Why did Germany lose WW2?

[MontyB]

I don't have a problem whatsoever. Your problem and your mate is, both of you refuse to accept studies from historians who are fully qualified. To refer to published studies of ULTRA by historians as boasting by your buddy is a stupid statement to say the least.

It has been a while but I have just got through reading the Summer 2013 US Naval War College publication and it has an interesting break down on ULTRA and the war in North Africa.

http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/2013---Summer.aspx

 

[lljadw]

Hear,hear

 

[BritinBritain]

Accession Number : ADA118830

Title : The Effect of Ultra on the World War II North African Campaign.

Descriptive Note : Study project,

Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Personal Author(s) : Carey,Arthur T.

Report Date : MAY 1982

Pagination or Media Count : 62

Abstract : The North African campaign was the US Army's entry into the European ground war. One of the assets the senior Allied leaders had was a British secret known as Ultra - the ability to read Germany's highest level radio transmissions. It is one thing to steal enemy information; it is another matter to make use of the information. A study of how the Allies made use of Ultra information at seven key points during the Campaign showed that, on the whole, very good use was made of the information. There were also errors. Between the good use and the poor use of Ultra, excellent lessons for future commanders in similar situations were displayed. The first lesson is that decrypts of this nature provide accurate RAW information that must be properly analyzed and compared with other sources. Second: Ultra information can give capabilities and probabilities but not intentions. Again analysis is the key. The last major lesson is that the best of intelligence is no substitute for good command strategy and tactics. (Author)

Descriptors : *Land warfare, *Military intelligence, *Cryptography, *Decoding, Radio transmission, Utilization, Military strategy, Military tactics, Covert operations, Battles, Interdiction, Decision making, Military commanders, Military planning, Combat effectiveness, Military forces(United States), Military forces(Foreign), North Africa

Subject Categories : Military Intelligence
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

There are a number of other studies regarding the effectiveness of Ultra, but too long to post.

 

[VDKMS]

Because of Ultra Montgomery knew when and where Rommel would attack. Rommel's panzers rode right into a massive anti-tank minefield and got bombarded by a big chunk of Monty's artillery who were waiting for Rommel's forces. Rommel thought the Italians betrayed him.

 

[MontyB]

Accession Number : ADA118830

Title : The Effect of Ultra on the World War II North African Campaign.

Descriptive Note : Study project,

Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Personal Author(s) : Carey,Arthur T.

Report Date : MAY 1982

Pagination or Media Count : 62

Abstract : The North African campaign was the US Army's entry into the European ground war. One of the assets the senior Allied leaders had was a British secret known as Ultra - the ability to read Germany's highest level radio transmissions. It is one thing to steal enemy information; it is another matter to make use of the information. A study of how the Allies made use of Ultra information at seven key points during the Campaign showed that, on the whole, very good use was made of the information. There were also errors. Between the good use and the poor use of Ultra, excellent lessons for future commanders in similar situations were displayed. The first lesson is that decrypts of this nature provide accurate RAW information that must be properly analyzed and compared with other sources. Second: Ultra information can give capabilities and probabilities but not intentions. Again analysis is the key. The last major lesson is that the best of intelligence is no substitute for good command strategy and tactics. (Author)

Descriptors : *Land warfare, *Military intelligence, *Cryptography, *Decoding, Radio transmission, Utilization, Military strategy, Military tactics, Covert operations, Battles, Interdiction, Decision making, Military commanders, Military planning, Combat effectiveness, Military forces(United States), Military forces(Foreign), North Africa

Subject Categories : Military Intelligence
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

There are a number of other studies regarding the effectiveness of Ultra, but too long to post.

But I think this is the point we were making way back then, while ULTRA was useful and of benefit to the allies it was not decisive.

 

[BritinBritain]

But I think this is the point we were making way back then, while ULTRA was useful and of benefit to the allies it was not decisive.

The point is, a commander can have all the best intelligence gather in the world, its how the information is used that matters.

Without ULTRA would more battles have been lost, would the war gone on for longer, would more convoys in the Atlantic been sunk, could the war have been lost?

No battle or war can be one without accurate information on enemy movements, right from Roman times until today, accurate intelligence is vital to any commander.

 

[MontyB]

Without ULTRA would more battles have been lost

A: Indeterminable, battles with the help of ULTRA were still lost (Crete for example) and as indicated in the document I quoted battles without ULTRA were won.

would the war gone on for longer.

