITHOUT any losses

 

[VDKMS]

One thing I have not read in this tread is the rivalry among commanders that can have an influence on the outcome of a battle or the war.

In my opinion ( I'm not an expert, so don't shoot at me ) the disaster of Market Garden was because of the rivalry between Patton and Montgomery to be first in Berlin. The operation Market Garden began only as Garden, Market (airborne) was added later propably because Brereton wanted some action for his airborne troops and wanted (did?) talk to Patton to use them in south-western Germany so Patton could cross the Rhine and drive straight to Berlin. ( in France Patton was faster to hit the target than the paratroopers to get into the planes)
By adding Market to the operation Montgomery was sure that Patton couldn't move because all the airborne troops were needed for his opearation as was the bulk of the resources coming from the ports in France. Securing the port of Antwerp would mean more time lost to be first in Berlin. Montgomery knew the panzers were in the neighborhood. He was also a very cautious commander and only made his move when he was 110% sure of victory. Markey Garden was a very risky operation and his last chance to get to Berlin before Patton. Eisenhower was propably aware of it and let the Russians fight for Berlin (there was also a rivalry to get into Berlin first). It saved a lot of allied casualties and a major embarrassment for one commander.

The Belgians had the German invasion plans when a plane with the documents crashed in Belgium (a policeman burnt his hand by taking the documents out a burning stove while interrogating the Germans) but Hitler reckoned that the allies would believe that the plans would now be changed. He was right.

You cannot win a war with intelligence but it can tip the scale.

 

[MontyB]

So the ships lost after May 1943 were sunk by mermaids or deep sea monsters or a figment of the Admiralties imagination?

Jan (49) Feb (88) Mar (131) Apr (57) May (49) Jun (27)
Jul (59) Aug (30) Sep (25) Oct (31) Nov (16) Dec (17)
579 ships hit in 1943.

1944
Jan (20) Feb (28) Mar (22) Apr (12) May (17) Jun (22)
Jul (27) Aug (37) Sep (15) Oct (10) Nov (11) Dec (25)
246 ships hit in 1944.

1945
Jan (24) Feb (24) Mar (21) Apr (23) May (6)
98 ships hit in 1945.

I think you may also be over looking those sunk by aircraft, mines, coastal defences and surface ships, of the total tonnage sunk during WW2 Uboats accounted for around two thirds the rest were sunk by other sources.

June 1943 to May 1944:
Submarines sunk 216 ships for a total of 1,219,000 tons
Aircraft sunk 64 ships for a total of 378,000 tons
Mines sunk 19 ships for a total of 55,000 tons
Raiders sunk 4 ships for a total of 35,000 tons
Other causes sunk 9 ships for a total of 20,000 tons
Coastal forces sunk 11 ships for a total of 18,000 tons
Warships sunk 1 ship for a total of 8,000 tons


Total for Sept 1939 to August 1945
Submarines sunk 2,828 ships for a total of 14,868,000 tons
Aircraft sunk 820 ships for a total of 2,890,000 tons
Mines sunk 534 ships for a total of 1,406,000 tons
Other causes sunk 632 ships for a total of 1,030,000 tons
Raiders sunk 133 ships for a total of 830,000 tons
Warships sunk 104 ships for a total of 498,000 tons
Coastal forces sunk 99 ships for a total of 230,000 tons

Total Losses = 5,150 British, Allied and neutral ships of 21,570,000 tons (300,000 tons per month)

Now for something in support of lljadw's argument here,
"In concentrating on losses, it should not be overlooked that taking the war as a whole, well over 99% of merchantmen reached their destination safely."


Source: Naval History - Uboats at war.

 

[lljadw]

One thing I have not read in this tread is the rivalry among commanders that can have an influence on the outcome of a battle or the war.

In my opinion ( I'm not an expert, so don't shoot at me ) the disaster of Market Garden was because of the rivalry between Patton and Montgomery to be first in Berlin. The operation Market Garden began only as Garden, Market (airborne) was added later propably because Brereton wanted some action for his airborne troops and wanted (did?) talk to Patton to use them in south-western Germany so Patton could cross the Rhine and drive straight to Berlin. ( in France Patton was faster to hit the target than the paratroopers to get into the planes)
By adding Market to the operation Montgomery was sure that Patton couldn't move because all the airborne troops were needed for his opearation as was the bulk of the resources coming from the ports in France. Securing the port of Antwerp would mean more time lost to be first in Berlin. Montgomery knew the panzers were in the neighborhood. He was also a very cautious commander and only made his move when he was 110% sure of victory. Markey Garden was a very risky operation and his last chance to get to Berlin before Patton. Eisenhower was propably aware of it and let the Russians fight for Berlin (there was also a rivalry to get into Berlin first). It saved a lot of allied casualties and a major embarrassment for one commander.

