Why did Germany lose WW2?

[lljadw]

In 194O,more than 8000 ships were entering British harbors (imports were 41.9 million tons) and ...also were leaving British harbours;this is without military transports,of the 16000 ships,471(3 %) were sunk by U Boats.
While in 1941,the imports decreased to 30.5 million tons (6000 ships,LL not included)of the 12000 ships entering and leaving British harbours,432 were lost by U Boats (4 %)
In september 1939,Britain had a merchant fleet of 17.7 million ton,till 31 december 1941,it lost 4.8 million ton by U Boats,it built 2.2 million ton,and it received 6 million ton from Denmark,Norway,Holland and Belgium (tonnage received /captured from France,Greece,Italy and Germany not included)
A reasonable guess is that the British/allied merchant navies (without the US) were 30 % stronger on 31 december 1941 than at the start of the war .
IMHO,that means that at 31 december 1941,the Germans had failed not only to starve Britain,but also to weaken the British merchant navy.

 

[BritinBritain]

In 194O,more than 8000 ships were entering British harbors (imports were 41.9 million tons) and ...also were leaving British harbours;this is without military transports,of the 16000 ships,471(3 %) were sunk by U Boats.
While in 1941,the imports decreased to 30.5 million tons (6000 ships,LL not included)of the 12000 ships entering and leaving British harbours,432 were lost by U Boats (4 %)
In september 1939,Britain had a merchant fleet of 17.7 million ton,till 31 december 1941,it lost 4.8 million ton by U Boats,it built 2.2 million ton,and it received 6 million ton from Denmark,Norway,Holland and Belgium (tonnage received /captured from France,Greece,Italy and Germany not included)
A reasonable guess is that the British/allied merchant navies (without the US) were 30 % stronger on 31 december 1941 than at the start of the war .
IMHO,that means that at 31 december 1941,the Germans had failed not only to starve Britain,but also to weaken the British merchant navy.

So you are saying Churchill was wrong and you are right?

At one stage, ships were being sunk faster then they could be built, yet you still say Churchill was wrong and you are right? Are you still saying that Ultra played very little part in convoy safety?

How strange that you change tack whenever you are proven wrong.

 

[lljadw]

I am saying that the facts are proving Winston wrong ,I am not the only who is saying this :the eminent naval historian Clay Blair also is saying the same :what Churchill was writing in his memoires is wrong .
Saying that ships were being sunk faster than they could be built is disingenious: on 31 december 1941,Britain had more GRT than on 1 september 1939,much more,(7 million ton) ,this proves
1) that on 31 december 1941,Britain had won the battle of the atlantic and the U Boats had lost
2) that in this period there never was a danger that Britain would be starved
3) that is this period,Enigma had NO big influence on the U Boat War ,unless you can prove than without Enigma,the Boats would not sink 4.8 million ton,but 12 million ton .
I will wait for your proofs,but,even if the calfs are dancing on the ice,you will not be able to prove the decisive importance of Enigma .

 

[BritinBritain]

I am saying that the facts are proving Winston wrong ,I am not the only who is saying this :the eminent naval historian Clay Blair also is saying the same :what Churchill was writing in his memoires is wrong .
Saying that ships were being sunk faster than they could be built is disingenious: on 31 december 1941,Britain had more GRT than on 1 september 1939,much more,(7 million ton) ,this proves
1) that on 31 december 1941,Britain had won the battle of the atlantic and the U Boats had lost
2) that in this period there never was a danger that Britain would be starved
3) that is this period,Enigma had NO big influence on the U Boat War ,unless you can prove than without Enigma,the Boats would not sink 4.8 million ton,but 12 million ton .
I will wait for your proofs,but,even if the calfs are dancing on the ice,you will not be able to prove the decisive importance of Enigma .

Again you are talking absolute bollocks.

"till 31 december 1941,it lost 4.8 million ton by U Boats,it built 2.2 million ton" Your own words numbnut. That's 2.6 millions tons shortfall

Britain had won the battle of the Atlantic by the end of 1941? Whatever you are smoking I'd like some.

