Why did Germany lose WW2?

[lljadw]

A third? That ain't right. By 'Wehrmacht' do you mean all the armed services of Germany or just the Army (Heer)? I'm pretty sure that almost all of the front line combat strength of the Heer and Luftwaffe was committed to Barbarossa. The vast majority of the divisions not committed in 1941 were in other theatres, i.e Africa or 2nd echelon or training formations. In other words they were not front line combat capable.


The Red Army may not have been a horde of untrained men, but due to the officer purges of the late 1930s most of the best brains had been cut out of the Red Army. Many of the divisional and corps commanders facing the Germans in 1941 were either green or politically reliable officers who may not have been the best field commanders. There were some good commanders at the army level like Dimitri Lelyushenko, Boris Shaposhnikov and of course, Zhukov but most of the Red Army commanders were substandard compared to their contemparies in the Wehrmacht. The one thing in their favour was that they were on average 10 years younger and thus fitter and better able to withstand the demands of intense warfare.

Due to the staggering losses suffered in the field by the Red Army in 1941, they resorted to sending in troops with the minimal of basic training. They were also thrown piecemeal into useless offensives in late 1941 in a futile attempt to stem the march of the German Army. The Germans did suffer some significant losses but compared to the Red Army they were minimal. I no longer have my copy of 'Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century' by Krivosheev but if you check the force losses for each side in 1941 you'll see that the Red Army and VVS (Soviet Airforce) numerically lost a lot more than the Germans did. The Soviets eventually won because they were able to replace their losses whereas the Germans were not.

By Wehrmacht,I mean all German forces;strength of the Ostheer was :2.7;strength of the Wehrmacht more than 8 million.
I know that the divisions in the West were not apt for the war in the East,but the Ostheer had less aircraft and only as much artillery as in may 194O;there is also the point that due to Britain in the war,a lot of the German war production was committed to the air defense (88 mm guns) and the Uboats ,thus my point of a second front that became more important the following years and that was more important IMVHO than Lend-Lease.
of course the Soviets could mobilize more and FASTER their manpower (that's a reason for the German failure):in june 2.7 in september 3.4 in december 4.5 (front strength),they send more than 6 million men to the front in less than 5 months !
About the losses:I have down-loaded some excerpts from Krivosheev :Soviet losses in the 3th quarter :2.7 million ,in the 4th quarter 1.5 million (and probably to low ),but :the German losses (from Va-Banque ) 3th quarter :530000 ;4th quarter :300000 ;the ratio for the two quarters is 1-5
The weekly German losses in 1941 was 3OOOO
In 1942 the German losses were some 1100000;weekly some 20000
In 1943 the German losses were 1442654 (from an excerpt of Kursk:a statistical analysis on the net ) :weekly = 27670
Thus you see that 1941 was,relatively,worse for the Germans than 1942 and 1943 .I see a mixture of 2 possible reasons 1The German Army in 194O was not that superior (in jun e 1941 they had 3850 tanks (a lot of them PzI !) and Assault Guns for 2.7 million and in june 1944 4200 tanks and AG for 2.2 (or 2.6 )
2 .Was the Red Army in 1941 that inferior ?Krivosheev gives the following Soviet losses:1942 :6.6 million 1943:6.9 million;1944:5.7 million 1945 :2638167 !(with a weekly loss of 153893,worse than 1941 ,I don't think that one could say that the Red army was worse in 1945 than in 1941)
Loss ratio's:
1941 :1-5
1942 : 1-6
1943 :1-4.9
1944 :1-2.8(German losses were some 2 million)
for 1945 there are no reliable figures for the German losses
If one looks at the loss ratios,I think that there was less difference between the German performance in 1941,1942 and 1943;the same for the Red Army ;that's why I mentioned that the war in the East was a war of attrition between two mainly not motorised armies (if you do not object,I will develop later my argument of non motorized armies
I don't think that the Russian counter-offensives in 1941 were useless :they bought the SU the time to transfer as much as possible their industries to the east.An other point is the Russian winteroffensivewhat,IMVHO ,was a total failure and wast of manpower and war material(the Germans lost some 20000 weekly and the Russians 120000)
PS:all the loss figures are combatlosses only

 

[Guaporense]

Due to the staggering losses suffered in the field by the Red Army in 1941, they resorted to sending in troops with the minimal of basic training.

I think this explains why the loss ratio of 1942 was even worse than in 1941: In 1942 for every German killed and wounded, the soviets lost 6 killed and wounded. While in 1941, the ratio of casualties was 1 to 5, as pointed out by ljdadw, and note that in 1941 most of these casualties were prisioners, not soldiers killed and wounded. With means that the tactical combat proficiency of the Red Army in 1941 was better than in 1942.