A: Indeterminable, there are lots of actions that shortened or prolonged the war.

would more convoys in the Atlantic been sunk

A: Indeterminable

could the war have been lost?

A: No, because even had Germany knocked Russia out of the war it still could not have controlled the oceans therefore it had no capacity to invade Britain nor could it have threatened the USA therefore it could not have won the war.

At best Germany could have ruled continental Europe but that was as far as it could have gone.

No battle or war can be one without accurate information on enemy movements, right from Roman times until today, accurate intelligence is vital to any commander.

True to a degree but you are overlooking the fact that even with the best intel available battles can still be lost.

 

[BritinBritain]

A: Indeterminable, battles with the help of ULTRA were still lost (Crete for example) and as indicated in the document I quoted battles without ULTRA were won.

That was not the fault of ULTRA, that was the fault of the man on the ground. The Ultra-derived intelligence that Freyberg received was very detailed, it was taken out of context and misinterpreted.

A: Indeterminable, there are lots of actions that shortened or prolonged the war.

Again a lot of what if's, which is why I take any study many years after WW2 with a pinch of salt, the people doing to the study were not there.

Indeterminable

Churchill stated that the time he was really scared was during the U Boat "Happy Time." Even though taking all convoys from start to finish 98% got through unscathed, during the early part of the war convoys were decimated, it was only after the U Boat had been beaten that convoys were able to get through without loss.

A: No, because even had Germany knocked Russia out of the war it still could not have controlled the oceans therefore it had no capacity to invade Britain nor could it have threatened the USA therefore it could not have won the war.

Yet it may not have lost the war. If Germany had the resources of the Soviet Union why would she need to put to sea? I don't think Hitler would have needed to invade Britain.

At best Germany could have ruled continental Europe but that was as far as it could have gone.

I agree with that.

True to a degree but you are overlooking the fact that even with the best intel available battles can still be lost.

I'm not overlooking anything, I stated "The point is, a commander can have all the best intelligence gather in the world, its how the information is used that matters." The invasion of Crete comes to mind.

 

[MontyB]

That was not the fault of ULTRA, that was the fault of the man on the ground. The Ultra-derived intelligence that Freyberg received was very detailed, it was taken out of context and misinterpreted.
....
I'm not overlooking anything, I stated "The point is, a commander can have all the best intelligence gather in the world, its how the information is used that matters." The invasion of Crete comes to mind.

But to me what this says is that ULTRA was not decisive, there is no doubt that it had a value in some case a great deal of value but in others it was a complete failure.

Did it contribute to winning the war sure it did but was it the reason the allies won in my opinion no it wasn't.

I am not sure I am going to say this correctly but in my opinion intelligence is really only good until the opposition reacts at which point it is out of date.

 

[BritinBritain]

But to me what this says is that ULTRA was not decisive, there is no doubt that it had a value in some case a great deal of value but in others it was a complete failure.

The failure of Crete was down to Freyberg not Ultra. Thats like saying a rifleman misses his target because of the rifle and or ammunition, not the rifleman.

Did it contribute to winning the war sure it did but was it the reason the allies won in my opinion no it wasn't.

I firmly believe that the war could have gone on even longer in Europe if it wasn't for ULTRA. However I never said the allies won the war because of ULTRA, but it played a part as a very important cog in a very huge machine.

I am not sure I am going to say this correctly but in my opinion intelligence is really only good until the opposition reacts at which point it is out of date.

If the enemy reacts because of information given to the allies from ULTRA, then ULTRA has done its job.

 

[lljadw]

The failure of Crete was down to Freyberg not Ultra.

>still the childish HCH thinking that battles were lost because of the "fault "(of course) of one man .

 

[MontyB]

>still the childish HCH thinking that battles were lost because of the "fault "(of course) of one man .

Actually I agree with him in that respect I think Freybergs actions on Crete were a major factor in the defeat.

Freyberg had the benefit of Ultra and he had the German battle plan all telling him exactly the same thing and yet he concentrated on preparing for a seaborne invasion that he knew was not coming.

Personally the man that should have been given command on Crete was Morshead he was a far more aggressive commander than Freyberg who was really only interested in planning to evacuate the island.