1942 the year you claim the U Boat menace was beaten.

January Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 48 British, Allied and neutral ships of 277,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 3 escorts

February Monthly Loss Summary
- 73 British, Allied and neutral ships of 430,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 2 corvettes and 2 US destroyers off Newfoundland and the US east coast.

March Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 98 British, Allied and neutral ships of 547,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes.

April Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 74 British, Allied and neutral ships of 439,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 US destroyer mined off Florida

May Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 122 British, Allied and neutral ships of 585,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 1 submarine

June Monthly Loss Summary
- 128 British, Allied and neutral ships of 650,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 destroyer and 1 submarine

July Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 101 British, Allied and neutral ships of 511,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes

August Monthly Loss Summary
- 106 British, Allied and neutral ships of 544,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 US destroyer by collision off Nova Scotia

September Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 102 British, Allied and neutral ships of 531,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 5 escorts

October Monthly Loss Summary
- 82 British, Allied and neutral ships of 548,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 cruiser

November Monthly Loss Summary
- British, Allied and neutral ships of 567,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 escort carrier, 1 destroyer and 1 corvette

December Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 54 British, Allied and neutral ships of 305,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 3 escorts

Not bad for a spent force wouldn't you say?

The role of intelligence
Intelligence was the other major factor in this second Battle of the Atlantic. Both sides at various times were able to read the signal traffic of the other. Britain's ability to break the Enigma codes, and the resulting 'Ultra' intelligence was a priceless advantage, particularly after the Royal Navy seized an Enigma machine from a captured U-boat in May 1941. Armed with information about where U-boats were patrolling, the British were able to move convoys in safe areas, away from the wolfpacks.

However, the code-breakers at Bletchley Park had a constant battle to keep their information current. German changes to the naval Enigma code at the beginning of 1942 led to a rise in Allied sinkings, as the flow of Ultra intelligence temporarily ceased.
This problem was compounded by the fact that although the USA had entered the war, it did not immediately put into place some protective measures - such as introducing convoys, and 'blacking out' coastal towns. A handful of U-boats operating on the North American and Caribbean seaboards area in the first half of 1942 accounted for nearly 500 Allied ships. The period of this campaign, called Operation Drumbeat, was the second 'happy time' for the German submariners.

I don't have to prove anything, where is your proof that Ultra did not play an important role in defeating the U Boat menace? You can't because you haven't any. Anyone with an iota of common sense would realise that reliable intelligence is absolutely vital in war time as is deception. I suppose next you will say Operation Mincemeat was not as successful as it was made out to be.

The calfs are dancing on the ice? Are you stupid or what?

Your village has been calling, they want their idiot back.

 

[VDKMS]

Something that always is forgotten about MG:the airborne troops mainly were US,at Eindhoven and Nijmegen,the US 82 and 101 AB were committed .Critics of Monty always should be countered with
1) Ike was supreme commander
2) If Ike did not believe in the success of MG,he would not risk the lives of a lot of Americans.
The whole MG thing is only the usual search of a scapegoat (Monty,Ike,the intelligence) and the refusal to admit that the Germans defeated the allies .
It is the same on Barbarossa :the German generals refused to admit that they were defeated by the Soviets and had a lot of scape-goats :Hitler (of course),the weather (we all know it only was cold on the German side,...)
If Liverpool is defeated by Chelsea,the reaction in Liverpool will be :it is impossible that these....... from Chelsea could defeat us,thus ,the culprit is :the referee,the coach,the weather ....
It is always the same :chauvinism.

Then why didn't Montgomery secured the entrance to the port of Antwerp first? The allies were strugling with long supply lines which would have been cured once the port of Antwerp was available. Ironically the failure of defeating Von Zangen's 15th Army in south-west Holland also would have dire consequences during Market Garden. Montgomery could have easaly defeated the German 15th Arny and then move eastwards to Ahrnem, but then again, you don't need the Airborne for that so they could have been given the task to help Patton storm into Germany.
Montgomery's rhetoric was far more superiour than Patton's and was better able to convince Eisenhower than Patton's boss Bradley, who stated in his book that when he saw the plans for Market Garden he could not have been more stunned if the teetotalling Montgomery had stumbled into headquarters with a hangover. Eisenhower agreed to Montgomery's Market Garden because as Patton said Ike made his decision not as an American but as an ally.