The Belgians had the German invasion plans when a plane with the documents crashed in Belgium (a policeman burnt his hand by taking the documents out a burning stove while interrogating the Germans) but Hitler reckoned that the allies would believe that the plans would now be changed. He was right.

You cannot win a war with intelligence but it can tip the scale.[/QUOTE
Something that always is forgotten about MG:the airborne troops mainly were US,at Eindhoven and Nijmegen,the US 82 and 101 AB were committed .Critics of Monty always should be countered with
1) Ike was supreme commander
2) If Ike did not believe in the success of MG,he would not risk the lives of a lot of Americans.
The whole MG thing is only the usual search of a scapegoat (Monty,Ike,the intelligence) and the refusal to admit that the Germans defeated the allies .
It is the same on Barbarossa :the German generals refused to admit that they were defeated by the Soviets and had a lot of scape-goats :Hitler (of course),the weather (we all know it only was cold on the German side,...)
If Liverpool is defeated by Chelsea,the reaction in Liverpool will be :it is impossible that these....... from Chelsea could defeat us,thus ,the culprit is :the referee,the coach,the weather ....
It is always the same :chauvinism.

 

[MontyB]

I also think that the overall plan for MG was a gamble right from the start, the idea to send an armoured corps up a single road was always going to be dicey given the German anti-armour capabilities, landing the British airborne contingent so far from its target and in multiple stages was going to be a problem.

On the whole I think the thing they all overlooked with regards to Market Garden was the German ability to recover and adapt to changes, in other words they underestimated the enemy.

 

[Der Alte]

On the whole I think the thing they all overlooked with regards to Market Garden was the German ability to recover and adapt to changes, in other words they underestimated the enemy.

Yes that, and the fact that many extremely able senior commanders was in and around the Market Garden area. These included Field Marshal Walther Model, commander of Army Group B, who had recently sited his headquarters in Oosterbeek alongside one of the British 1st Airborne Division's intended routes to Arnhem. Model had helped to create growing order out of the chaos of early September and was in the process of reinforcing his front. One of his new formations was the First Parachute Army, commanded by the skillful Gen. Kurt Student, which had its headquarters just off the main Eindhoven–Nijmegen highway. Bittrich's panzer corps was located just twenty-five miles from Arnhem. All three men had developed contingency plans for an Allied attack and ensured that they could counter quickly. Because the troops weren't scattered, the Germans could easily pinpoint where they had hit the ground and make a quick deduction of the likely objectives of the Allied operation.

 

[George]

I also think that the overall plan for MG was a gamble right from the start, the idea to send an armoured corps up a single road was always going to be dicey given the German anti-armour capabilities, landing the British airborne contingent so far from its target and in multiple stages was going to be a problem.

On the whole I think the thing they all overlooked with regards to Market Garden was the German ability to recover and adapt to changes, in other words they underestimated the enemy.

According to the comments @ the end of the book "A bridge too far" The planners would have had a better chance if they had bothered to ask the Dutch Oddicers available to them how to, or how not to invade. Seems the invasion was a standard test @ the Dutch military Acadamy & those who planed a M-G attack failed the test.
U-boats: The difficulties with torpedoes that the US sub fleet had it well known. Apparently the U-boats had many problems with their's, seems a lot of merchant ships & warships survived because of faulty German fuzes. A Battleship with 1st sea Lord Churchill on board was hit, but the torpedo didn't detonate, considering how other British battleships had a habit of blowing up....the War might have had a considerable change.

 

[MontyB]

According to the comments @ the end of the book "A bridge too far" The planners would have had a better chance if they had bothered to ask the Dutch Oddicers available to them how to, or how not to invade. Seems the invasion was a standard test @ the Dutch military Acadamy & those who planed a M-G attack failed the test.