 

[Guaporense]

yes and no:all fronts were interdependent:a collapse of the SU in 1941 would have made it very difficult fot the US and UK to win ,but a German victory in the Battle of the Atlantic(and the elimination of the UK) would have been desastrous for the SU

Sure they all were. However, from 1941 to 1944, the vast majority of Ger's resources were allocated against the USSR. This means that if the war in the west ended, the forces to reinforce the Ostfront would increase the number of men and materiel by about 30-40%.

While, if the war against the USSR ended, the forces against the western allies would increase by several times over. For example, in normandy 1944, instead of 70 divisions and 800 aircraft, without the USSR the germans could concentrate maybe 250-300 divisions and 5000-6000 aircraft in the western front. The western allies would face a task of maybe an order of magnitude greater than they historically faced.

there was already a second front in june 1941 nly a third of the wehrmacht was committed in the east

The percentage of divisions commited in the east from 1941 to 1943 was about 70-75%. And the percentage of divisions effectively fighting was about 98% (150-200 divisions vs 4-5 divisions in Africa).

2:quantity defeating quality :this is an exageration :the quantity had also a quality :the red army was not a horde of untrained men ,it was not cannon-fodder;the German losses were enormous in 1941 :an average of 31000 a year and the quality of the Wehrmacht was not that superior .
What is exact is that the SU survived in 1941,because it was able to send to the front some 6 million men AND weapons and supply

Sure, an untrained horde would not be able to win the war. But the quality of the USSR troops was still much inferior to german.

 

[lljadw]

from a post by Qvist on AHF:Geerman Combat Losses by quarter
3q 1941:551189
4q 1941:279861
1942 1q:28O238
2q:220291
3q:383750
4q :177O5O
1943 1q:498795
2q:110139
3q:533025
4q:381725
1944 :1q:423715
:2q:352831
:3q:879127
:4q:297782
I compilated the weekly losses for the same periods
1941 1:38201
2:21294
1942 1 :21796
2:16945
3:29198
4:13471
1943 :1:38795
2: 8472
3:40556
4:29044
1944 1:32957
2:27140
3:56890
4:22657
German forces committed in the east(remplacements included)
1941 :3.7 million CL:830000 =22.45 % (for 27 weeks )
1942 :4.4 million CL 1.1 million =25 % (the figure of 4.4 million is not very reliable)
1943 :4.2 million CL 1.4 million =33 %
1944 :4.7 million CL 2 million =45 %(the figure of 4.7 million is not very reliable )
the forces committed in 1942 and 1944 could be higher
as you see the % for 1941 is maybe (on year base) even higher than in 1944;I see two possible explanations :the Germans in 1941 not that good as generally assumed or the Soviets in 1941 not that bad as generally assumed (or a mixture of the two)

 

[Doppleganger]

I think it's a reach to say that the Red Army of 1941 was better than that of 1942; sure the loss ratios might have been higher in 1942 but that's partly because the Red Army was hastily reforming in 1942 and training was still minimal and because the Soviets were caught by surprise at the direction of Case Blau - towards Stalingrad rather than Moscow. Add to that the losses suffered during the successful Operation Uranus (Stalingrad counter-offensive) and unsuccessful Operation Mars (attempt by Zhukov to bludgeon Army Group Centre camped near Rzhev) - the latter gave rise to the term 'Rzhev meat grinder' with the 'meat' being unfortunate Russian soldiers.

Sure the only chance for the Soviets in 1941 was to trade land for time, time to get their industries, command structures and political apparatus relocated East but the counter-offensives in October and November 1941 could have been much better co-ordinated. The Russian winter-offensive wasn't a total waste of time, although the Red Army did allow themselves to be overextended and thus suffered heavy losses as a result. They did not learn this lesson at all in WW2 as Manstein demonstrated in 1943 during the 3rd Battle of Kharkov. Army Group Centre nearly routed and I guess Stalin was thinking 'just one more push and we've got them!' Von Kluge's 4th Army fared the best but mainly because he had disobeyed direct orders from German High Command to commit to the 2nd phase of the assault on Moscow. Had 4th Army not been so 'relatively' strong Army Group Centre might have crumbled.