Ever wondered why Montgomery's troops landed at the easternmost part of the invasion beaches? Don't get me wrong, he was a very good commander but he was also a **** of the walk.

 

[lljadw]

Again you are talking absolute bollocks.

"till 31 december 1941,it lost 4.8 million ton by U Boats,it built 2.2 million ton" Your own words numbnut. That's 2.6 millions tons shortfall

Britain had won the battle of the Atlantic by the end of 1941? Whatever you are smoking I'd like some.

1942 the year you claim the U Boat menace was beaten.

January Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 48 British, Allied and neutral ships of 277,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 3 escorts

February Monthly Loss Summary
- 73 British, Allied and neutral ships of 430,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 2 corvettes and 2 US destroyers off Newfoundland and the US east coast.

March Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 98 British, Allied and neutral ships of 547,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes.

April Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 74 British, Allied and neutral ships of 439,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 US destroyer mined off Florida

May Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 122 British, Allied and neutral ships of 585,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 1 submarine

June Monthly Loss Summary
- 128 British, Allied and neutral ships of 650,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 destroyer and 1 submarine

July Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 101 British, Allied and neutral ships of 511,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes

August Monthly Loss Summary
- 106 British, Allied and neutral ships of 544,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 US destroyer by collision off Nova Scotia

September Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 102 British, Allied and neutral ships of 531,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 5 escorts

October Monthly Loss Summary
- 82 British, Allied and neutral ships of 548,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 cruiser

November Monthly Loss Summary
- British, Allied and neutral ships of 567,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 escort carrier, 1 destroyer and 1 corvette

December Monthly Loss Summary, including Russian Convoys
- 54 British, Allied and neutral ships of 305,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 3 escorts

Not bad for a spent force wouldn't you say?

The role of intelligence
Intelligence was the other major factor in this second Battle of the Atlantic. Both sides at various times were able to read the signal traffic of the other. Britain's ability to break the Enigma codes, and the resulting 'Ultra' intelligence was a priceless advantage, particularly after the Royal Navy seized an Enigma machine from a captured U-boat in May 1941. Armed with information about where U-boats were patrolling, the British were able to move convoys in safe areas, away from the wolfpacks.

However, the code-breakers at Bletchley Park had a constant battle to keep their information current. German changes to the naval Enigma code at the beginning of 1942 led to a rise in Allied sinkings, as the flow of Ultra intelligence temporarily ceased.
This problem was compounded by the fact that although the USA had entered the war, it did not immediately put into place some protective measures - such as introducing convoys, and 'blacking out' coastal towns. A handful of U-boats operating on the North American and Caribbean seaboards area in the first half of 1942 accounted for nearly 500 Allied ships. The period of this campaign, called Operation Drumbeat, was the second 'happy time' for the German submariners.

I don't have to prove anything, where is your proof that Ultra did not play an important role in defeating the U Boat menace? You can't because you haven't any. Anyone with an iota of common sense would realise that reliable intelligence is absolutely vital in war time as is deception. I suppose next you will say Operation Mincemeat was not as successful as it was made out to be.

The calfs are dancing on the ice? Are you stupid or what?

Your village has been calling, they want their idiot back.

As usual you are concealing your incapacity to understand words of more than 2 syllabes with insults .
At 31 december 1941,Britain had more GRT than on 1 september 1939,thus Britain had won .
And,I have nothing to prove about Ultra:YOU have to prove that the boastings from BP (=Hinsley) are true,because you were citing the BP propaganda .
You have given no proof at all (why am I not surprised?) that Ultra saved one British ship ,only demanding that we should believe inconditionally everything what you are jabbering .

