You like own-goals HaHa
Who is writing (without reading) :the German messages mentioned seaborne operations ?
Santa Claus,colonel Blimp,or captain Mainwaring?
Zzzzz.
In a normal situation,a commander receives 2 pages:
On page A ,the intelligence services are giving the facts
On page B ,they are giving their opinion about the facts : =interpretation,assumption,guesses.
than,the commander discuss the whole thing with his staff,asks for more information,for clarificationetc...
And,finally,he takes his decision .
What happened ?
Freyberg received a mixture of facts and guesses,interpretations,assumptions(and,it was unclear which were the facts,and which were the assumptions),he could not ask BP for clarification,he could not discuss with his staff what he had received .
2 comparisons :
On 15 may 1944,Ike received from an unknown source informations,which,following the analysts of this source,could indicate that 2 PzD and PzL were moving to Ste.Mère-l'Eglise. Ike could not communicate with this source,neither could he discuss the content of the message with his intelligence staff . What could/should Ike do ?
On 15 march 2009,Obama receives from an unknown source i information,which following the analysts of this source,could indicate that Bin Laden was hiding in Iran.Obama could not ask more information to this source,neither could he ask the opinion of his own intelligence staff .What could/should do Obama with this information ?
What happened ?
Freyberg received a mixture of facts and guesses,interpretations,assumptions(and,it was unclear which were the facts,and which were the assumptions),he could not ask BP for clarification,he could not discuss with his staff what he had received .
You are still ignoring the fact that Freyberg had the German order of battle in his hands for God sake which would or should have cleared up any misunderstanding.
We are not talking about Ike or Obama, I am not interested in Ike or Obama, we are talking about Freyberg misinterpreting intelligence from ULTRA and totally ignoring the captured German order of battle, Freyberg knew where his intelligence was coming from. Thats it, simple.
This confusion should not have occurred though as on the 11th of May Brigadier Dorman-Smith was flown to Crete to brief Freyberg on the accumulated intelligence and he left depressed describing him as a "bear of little brain" in other words a man of great courage but little tactical sense.
Ultra was an added bonus to the Allies, not their primary source of wisdom. Ultra was only one intelligence source among many. Other sources ranged from reconnaissance, both ground and air, POW interrogation, other SIGINT and reports from contacts on the front line and the relevant commanders history in battle. From analysing their impact upon operations it is possible to assert that they were themselves more significant a factor than was Ultra although again Ultra always had the potential to be decisive. Ultra was never used as an infallible source, but instead it was corroborated with these other sources to gauge its reliability. Since the release of many of the Ultra documents Ultra's role in the Second world War has been greatly exaggerated, being elevated to the rank of a decisive factor. Such an assertion involves the overlooking of the numerous and crippling limitations of this form of intelligence, technically and operationally. Through analysis of such limitations, in relation to its isolated successes, it can be seen that Ultra was no more than a supplementary factor in the allies favour, complimenting their knowledge of the Axis powers and their forces, as it sat in the background sifting through decrypts until it found information worth passing on to a higher authority. Eventually during this sifting process Ultra enabled the Allies to know immensely useful information about its enemy and, although rarely in the short term, due to the slow speed of its distribution.
I did a quick read about the battle of Crete and it said something about an error at Maleme
"Though the New Zealanders were able to hold the hill through the day, an error led to their being withdrawn during the night"It does not say what caused the error. Was it faulty intelligence or a command error or something else.
Defending the key positions at Maleme was 22nd Battalion. Under the command of First World War Victoria Cross (VC) winner Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Andrew, the battalion occupied positions along the western edges of the airfield as well the substantial hill – known as Point 107 – overlooking it. By the afternoon the situation was serious enough for Andrew to seek additional support from 23rd Battalion, located to his east. This request was turned down by Brigadier James Hargest, commander of 5th (NZ) Brigade, who mistakenly believed 23rd Battalion was tied up dealing with enemy paratroops in its area.
In desperation Andrew decided to use his meagre reserve – two tanks and an infantry platoon – to drive the Germans back from the edge of the airfield. But the counter-attack petered out when the tanks broke down. Unable to contact his forward companies and fearing that the rest of the battalion would be cut off, Andrew decided to pull back from Point 107 to a nearby ridge. Hargest agreed to the withdrawal – famously replying, ‘if you must, you must’ – before ordering two companies forward to reinforce 22nd Battalion. One of these companies briefly reoccupied Point 107 before falling back, while the other failed to make contact in the dark and also withdrew. Andrew pulled his battalion back to link up with 21st Battalion in the east, leaving behind two forward companies fighting on the western edge of the airfield. Both companies managed to extricate themselves when they found that the rest of the battalion had withdrawn.