I agree that he wasn't the only reason the allies failed on Crete but he failed horribly as a leader which led to confusion and indecisiveness amongst his men and ultimately defeat.

 

[lljadw]

1)actually,there was a seaborne invasion : only a minority of the Axis went by air

2)Was there any reason why Freyberg should have listen to Ultra? Were there any proofs that Ultra was reliable?

3) Why was Freyberg convinced of a seaborne invasion ? Maybe,because he had informations about it ?

4)If Freyberg had listen to Ultra,would the invasion fail ?

5)Did the invasion succeed because Freyberg did not listen to Ultra ?

The question is not if Freyberg was horrible,but,if (as has been stated) Freyberg was responsible for the loss of Crete.

 

[MontyB]

I think he was, Crete was defensible as proven by the fact that they damn near did defend it.

1) It wasn't only Ultra giving him intel, they had captured the German battle plan and still he failed to adapt.

2) Sure he knew that the island was to be reinforced by sea but he also knew that the Royal Navy had the upper hand in the area making any seaborne landing risky at best.

3) No the invasion succeeded because he failed to listen to Ultra, Intel on the ground, captured intel and worst of all he failed to adapt once he knew what was going on, Freybergs problem as has been pointed out in books on the subject is that he did not believe the island was defensible and wanted it evacuated.

 

[BritinBritain]

>still the childish HCH thinking that battles were lost because of the "fault "(of course) of one man .

Who's fault was it you silly little man? You get more and more stupid everyday.

You should become friends with Peter Dow, you and he have got a similar intellect.

 

[lljadw]

I think he was, Crete was defensible as proven by the fact that they damn near did defend it.

1) It wasn't only Ultra giving him intel, they had captured the German battle plan and still he failed to adapt.

2) Sure he knew that the island was to be reinforced by sea but he also knew that the Royal Navy had the upper hand in the area making any seaborne landing risky at best.

3) No the invasion succeeded because he failed to listen to Ultra, Intel on the ground, captured intel and worst of all he failed to adapt once he knew what was going on, Freybergs problem as has been pointed out in books on the subject is that he did not believe the island was defensible and wanted it evacuated.

From "the fall of Crete:was Freyberg culpable ?"

P132:To blame Freyberg,owing tohim being the senior commander in the ground is identifying an easy scape-goat .

P 135:The Ultra intelligence did not however determine the weighing of effort in each of the three sectors that the LW had determined as drop zones,nor did it accurately weight the seaborne invasion .Freyberg did make some faulty assumptions in relation to the intelligence,but none that would not have seemed feasible at the time .

P 137:Given the operational and strategic circumstances that he and his troops were placed in,the strength and competence of his enemy,and the failure of some of his subordinates toprosecute his operational plan,Freyberg can not be held culpable for the loss of Crete .

 

[lljadw]

Who's fault was it you silly little man? You get more and more stupid everyday.

You should become friends with Peter Dow, you and he have got a similar intellect.

Your jingoistic insults are bumping against the armour of my contempt

 

[MontyB]

P 135:The Ultra intelligence did not however determine the weighing of effort in each of the three sectors that the LW had determined as drop zones,nor did it accurately weight the seaborne invasion .Freyberg did make some faulty assumptions in relation to the intelligence,but none that would not have seemed feasible at the time .

I am not sure this is entirely accurate as a number of things I have read indicated specifically that Maleme was known as the focus of operations further to this the capture of German invasion plans must have filled in many of the blanks Ultra didn't.

My problem with Freyberg is not that he was a bad leader as I don't believe he was given the level of support he had from 2nd Division veterans even after the war but I am convinced his problem was a failure to adapt his defense even when in possession of the information needed to conclude a defense of the island and as I have indicated I believe that this was due to him being convinced even before accepting the role that the island could not be defended.

 

[BritinBritain]

Your jingoistic insults are bumping against the armour of my contempt

Jingoistic insults? Do you actually know what jingoistic means? Your contempt has armour? You are an idiot, thats fact, you should stick to playing with toy cars, thats about your level of intelligence.

Your parents have got to be siblings.

 

[lljadw]

Jingoistic insults? Do you actually know what jingoistic means? Your contempt has armour? You are an idiot, thats fact, you should stick to playing with toy cars, thats about your level of intelligence.

Your parents have got to be siblings.

Who is using insults,is proving to have no arguments .