 

[lljadw]

Then why didn't Montgomery secured the entrance to the port of Antwerp first? The allies were strugling with long supply lines which would have been cured once the port of Antwerp was available. Ironically the failure of defeating Von Zangen's 15th Army in south-west Holland also would have dire consequences during Market Garden. Montgomery could have easaly defeated the German 15th Arny and then move eastwards to Ahrnem, but then again, you don't need the Airborne for that so they could have been given the task to help Patton storm into Germany.
Montgomery's rhetoric was far more superiour than Patton's and was better able to convince Eisenhower than Patton's boss Bradley, who stated in his book that when he saw the plans for Market Garden he could not have been more stunned if the teetotalling Montgomery had stumbled into headquarters with a hangover. Eisenhower agreed to Montgomery's Market Garden because as Patton said Ike made his decision not as an American but as an ally.

Ever wondered why Montgomery's troops landed at the easternmost part of the invasion beaches? Don't get me wrong, he was a very good commander but he was also a **** of the walk.

Securing the approaches of the port of Antwerp first,would mean
a)delaying the advance to Germany
b)delaying MG
At the end of august,the German front collapsed,but that would only be temporary ;thus,the only reasonable strategy was going eastwards,before the German front was repaired.

 

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[BritinBritain]

As usual you are concealing your incapacity to understand words of more than 2 syllabes with insults .
At 31 december 1941,Britain had more GRT than on 1 september 1939,thus Britain had won .
And,I have nothing to prove about Ultra:YOU have to prove that the boastings from BP (=Hinsley) are true,because you were citing the BP propaganda .
You have given no proof at all (why am I not surprised?) that Ultra saved one British ship ,only demanding that we should believe inconditionally everything what you are jabbering .

You know what, you are more stupid then I thought you were. How do I get it into your thick skull that INTELLIGENCE IS VITAL.

Thanks to Ultra convoys were routed AWAY FROM U BOAT WOLF PACKS YOU STUPID LITTLE MAN!!!!!!

Source. http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Battle_of_the_Atlantic.aspx

Historians point to the decisive role of ULTRA in the Atlantic war, particularly in early 1943 when the German defeat followed quickly after the breakthrough in late March. However, the elimination of the air gap would have defeated the wolf-packs without ULTRA, although special intelligence allowed it to happen faster and with more telling effect. It was air power that forced submarines to operate fully submerged as a normal mode. Maritime air power, directed by ULTRA, also devastated the U-boat fleet when it attempted to renew the offensive with acoustic homing torpedoes in late summer. Air power held the U-boat in check for the balance of the war.

The decisiveness of the Allied victory over Germany's submariners in 1943 was a highlight in the naval war, and most histories of the Atlantic end there. As far as the war itself is concerned, the scale and drama of the victory over the U-boats were of less importance than the check in shipping losses it represented. These were already a localized and declining proportion of Allied tonnage by late 1942. Allied shipping losses from January to May 1943 averaged 450,000 tons per month, most of this to U-boats. In the last seven months losses averaged approximately 200,000 with only about 40–60,000 tons accounted for by submarines. To the victory of 1943 can be added the opening of the Mediterranean in the summer and the enormous volume of new construction from American yards over the year. An open Mediterranean improved the usefulness of available shipping, while Allied shipyards launched 14 million tons of new shipping in 1943, outstripping losses by about 11.5 million tons. Unfortunately for the UK, the new shipping was almost entirely American and only Roosevelt's intervention gave the British access to it. Shortages of shipping and strict regulation by the UK's ministry of war transport plagued British action for the balance of the war, while the percentage of British controlled shipping under bareboat charter (that is, without crews) increased substantially. These factors contributed to the UK's post-war economic crisis.

http://www.historynet.com/what-if-the-allies-had-not-broken-the-german-naval-code.htm

Britain's first major breakthrough came in May 1941, when its warships seized a German weather trawler and, by happy accident, captured a German U-boat. In both cases British cryptanalysts acquired keys that enabled them to decrypt German naval traffic fast enough for the information to be operationally useful, especially in terms of re-routing convoys away from wolf packs.

But in February 1942 the Germans shifted to Triton, a more complex Enig-ma variant the British couldn't read. The result was a major increase in U-boat interceptions of convoys and merchant ship losses—over 5.6 million tons between February and November 1942.