 

[lljadw]

Soviet forces engaged (operational forces and Stavka reserve)
1941 :9million CL :4.16 million =46.22 % (for 27 weeks)
1942 :14.177 million CL :6.58 million =46.4%
1943 :14.78 million CL:6.87 million = 46.4%
1944 :14.06 million CL:5.68 million = 40.4 %
The CL are taken from Krivosheev ;the strength figures from a post of Art on AHF

 

[radarsonar]

Hitler psychology

Germany lost the world war 2 because Hitler listened to his heart instead of his head. The thing I admire about him is he could have easily stayed on in power by halting aggression after occupying austria, czechoslovakia, poland and France.

By this time, he had re-gained Germany's lost territories of world war 1, and he was all powerful and popular within Germany. He could have enjoyed all the power till he died. But this guy fought for his Fatherland with all purity of his soul and died for the same cause.

I see this as much better than politicians who stick to power at any cost. What do you people think?

 

[lljadw]

Germany lost the world war 2 because Hitler listened to his heart instead of his head. The thing I admire about him is he could have easily stayed on in power by halting aggression after occupying austria, czechoslovakia, poland and France.

By this time, he had re-gained Germany's lost territories of world war 1, and he was all powerful and popular within Germany. He could have enjoyed all the power till he died. But this guy fought for his Fatherland with all purity of his soul and died for the same cause.

I see this as much better than politicians who stick to power at any cost. What do you people think?

I will remain polite and thus not say what I am thinking :x

 

[MontyB]

Germany lost the world war 2 because Hitler listened to his heart instead of his head. The thing I admire about him is he could have easily stayed on in power by halting aggression after occupying austria, czechoslovakia, poland and France.

By this time, he had re-gained Germany's lost territories of world war 1, and he was all powerful and popular within Germany. He could have enjoyed all the power till he died. But this guy fought for his Fatherland with all purity of his soul and died for the same cause.

I see this as much better than politicians who stick to power at any cost. What do you people think?

It is hard to find anything to admire in the man given the overall cost and effect of his leadership for the world.
You are probably right that he could have stopped at the channel and negotiated an end to the war but that would have shown a level of sanity and rationalism that he just didn't have, mind you had he really had Germany's best interests at heart he would have stayed on his side of the Polish border and spared the world 50 million-ish lives and his country from utter destruction.

 

[redcoat]

I see this as much better than politicians who stick to power at any cost.?

What have you been sniffing ?

Hitler is the ultimate expression of a politician who sticks to power at any cost.

His lust for power brought Germany nothing but death and destruction

 

[Guaporense]

Putting quarterly red army losses together, we get the overall picture:

from a post by Qvist on AHF:

German/Soviet Combat Losses by quarter

1941 3q: 551,189 / 2,744,765 ratio: 4.979
1941 4q: 279,861 / 1,563,329 ratio: 5.586
1942 1q: 28O,238 / 1,791,441 ratio: 6.395
1942 2q: 220,291 / 1,478,441 ratio: 6.711
1942 3q: 383,750 / 2,418,801 ratio: 6.303
1942 4q: 177,O5O / 1,391,831 ratio: 7.863
1943 1q: 498,795 / 2,077,543 ratio: 4.165
1943 2q: 110,139 / 596,868 ratio: 5.419
1943 3q: 533,025 / 2,747,957 ratio: 5.155
1943 4q: 381,725 / 2,061,251 ratio: 5.399
1944 1q: 423,715 / 2,035,823 ratio: 4.805
1944 2q: 352,831 / 1,208,573 ratio: 3.425
1944 3q: 879,127 / 1,972,397 ratio: 2.244
1944 4q: 297,782 / 1,286,411 ratio: 4.319

This shows the decline of the fighting power of the German army from 1942 to 1944. Note too the decline in quality of the red army between 1941 and 1942, as they had to mobilize hundreds of poorly trained divisions to stop the onslaught. Then, the quality of their troops increased, while German quality declined.

Note the turning point at Stalingrad, at 1943 1q.

The best quarter for the Red Army was the 3q of 1944. Sure, with Bagration, they ate the wehrmacht that quarter.

 

[Supostat]

Putting quarterly red army losses together, we get the overall picture:

from a post by Qvist on AHF:

German/Soviet Combat Losses by quarter

1941 3q: 551,189 / 2,744,765 ratio: 4.979
1941 4q: 279,861 / 1,563,329 ratio: 5.586
1942 1q: 28O,238 / 1,791,441 ratio: 6.395
1942 2q: 220,291 / 1,478,441 ratio: 6.711
1942 3q: 383,750 / 2,418,801 ratio: 6.303
1942 4q: 177,O5O / 1,391,831 ratio: 7.863
1943 1q: 498,795 / 2,077,543 ratio: 4.165
1943 2q: 110,139 / 596,868 ratio: 5.419
1943 3q: 533,025 / 2,747,957 ratio: 5.155
1943 4q: 381,725 / 2,061,251 ratio: 5.399
1944 1q: 423,715 / 2,035,823 ratio: 4.805
1944 2q: 352,831 / 1,208,573 ratio: 3.425
1944 3q: 879,127 / 1,972,397 ratio: 2.244
1944 4q: 297,782 / 1,286,411 ratio: 4.319

There is something wrong with these numbers. I put them together and get 25M of Soviet Losses (and that without 1945!).

