Thoughts on the Russo-Ukranian War?

About what is saying Santelises :
1 There is no proof that the Ukrainian deception greatly aided their offensive in the Charkiv region .
Even if it would so, it can never be proved ,
2 And as the MIW/ISW Santelises repeats things about Fortitude and Mincemeat that have been proved to be totally wrong .
If Hitler was convinced that Normandy was a diversionary attack, he would not have sent on 6 June Das Reich to Normandy,a part of Panzerlehr to the East and later Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg to Normandy .
Reinforcements were sent to Normandy, but not because the OKW was thinking that the real attack would occur in Normandy .
It is the same for Kerson and Charkiv .
3 The fact that Santelises repeats the Fortitude and Mincemeat myths, is a valid reason to believe that what he claims about Kherson and Charkiv is also a myth .
The real reason why an army is reinforcing point A and not point B is that the defenses of point A are weaker than those of point B and not that it believes that the enemy will attack A and not B .
 
Military operations don't work like that. You are asking for proof of something that didn't happen. The Ukrainians used deception to make the Russian to deploy forces somewhere else.Ukrainians had two options A to use deception or B to not use deception. They did A and it worked. If they hadn't they had most likely suffered more casualties only because the Russians hadn't deployed some of their forces south.

The remarkable about the Charkiv offensive is; the Ukrainians were very vocal about an offensive in the Kherson region and the Russians believed them. Usually military planners to tell the world about what they are planning to do.
 
Military operations don't work like that. You are asking for proof of something that didn't happen. The Ukrainians used deception to make the Russian to deploy forces somewhere else.Ukrainians had two options A to use deception or B to not use deception. They did A and it worked. If they hadn't they had most likely suffered more casualties only because the Russians hadn't deployed some of their forces south.

The remarkable about the Charkiv offensive is; the Ukrainians were very vocal about an offensive in the Kherson region and the Russians believed them. Usually military planners to tell the world about what they are planning to do.

The Russians also had two options : to deploy troops in the Kherson region or in the Charkiv region .
There is no proof that the Russians send reinforcements to Kherson because the Ukrainians told publicly that they would attack there .
There is also no proof that the Charkiv offensive would have failed if Charkiv was not weakened .
We don't know the Russian strength in Charkiv ,neither do we know the Ukrainian strength .
The big mistake you make is to think that the Russian strategy was depending on what the Russians believed Ukraine would/could do .
There is no proven causal relation between deception done by A and the strategy of B .
The Russians sent forces to Kherson,not because they thought Ukraine would attack there, but because their opinion was that if Ukraine attacked Kherson, the Kherson forces would be defeated .
It was the same in Normandy : the Germans did not care about where the Allies would land,because they knew that they were obliged to defend everything ,as the Allies would land where the defense was very weak .
Normandy was reinforced because it was weaker than the other sectors .
Kherson was reinforced because it was weaker than Charkiv .
The Russians and the Germans were the weaker side and as thus the knowledge where the opponent could/would attack was a luxury they could not use .
Information about where the enemy can/will attack is only useful if you have the needed forces to defend the sector where the enemy can/will attack .
.
If you do not have these forces, this information is useless .
 
The Russians also had two options : to deploy troops in the Kherson region or in the Charkiv region .
There is no proof that the Russians send reinforcements to Kherson because the Ukrainians told publicly that they would attack there .
There is also no proof that the Charkiv offensive would have failed if Charkiv was not weakened .
We don't know the Russian strength in Charkiv ,neither do we know the Ukrainian strength .
The big mistake you make is to think that the Russian strategy was depending on what the Russians believed Ukraine would/could do .
There is no proven causal relation between deception done by A and the strategy of B .
The Russians sent forces to Kherson,not because they thought Ukraine would attack there, but because their opinion was that if Ukraine attacked Kherson, the Kherson forces would be defeated .
It was the same in Normandy : the Germans did not care about where the Allies would land,because they knew that they were obliged to defend everything ,as the Allies would land where the defense was very weak .
Normandy was reinforced because it was weaker than the other sectors .
Kherson was reinforced because it was weaker than Charkiv .
The Russians and the Germans were the weaker side and as thus the knowledge where the opponent could/would attack was a luxury they could not use .
Information about where the enemy can/will attack is only useful if you have the needed forces to defend the sector where the enemy can/will attack .
.
If you do not have these forces, this information is useless .

The Russians moved parts of the 1st Guard Army from Kharkiv to Kherson which weakened the Russian defense around Kharkiv. The intelligence contribute to get a picture of where and what the opponent are doing. There is another aspect of how the intelligence is working. The Ukrainians have been able to target high ranked Russian commanders which weakened their centralized command structure. How did they know where these officers were

The Ukrainians have one advantage in this war. They know the Russian mind and doctrine but mostly they know the Russian weakness.

You are right about not acting on what the intelligence tells the political and military leadership. The Russians failed when they thought the Ukrainians would welcome them as liberators. If we speculate about it, either is the Russian intelligence bad or they told Putin what he wanted to hear.