One of the things I have never really understood with MG is why there ws little attempt to widen the breech that XXX Corps was creating and in doing so drawing in German reinforcements away from Arnhem while giving XXX corps some protection.

I understand the terrain was always going to be an issue but sending an armoured corps up and elevated road without protection seems like a plan doomed to fail.

 

[BritinBritain]

I think you may also be over looking those sunk by aircraft, mines, coastal defences and surface ships, of the total tonnage sunk during WW2 Uboats accounted for around two thirds the rest were sunk by other sources.

June 1943 to May 1944:
Submarines sunk 216 ships for a total of 1,219,000 tons
Aircraft sunk 64 ships for a total of 378,000 tons
Mines sunk 19 ships for a total of 55,000 tons
Raiders sunk 4 ships for a total of 35,000 tons
Other causes sunk 9 ships for a total of 20,000 tons
Coastal forces sunk 11 ships for a total of 18,000 tons
Warships sunk 1 ship for a total of 8,000 tons


Total for Sept 1939 to August 1945
Submarines sunk 2,828 ships for a total of 14,868,000 tons
Aircraft sunk 820 ships for a total of 2,890,000 tons
Mines sunk 534 ships for a total of 1,406,000 tons
Other causes sunk 632 ships for a total of 1,030,000 tons
Raiders sunk 133 ships for a total of 830,000 tons
Warships sunk 104 ships for a total of 498,000 tons
Coastal forces sunk 99 ships for a total of 230,000 tons

Total Losses = 5,150 British, Allied and neutral ships of 21,570,000 tons (300,000 tons per month)

Now for something in support of lljadw's argument here,
"In concentrating on losses, it should not be overlooked that taking the war as a whole, well over 99% of merchantmen reached their destination safely."


Source: Naval History - Uboats at war.

The figures I gave were for loses due to U Boat action alone and the effect of Ultra and other innovations such as ship borne radar had in reducing sinking of merchant ships. I did not over look other causes of ships sunk as they were not part of the discussion. As you yourself stated two thirds were sunk by U Boats.

As 99% of merchantmen reached their destinations safely confirms my argument that Ultra and other innovations had a bearing on losses which lljadw denies or boasting as he calls it.

However, that 99% reaching safety included the whole of the war where very few if any ships were sunk. What was the percentage of ships sunk before effective counter measures were introduced for example PQ17 where 23 ships out of 34 were sunk.

 

[BritinBritain]

Who said that the ME oil was vital ?

I'd hazard a guess and say that the German Army considered it vital, or are you saying the German Army didn't need it?

Who said that the UBoats were not defeated in may 1943?

I reckon those who died or badly burned when their ship was sunk from under then would have something to say along those lines.

Who said that Britain was on her knees in june 1940?(while she had a a strong navy,the Germans had none,while she had a strong RAF,the LW was very weakened,while the Home Forces were strong enough to repel a German landing)

How many times do you have to be told that the vast majority of the British Army's equipment stayed on the beaches at Dunkirk.

There was only one fully equipped division in Britain commanded by B. L. Montgomery

About the UBoats,the facts are contradicting Winston's statements in his memoires:

So you are saying that you know more then Churchill knew?
How clever of you.

In september 1939,Britain and the US had a merchantfleet of 26.6 million of GRT;during the war,Britain,the US and Canada did build some 47.8 million ton GRT;during the war,the allies received the aid of the merchant navies of Norway,Denmark,Belgium,Holland,Greece(some 10 million ton),during the war,the allies captured the main part of the German and Italian merchant navies (1 million ton):total:85.4 million ton.All this dwarfed the losses caused by the U Boats (14 million ton),and the allies ended the war with 70 million ton (losses by other causes not included) :
these figures prove that the U Boats never had a chance to starve Britain .

The Allies captured Italian and German Merchant ships? When did this miracle happen? 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945? Delete the years not applicable.

These figures also prove that the boasting by BP that,without Enigma,Overlord would be delayed for 2 years are only boastings.

Don''t talk absolute bollocks. You have absolutely no idea how vital intelligence is.

Besides,already BEFORE may 1943,the U Boats were helpless

So helpless they sank 579 ships, and all the time they were in port.

in november 1942,the US were sending thousands of men over the ocean to Morocco(operation Torch),WITHOUT any losses

Just goes to show how important Ultra was doesn't it numbnut