Problem is, the number is incredibly high, if we remember, that number of personell served in Red Army in period 1941-1945 is 35M. If 25M of them is killed, how can there still be 10M of capable to fight men, if usually there are 3 injured soldiers per 1 killed one?

I think there is various methods of counting of losses employed. Only killed soldiers for German side, while killed and incapacitated soldiers for Russian side... 25M is credible value for killed and incapacitated, not for killed alone.

 

[lljadw]

There is something wrong with these numbers. I put them together and get 25M of Soviet Losses (and that without 1945!).

Problem is, the number is incredibly high, if we remember, that number of personell served in Red Army in period 1941-1945 is 35M. If 25M of them is killed, how can there still be 10M of capable to fight men, if usually there are 3 injured soldiers per 1 killed one?

I think there is various methods of counting of losses employed. Only killed soldiers for German side, while killed and incapacitated soldiers for Russian side... 25M is credible value for killed and incapacitated, not for killed alone.

There is nothing wrong with these numbers :they are totals of death,wounded and missing and sick (?),for the sickness cases I am not sure .They are derived from the official Russian figures by Krivosheev .The figures for 1945 are not mentioned,because there are no reliable German figures for that year,thus no comparison possible .

 

[Supostat]

There is nothing wrong with these numbers :they are totals of death,wounded and missing and sick (?),for the sickness cases I am not sure .

And the same for Germans? Is it clearly known that criteria for `injured` soldier for all sides are the same? Maybe soldier, injured and returned to duty within couple of days, did not qualify as casualty for one side, while the same case for other side did qualify as casualty?

Thus, this kind of `casualties stats` could be inacurate, also because double-, triple- of even multicounting is possible (there have been examples when WW2 soldiers were injured, healed, returned to battle, injured and healed again, returned to battle once more, injured again and finally killed).

 

[lljadw]

For the German non combat losses (mostly sickness and accidents ):from june to april 1942:570OOO nly are included those who had to leave the backward area of the front and were transported to rear areas ,ex . Minsk,Smolensk or even to Germany.
For these NCL :93 % was unfit for a month ,5% was unfit for front service,1% unfit for any duty and 0.667% died .
For the Combat losses :22.9% were KIA,8.6% died of injuries within 3 months(DOW),56 % were ready for duty in 3 months ,10 % were unsuitable for front service (frontunfaehig) and 2.5% were discharged .
Normally,a soldier twice wounded was counted twice .
Source :AHF :German casualties in Barbarossa in 1941

 

[iron cross]

why did germany lose the war

i think they should have finished the Russians off when they had the chance instead of waiting and letting them build more tanks and planes they then could of recruited more Russian waffen ss and had more supplies and more slave labour then they would of been a force to reckon with:neutral:

 

[imp]

Was it not as simple as to ambitious spreading thin with to many fronts to fight on. If they had not attacked Russia would the bear have stepped up to bat or just protected its border having seen what they had achieved up till that time.

 

[LeEnfield]

The one thing Hitler always said was that "He did not want to fight a war on two fronts" In the finish his army was scattered in fighting all over the place, just think what might have happened if he was only fighting on one front and could pour every bit of his resources into that conflict.

 

[iron cross]

The one thing Hitler always said was that "He did not want to fight a war on two fronts" In the finish his army was scattered in fighting all over the place, just think what might have happened if he was only fighting on one front and could pour every bit of his resources into that conflict.

yes good point LeEnfield but i think he hittler wanted to take all of europe and thats what you have to do

 

[mmarsh]

The one thing Hitler always said was that "He did not want to fight a war on two fronts" In the finish his army was scattered in fighting all over the place, just think what might have happened if he was only fighting on one front and could pour every bit of his resources into that conflict.

By July 6 1944, he had poured 80% of his resources into the Eastern Front would pulling the other 20% out of Western Europe made much difference? I doubt it.

It would have been sticker situation for the allies if it were the other way around but I still think they would have won at the very bloody end for the simple reason that even at full strength Germany could not have possibly stopped the invasion, simply too much territory to defend. The allies could have landed anywhere from Norway to Greece.