The Ukrainians used deception once, can they do it again. Probably not. What they are doing right now is hiding where and when they will launch their offensive. The obvious target is Crimea when it is more vulnerable than Donbass.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ssessment-september-6?ref=kyivindependent.com
 
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I struggle to see why Russia would think they would be welcomed with open arms given the results of the 1991 Independance referendum, it really wasn't close.

Yes Vote:
picture2355.png


No Vote:
picture2356.png


The results sort of justify the Crimean action but outside that not one other oblast was close.
 
The Russians moved parts of the 1st Guard Army from Kharkiv to Kherson which weakened the Russian defense around Kharkiv. The intelligence contribute to get a picture of where and what the opponent are doing. There is another aspect of how the intelligence is working. The Ukrainians have been able to target high ranked Russian commanders which weakened their centralized command structure. How did they know where these officers were

The Ukrainians have one advantage in this war. They know the Russian mind and doctrine but mostly they know the Russian weakness.

You are right about not acting on what the intelligence tells the political and military leadership. The Russians failed when they thought the Ukrainians would welcome them as liberators. If we speculate about it, either is the Russian intelligence bad or they told Putin what he wanted to hear.

The Ukrainians used deception once, can they do it again. Probably not. What they are doing right now is hiding where and when they will launch their offensive. The obvious target is Crimea when it is more vulnerable than Donbass.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ssessment-september-6?ref=kyivindependent.com

They told Putin what he wanted to hear ,because what he wanted to hear (The Ukrainians welcoming the Russians as liberators ) was the condition sine qua non for the success of the war . If the Ukrainians fought back, 200000 Russians could not defeat them . It was the same for the Russians in Afghanistan .
US also acted conforming what it wanted to hear in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Iraq ,for the same reason.
That the Ukrainians are hiding where and when they will attack is something questionable, as we don't know that that they know where and when they can attack . An Ukrainian attack is not certain .
Hitler did the same .
 
I struggle to see why Russia would think they would be welcomed with open arms given the results of the 1991 Independance referendum, it really wasn't close.

Yes Vote:
picture2355.png


No Vote:
picture2356.png


The results sort of justify the Crimean action but outside that not one other oblast was close.

I do not struggle to see this ,as it was needed to win .
Wishful thinking .
The interventionists in DC also thought that the Iraqi,Vietnamese and Afghans would welcome the US army as liberator and would very eagerly accept US culture .
 
They told Putin what he wanted to hear ,because what he wanted to hear (The Ukrainians welcoming the Russians as liberators ) was the condition sine qua non for the success of the war . If the Ukrainians fought back, 200000 Russians could not defeat them . It was the same for the Russians in Afghanistan .
US also acted conforming what it wanted to hear in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Iraq ,for the same reason.
That the Ukrainians are hiding where and when they will attack is something questionable, as we don't know that that they know where and when they can attack . An Ukrainian attack is not certain .
Hitler did the same .

The Ukrainians have launched counter offensives before so they have the skills to coordinate offensives. The Ukrainians have a decentralized command structure, which is more effective than the Russian. The Ukrainian ability to detect Russian command posts and logistical hubs makes it harder for the Russians to defend against Ukrainian attacks.
 
The Ukrainians have launched counter offensives before so they have the skills to coordinate offensives. The Ukrainians have a decentralized command structure, which is more effective than the Russian. The Ukrainian ability to detect Russian command posts and logistical hubs makes it harder for the Russians to defend against Ukrainian attacks.

Recently an high placed Ukrainian official said that for the moment Ukraine would not start an attack,as it is waiting on more tank reinforcements from the West .
Zelensky said the same .
This could be a deception, but OTOH, it is very doubtful that Ukraine would launch an attack in the Spring Rasputitza and ,if it did, that such an attack could be successful .
The Ukrainian minister of Defense said that an attack would depend on the weather and could be postponed to May .
I also think that you are exaggerating the benefits of a 'decentralised '' command structure ,as attacks must always be coordinated/directed by a central command .
 
Recently an high placed Ukrainian official said that for the moment Ukraine would not start an attack,as it is waiting on more tank reinforcements from the West .
Zelensky said the same .
This could be a deception, but OTOH, it is very doubtful that Ukraine would launch an attack in the Spring Rasputitza and ,if it did, that such an attack could be successful .
The Ukrainian minister of Defense said that an attack would depend on the weather and could be postponed to May .
I also think that you are exaggerating the benefits of a 'decentralised '' command structure ,as attacks must always be coordinated/directed by a central command .

I think you are misinterpreting what he means by decentralised in this case.

Overall I don't think the Ukrainians are ready for an offensive yet, I just don't think they have enough of the material they are going to need.
 
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War is chaos and a lot of things can change during a battle. The decentralized command structure gives the lower ranked commanders the ability to respond to changes in the environment and to call in artillery, air support and other assets. If we have a brigade battlegroup getting the mission to launch an attack in an area. The commander gives his subordinate commanders more flexibility to do the job and to solve the problems they might face during the attack.