All that was about to change, however. In October 1942, two British destroyers found and attacked U-559 in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. A barrage of more than 200 depth charges forced the U-boat to the surface. When the German crew abandoned ship, three British seamen—Tommy Brown, Antony Fasson, and Colin Grazier—climbed into the U-boat's control room. Making their way to the captain's cabin, they used a machine gun to open its locked cabinets, then frantically grabbed the documents they found inside. Brown made it to safety, but Fasson and Grazier drowned when the U-boat abruptly sank, never knowing that the documents they had died to secure contained the keys needed to break the Triton code. It took British cryptanalysts until early 1943 to capitalize on this find. When they did, the results were dramatic.

By that juncture, Allies had all the elements they needed to wage the Battle of the Atlantic: radar, sonar, improved depth charges, and long-range aircraft. But the decrypts maximized their usefulness and, moreover, transformed the nature of the battle. The Allies not only diverted convoys from wolf packs, but zeroed in on both combat U-boats and the oversized supply U-boats that enabled the combat boats to greatly extend their time at sea. The hunters became the hunted.

By May 1943, U-boat losses were so heavy that Admiral Karl Dönitz withdrew them from the North Atlantic. Although the battle continued at a reduced tempo, the Allies had effectively won. According to military historians Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, "Ultra's contribution to the antisubmarine battle now became the most significant intelligence victory of the war, and the only episode in which intelligence alone had a decisive impact on military operations."

Historian David Kahn is probably on target when he concludes that a failure to crack the code would have delayed the Allied ground offensives by several months—and in the case of the Normandy invasion, pushed it back into 1945. Based on shipping figures, Kahn estimates that the Mediterranean offensives would have been delayed by three months, and that to get sufficient tonnage it would have been necessary to transfer vessels from the Pacific, thereby delaying operations in that theater as well. The increased number of U-boats (because of reduced losses) would also have made Lend-Lease supply to the Soviet Union far more problematic. Barring the atomic bomb, the war might have been extended by as much as two years, until 1947.

What more proof do you need you silly little man???

You are the biggest idiot I have ever come across, yes I do insult people like you, I don't suffer fools and you clearly are a fool.

 

[Trooper1854]

Germany lost the war because it was Germany, against the rest of the world.
They did not have the resources to fight a prolonged war.
They were not on a full war production footing until it was too late.
They relied too heavily on vanquished people to produce war goods.
They lacked essential resources.

Intelligence did play a very, very large part of their defeat.
There is nothing better in conflict than knowing what your enemy is going to do next. For example;
The Luftwaffe was a far superior force than the RAF in numbers, experience and tactics in 1940, but they were unable to defeat them because they were out maneuvered because the RAF had a better intelligence network due to Ultra and Radar.
In the Battle of the Atlantic, the U-Boats should have crippled Britain, but again due to Ultra, they were out maneuvered.
Never, ever underestimate the power of intelligence.
Historians with far more qualifications and experience than anyone here, have all agreed Bletchley Park's work shortened the war by at least two years.
If anyone wants to put down the work Station X did, they have a weak grasp on the history of WWII.

 

[BritinBritain]

Germany lost the war because it was Germany, against the rest of the world.
They did not have the resources to fight a prolonged war.
They were not on a full war production footing until it was too late.
They relied too heavily on vanquished people to produce war goods.
They lacked essential resources.

Intelligence did play a very, very large part of their defeat.
There is nothing better in conflict than knowing what your enemy is going to do next. For example;
The Luftwaffe was a far superior force than the RAF in numbers, experience and tactics in 1940, but they were unable to defeat them because they were out maneuvered because the RAF had a better intelligence network due to Ultra and Radar.
In the Battle of the Atlantic, the U-Boats should have crippled Britain, but again due to Ultra, they were out maneuvered.
Never, ever underestimate the power of intelligence.
Historians with far more qualifications and experience than anyone here, have all agreed Bletchley Park's work shortened the war by at least two years.
If anyone wants to put down the work Station X did, they have a weak grasp on the history of WWII.

