IDF General admits to Egyptian POW's massacre 1967
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First slice:
As Evidence Mounts, Toll of Israeli Prisoner of War Massacres Grows
By Katherine M. Metres
"If I were to be put on trial for what I did, then it would be necessary to put on trial at least one-half the Israeli army which, in similar circumstances, did what I did."—Israeli Brig. Gen. Aryeh Biro, who admitted to killing hundereds of unresisting Egyptians.
In July 1995, the long, hidden story began to leak. Publication in the Israeli press of a study undertaken for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) briefly noted that 35 Egyptian "soldiers"—actually civilian Public Works employees, it was later admitted—were murdered during the 1956 Suez War, ostensibly because there was insufficient manpower to guard them (Davar, 7/21/95). After this little-noticed article was published, the military censor could no longer prevent the publication of historian Ronal Fisher's research on Israeli massacres of 273 Egyptians who, according to international law, should have been prisoners of war (Ma'ariv, 8/8/95).*
Former soldiers' recollections of the massacres they committed gained momentum, and soon a host of war crimes previously known only to the participants came to light in the mainstream Israeli press. Israelis admitted that in the 1967 Six-Day War, the IDF executed Palestinian POWs who were fighting in the Egyptian army, a thousand unresisting Egyptians, and dozens of unarmed Palestinian refugees.
The 1956 massacres occurred in the context of the lsraeli invasion of the Egyptian Sinai, which was planned in collusion with Britain and France in order to overthrow Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and return the Suez Canal to European control. The war began when Israeli Battalion 890 parachuted onto the eastern side of Sinai's Mitla Pass. The battalion was commanded by Raphael (Raful) Eitan, who later helped carry out Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and who played a role in the massacres of Palestinian and Lebanese civilian residents of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut.
The Israeli paratroopers rounded up 49 Egyptian and Sudanese civil engineers who were camped near the invaders. Later, when Eitan received orders to move on, the Israelis tied the workers' hands and executed them. Aryeh Biro, the commander who ordered the deed and subsequently was promoted to brigadier general, says his unit killed them because there was no manpower for guarding prisoners and he feared they could inform the Egyptian troops of the Israeli unit's whereabouts. Biro's action constitutes a clear violation of the international prohibition on the execution of innocent civilians.
Fisher's eyewitnesses continue: On the fourth day of the 1956 invasion, a truck approached Eitan's Israeli battalion at Ras Sudar in Sinai. One of the men on the truck fired "a few aimless bullets," but the truck stopped short when an IDF anti-tank grenade hit it, killing the driver. According to Shaul Ziv, who fired that grenade, the exchange should have ended then, since the men in the truck, Palestinian and Egyptian irregulars, were stunned and unmoving. Yet Biro ordered his men to shoot until the last of the 56 men in the truck was dead.
The Real Carnage Begins
And then the real carnage began. On the sixth day of the campaign, Eitan's battalion set out for Sharm al-Sheikh. Before the Israeli soldiers reached their destination, they killed at least another 168 Egyptians. (According to Biro himself, that number is low. He says his men killed "most of" a company of about 400. Prof. Israel Shahak, an Israeli writer and translator of Hebrew-language reports, says at least 2,000 Egyptians were killed.) The IDF says the "unit confronted an Egyptian division, a small part of which began a battle with our troops and was eliminated in the course of exchanges of fire. Most of the Egyptians were then taken prisoner and held until transferred to Israeli territory."
Independent Israeli historians disagree with the army's sanitized version of events. Uri Milstein, a right-winger, and Meir Pa'il, a former general associated with the far left, agree on this point. Milstein says that the Egyptians were surrounded by advancing Israeli units and "in the course of their attempt to escape, the Egyptians lost all of their operational capabilities and fell into groups, thirsty, hungry and exhausted, and then into the hands of Raful and his soldiers. The men of Battalion 890 understood that nothing would be done to them if they eliminated a few dozen or a few hundred POWs, as long as they won the war and returned home as heroes...Therefore, nearly every Egyptian who confronted him and his soldiers was eliminated in the course of the advance to the south."
Pa'il concurs: "In actual fact, what happened was that Battalion 890 met a disintegrated and defeated unit of the Egyptian army in Sharm al-Sheikh, a unit which could not fight and which was only seeking a way to be taken prisoner. If, nevertheless, there were several Egyptian soldiers who fired a bullet or two, no one really thought that they intended to fight. Raful saw that he did not have enough men to put in charge of the gathering of Egyptian soldiers who wanted to surrender and gave an order to kill all of them...For him, a soldier who takes a transistor radio as booty is a criminal. But a soldier who kills an Arab, hands up or hands down, is blessed."
In spite of the facts of history—ranging from the 1948 massacre of Palestinian civilians in Deir Yassin to the 1994 murders of Muslim men and boys at prayer in Hebron—many Israelis continue to see themselves as morally superior to their neighbors. The news of the massacres pierced this persistent myth once again. Predictably, the Israeli public reacted with shock. However, while some were shocked at the crimes ("How could we?"), others were shocked only at the revelation of the crimes ("Why did these former soldiers and historians reveal this damaging information now?").
Ben Dror Yemini, a Labor party activist, is an example of the latter. He asserted that the uproar over the massacres amounted to the "rewriting of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion." His reference to an infamous "plan" by Jews to rule the world, thought to be a fabrication of Czarist Russian secret police, was an attempt to paint those who have made the massacres public as self-destructive accessories to anti-Semitism. He concluded smugly, "Not everyone among our fighters is the best person in the world, but compared to what happened in other places, we the Jews are nevertheless almost angels" (Ma'ariv , 8/20/95).
In reality, Israeli forces' not infrequent failure to distinguish between armed enemy soldiers who have not surrendered, soldiers who have laid down their arms, and noncombatants has been far from angelic. For example, the day before the murders at Mitla, Israeli border guards had killed 49 Palestinian farmers, citizens of Israel. Their only crime was attempting to return to their homes in the village of Kufr Qassem which, unknown to them, had been placed under curfew while they were at work in their fields. Likewise, in 1967, after Israel occupied the West Bank, many families who had fled across the Jordan River during the fighting were shot by the IDF while they were trying to return to their West Bank homes (News From Within, 9/95). Just as reports of the 1956 massacres implicate Rafael Eitan, a prominent right-wing figure in contemporary Israeli politics, reports now coming out of Israel regarding the 1967 war pose a serious threat to the current Labor government, because they implicate "Fouad" Ben Eliezer, the minister of housing. Aryeh Yitzhaki, a mainstream historian, states that "in the Six Day War the IDF killed approximately 1,000 Egyptian soldiers who had ceased functioning as a fighting force." Apparently, Eliezer's Shaked unit was responsible for one-third of those murders, which occurred during an operation called "Gazelle Hunt" because the IDF slaughtered the soldiers as they retreated. (Ha'aretz, 8/17/95).