The centralized command structure is different. The lower ranked commanders cannot respond to the change in the environment without the permission of the higher ranked commanders. It makes the responds slower.
 
A Russian officer in Putin's Federal Protective Service FSO has defected. He claims Putin is rather healthy (for his age). He also claims Putin never use cell phones nor the Internet so he gets the information from his inner circle. That doesn't make any sense, a living man with access to the Internet and have never watched Internet porn.


https://apnews.com/article/defector...center-putin-42c570974c93255d178c5b373c9c12d3

I guess that explains the bad mood.
;)

And let's face it not having the internet he will never get to see things like this ...
life altering story
 
I guess that explains the bad mood.
;)

And let's face it not having the internet he will never get to see things like this ...
life altering story

Or we can view it like. That guy has access to great technology and he uses it to tape a farting horse.

We all have heard speculation about Putin's health. This defector says he is quite healthy, but he has what many Russian leaders had before him, paranoia
 
Or we can view it like. That guy has access to great technology and he uses it to tape a farting horse.

We all have heard speculation about Putin's health. This defector says he is quite healthy, but he has what many Russian leaders had before him, paranoia

I think the question about his health could be answered by whether Putin has doppelgangers or not.
 
War is chaos and a lot of things can change during a battle. The decentralized command structure gives the lower ranked commanders the ability to respond to changes in the environment and to call in artillery, air support and other assets. If we have a brigade battlegroup getting the mission to launch an attack in an area. The commander gives his subordinate commanders more flexibility to do the job and to solve the problems they might face during the attack.

The centralized command structure is different. The lower ranked commanders cannot respond to the change in the environment without the permission of the higher ranked commanders. It makes the responds slower.

The danger of decentralized command structure is that it gives local,regional commanders too much power .
Example :a local commander feels that he can't sustain an enemy attack without using the strategic reserves or his own tactical reserves .
Who decides ? The local commander or the supreme commander ?
On D Day Speidel (Chief of staff of Rommel who was absent ) and Rundstedt (OBW ) demanded that the OKW reserves would be released, Jodl ,supported by Hitler, refused ,arguing that the situation was not clear and that one should wait .
In December 1944 Ike decided to send the 101 airborne to Bastogne ,although the commanders of the region north of Bastogne also asked for reinforcements .
The reality is that every decision from a local commander can have negative results for his neighbours, even for units far away and that thus the central commander not only must have the authority to annul the decision of the local commander but also to prevent it .Thus the local commander must first inform his superior before acting .
In May 1940 Guderian wanted to act autonomously without concern for the consequences for his neighbours and was vetoed by his superior Kleist .
 
Yep, I have been thinking about the Ukrainian spring offensive and trying to predict where they will launch it. I guess north of Bakhmut, south from Zaporizhzhiza toward Crimea. If this one is successful, the Ukrainian forces may cross the river around Kherson. One option might be between Melitopol and Mariupol to cut off the Russian supply lines between Donbass and Crimea

Well I suspect this is why we haven't seen much evidence of a Ukrainian attack.
Seems there may have been some form of leak...

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/us-nato-ukraine-war-plans-pentagon-b2315842.html
 
I read that before his invasion of Ukraine, Putin was considering attacking Japan. He must have forgotten about the trouncing Japan gave Russia in 1905.
 
The danger of decentralized command structure is that it gives local,regional commanders too much power .
Example :a local commander feels that he can't sustain an enemy attack without using the strategic reserves or his own tactical reserves .
Who decides ? The local commander or the supreme commander ?
On D Day Speidel (Chief of staff of Rommel who was absent ) and Rundstedt (OBW ) demanded that the OKW reserves would be released, Jodl ,supported by Hitler, refused ,arguing that the situation was not clear and that one should wait .
In December 1944 Ike decided to send the 101 airborne to Bastogne ,although the commanders of the region north of Bastogne also asked for reinforcements .
The reality is that every decision from a local commander can have negative results for his neighbours, even for units far away and that thus the central commander not only must have the authority to annul the decision of the local commander but also to prevent it .Thus the local commander must first inform his superior before acting .
In May 1940 Guderian wanted to act autonomously without concern for the consequences for his neighbours and was vetoed by his superior Kleist .

What you are describing is actually an example of centralized command structure. The decentralized command structure is mission focused and it doesn't have a lot in common with the Second World War.

The decentralized command structure is actually about delegate the decision making close as possible to those who do the job. The higher ranked commanders job is to provide with support to do who do the job. The mission focused approach allow the lower ranked commanders to adjust to a change during a mission because the opponent can respond differently than what you anticipated them to do.
 
I read that before his invasion of Ukraine, Putin was considering attacking Japan. He must have forgotten about the trouncing Japan gave Russia in 1905.

That would have caused a war between the US and Russia due to the bilateral defense agreement between the US and Japan
 
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