I couldn't agree more Trooper. I find it astonishing that some morons cannot see the importance of reliable intelligence not only in WW2 but since the dawn of time and every war fought since then, including today.

I cannot help getting very annoyed when armchair generals who have never worn combat boots and lugged a bundhook around have the audacity to spout their absolute rubbish.

 

[Der Alte]

Intelligence has provided key information to theater commanders which saved countless lives by telling them the enemy’s intent prior to the execution of their battle plans. This has allowed our combatant commanders to out maneuver the enemy’s forces or prepare defenses to halt their advances. Without Intelligence, our combatant commanders would be operating blind, which would cause us to lose many more lives, battles, and even wars.

Intelligence has expanded into many distinct, but sometimes overlapping disciplines and each one is a force multiplier which contributes critical information to the combatant commander.

Intelligence is perishable, so it is critical to get this information to the end-user as close to real time as possible. It is a proven fact that many of the supposed "intelligence failures" weren’t because the intelligence wasn’t there. It just didn’t get to the end-user in time for them to react to the given situation.

Even though military operations are the usual path to glory, intelligence is even more important since it functions to reduce surprise, error, and anomaly.

Some of Bletchley Park operations is to this day still classified, included parts of ULTRA.

 

[BritinBritain]

Intelligence has provided key information to theater commanders which saved countless lives by telling them the enemy’s intent prior to the execution of their battle plans. This has allowed our combatant commanders to out maneuver the enemy’s forces or prepare defenses to halt their advances. Without Intelligence, our combatant commanders would be operating blind, which would cause us to lose many more lives, battles, and even wars.

Intelligence has expanded into many distinct, but sometimes overlapping disciplines and each one is a force multiplier which contributes critical information to the combatant commander.

Intelligence is perishable, so it is critical to get this information to the end-user as close to real time as possible. It is a proven fact that many of the supposed "intelligence failures" weren’t because the intelligence wasn’t there. It just didn’t get to the end-user in time for them to react to the given situation.

Even though military operations are the usual path to glory, intelligence is even more important since it functions to reduce surprise, error, and anomaly.

I wouldn't be surprised if numbnut tries to argue with Opa who served in Military Intelligence.

Winston Churchill once stated "The truth is so precious, it must be protected by a bodyguard of lies."

Ultra proved that Operation Mincemeat and other deception plans were successful.

 

[Trooper1854]

Intelligence is perishable, so it is critical to get this information to the end-user as close to real time as possible. It is a proven fact that many of the supposed "intelligence failures" weren’t because the intelligence wasn’t there. It just didn’t get to the end-user in time for them to react to the given situation.

It is a known fact that in the early days of Ultra, intelligence would not be released unless they believed that the Germans, or Italians would think that their plans were betrayed by other means other than having their codes read.
They would launch fake photo recce missions to make the enemy think that they had been found out by that rather than the fact we were reading Enigma.
So on some occaisions intelligence was either not released, or released too late to be of any use.
Once they realised that the Axis powers own intelligence services were not as profficient as the Allied services, more and more intelligence was made available.
Another thing to take into account was the efforts made in such opperations such as "Mince Meat" where they dropped a dead body loaded with fake documents to throw the Germans of the scent of the landings at Sicily.
Intelligence always has and always will be a very important.
I worked with Army Intelligence for a while and when you see how much investment is made in their opperations, from a government who are not known for splashing money about with the military, you do realise its value.

 

[Trooper1854]

I wouldn't be surprised if numbnut tries to argue with Opa who served in Military Intelligence.

Winston Churchill once stated "The truth is so precious, it must be protected by a bodyguard of lies."

Ultra proved that Operation Mincemeat and other deception plans were successful.

Of his numerous quotes, this was always a fovourite of mine, I know it was about Russia but it means something too abou intlligence and deception,
"It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma"

 

[BritinBritain]

Of his numerous quotes, this was always a fovourite of mine, I know it was about Russia but it means something too abou intlligence and deception,
"It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma"

Imagine what kind of mind those people had who had to decrypt Enigma signals then finding the correct key. Then there is the guy who invented the mechanical computer at Bletchley. Astonishing.

 

[Der Alte]

The problem with intelligence and historiography is that the full truth will never be disclosed.

About ULTRA, yes it is difficult to document its effectiveness since many of the results was blurred on purpose.

Of the many ULTRA successes is, perhaps this story:

It helped the American FBI, for example, in Argentina, where a network of secret German radio stations had sprung up after being shut down in Brazil in 1942. With the help of ULTRA messages decoded by the British the Bureau learned of the strong political influence and extensive intelligence activities of German agent Johannes Becker, mapped out the operation of his ring, disrupted its work throughout the war, and later shut it down completely in the summer of 1945.

Without ULTRA, the FBI would not have been as successful in pinning down the extent of German espionage in South America through the SIS. On a broader level, ULTRA intelligence enabled the FBI to control the movements of its double agents and ensure they were successful in penetrating German intelligence. It was, in the end, one of the FBI’s most significant sources of intelligence in World War II.

 

[Trooper1854]

Imagine what kind of mind those people had who had to decrypt Enigma signals then finding the correct key. Then there is the guy who invented the mechanical computer at Bletchley. Astonishing.

In the museum at Bletchley Park, there is a working replica of Collosus, the first computer that was used to break the more advanced german codes.
It takes up a whole building and generates so much heat that even in winter with the heating off, they have the windows open!
On the wall by the entrance there is a micro chip, 1cm x 1cm that has the same computing capacity as the Collosus.
We must never underestimate the role Bletchley Park played in not just helping the Allies win WWII but wining other wars and even more importantly, preventing wars, and advancing the scince of computing.
After WWII, the opperations of Station X were moved to GCHQ Cheltenham where the people there, along with the inteligence agencies of the western world did many things to maintain world peace.
The Cold War didn't go "Hot" thanks to intelligence.
If anyone ever gets the chance to visit Bletchley Park they should do so.
It is a fascinating place with alot of amazing artifacts and it is so full of history that a day isn't long enough to get round it.

 

[Der Alte]

It should not be thought that the German radio intercept services, intelligence organizations, were totally unable to "read" the secret encrypted messages of the allied forces during the Second World War. "The B-Dienst (Beobachtungsdienst) was a German naval code breaking organisation. During World War II, B-Dienst solved British Naval Cypher No. 3, providing intelligence for the Battle of the Atlantic, until the British Admiralty introduced Naval Cypher No. 5 on 10 June 1943."

German U-Boat success during the early part of the Battle of the Atlantic was due in large measure to the ability of B-Dienst to "read" the British naval and merchant marine encoded messages and do so with relatively impunity, providing Doenitz with real-time action-able intelligence! Until the TYPEX cipher machine was widely adopted by the British navy, the movement of the Royal Navy were literally an "open book"! For all that meant!

 

[Trooper1854]

It should not be thought that the German radio intercept services, intelligence organizations, were totally unable to "read" the secret encrypted messages of the allied forces during the Second World War. "The B-Dienst (Beobachtungsdienst) was a German naval code breaking organisation. During World War II, B-Dienst solved British Naval Cypher No. 3, providing intelligence for the Battle of the Atlantic, until the British Admiralty introduced Naval Cypher No. 5 on 10 June 1943."

German U-Boat success during the early part of the Battle of the Atlantic was due in large measure to the ability of B-Dienst to "read" the British naval and merchant marine encoded messages and do so with relatively impunity, providing Doenitz with real-time action-able intelligence! Until the TYPEX cipher machine was widely adopted by the British navy, the movement of the Royal Navy were literally an "open book"! For all that meant!

It just shows how "compartmentalised" Allied intelligence was.
We were so aware how important it was to read Axis codes, and we knew that Enigma, and Lorenz were among the most complicated code machines available at the time, but the Allied codes and ciphers were very vulnerable.
It makes you wonder why they didn't use their expertise in breaking codes to help develop a more secure system for themselves.
It was probably due to them not wanting too many people knowing that they could break Axis codes.