Why did Germany lose WW2?

lljadw said:
I am not sure:The German casualties wer lower in the winter than during Barbarossa and the ratio German -Soviet casualties was in 1941 1-5 and in 1942 1-6 . From a military point of viewwas it not better for the Soviets not to launch their winteroffensive ? The results were minime and the costs very high,with a casualty ratio of 1-6 .Maybe the Red Army would be in a better position in 1942 .
Click to expand...
Operation Typhoon's principal aim was to seize Moscow by means of a double pincer envelopment, the same tactics used to capture Kiev. I think it was obvious that Stalin would try and hold Moscow by all means available and Hitler was hoping to suck in the remaining Russian field armies and then envelop them with 2 armoured pincers. Essentially this was not Blitzkrieg but modified Keil und Kessel (wedge and cauldron) tactics that were used by the Imperial German Army in WWI, although without the use of armour of course.

It's true that the Red Army suffered heavier casualties in the Winter of 1941 but the key point is they could afford those casualties whereas the Germans could not. For the Germans to have any chance of beating the Red Army they had to ensure as far as possible that any unnecessary casualties were not suffered. The Red Army in 1941 was offensively weak and operationally naive. They would have crashed against static German winter defences and been crushed. The Germans would have suffered far less casualties than they did historically and Army Group Centre would not have been pushed back nearly 200 miles in general panic.

With the benefit of hindsight a winter pause after Kiev is, to me, a no-brainer.
 
MontyB said:
True but I would guess that he felt once the southern flank was secure, the fall of Moscow before the close of operations (for the winter) would pretty much destroy the Russian will to fight on and given the progress they had made up to that point I doubt that too many leaders would found fault in this.

Certainly the benefit of hindsight tell us how fool hardy his plan was but I think that in December 1941 it was a perfectly rational idea to finish the war in the east rapidly or at least make the Russian position west of the Urals untenable.
Click to expand...
More and more historians now believe that Hitler was persuaded by his senior commanders to try for Moscow after Kiev, against his own better judgment. This partly explains Hitler's rage when Typhoon failed and why he sacked Army Group Centre's overall commander Fedor von Bock and 3 out of 6 of its army commanders, including Guderian.
 
Doppleganger said:
More and more historians now believe that Hitler was persuaded by his senior commanders to try for Moscow after Kiev, against his own better judgment. This partly explains Hitler's rage when Typhoon failed and why he sacked Army Group Centre's overall commander Fedor von Bock and 3 out of 6 of its army commanders, including Guderian.
Click to expand...
I thought that Bock was returning in january ,Guderian was sacked by Kluge and Rundstedt returned to the West;the sacking of Hoppner happened in january,during the Winteroffensive .
 
Doppleganger said:
Operation Typhoon's principal aim was to seize Moscow by means of a double pincer envelopment, the same tactics used to capture Kiev. I think it was obvious that Stalin would try and hold Moscow by all means available and Hitler was hoping to suck in the remaining Russian field armies and then envelop them with 2 armoured pincers. Essentially this was not Blitzkrieg but modified Keil und Kessel (wedge and cauldron) tactics that were used by the Imperial German Army in WWI, although without the use of armour of course.

It's true that the Red Army suffered heavier casualties in the Winter of 1941 but the key point is they could afford those casualties whereas the Germans could not. For the Germans to have any chance of beating the Red Army they had to ensure as far as possible that any unnecessary casualties were not suffered. The Red Army in 1941 was offensively weak and operationally naive. They would have crashed against static German winter defences and been crushed. The Germans would have suffered far less casualties than they did historically and Army Group Centre would not have been pushed back nearly 200 miles in general panic.

With the benefit of hindsight a winter pause after Kiev is, to me, a no-brainer.
Click to expand...
on the other hand,the Wehrmacht was not destroyed in the Russian winteroffensive:in the summer of 1942 the Stavka reckoned with the possibility of a German attack on Moscow and concentrated the Soviet reserves in that area
 
I do not understand the meaning of the second part of your post :I do not deny that after Kiev the Germans had to attack ;I am question only the utility,from a military point of view,of the Soviet Winteroffensive:it was a failure -the objectives were not obtained -due to the Soviets overestimating their force and underestimating the defensive capabilities of the Germans.
 
lljadw said:
I do not understand the meaning of the second part of your post :I do not deny that after Kiev the Germans had to attack ;I am question only the utility,from a military point of view,of the Soviet Winteroffensive:it was a failure -the objectives were not obtained -due to the Soviets overestimating their force and underestimating the defensive capabilities of the Germans.
Click to expand...
Bock was reassigned in 1942 only because Reichenau died of a heart attack and Bock was the most experienced large formation field commander available.

2nd Panzer Army was subordinate to Kluge's 4th Army and Kluge was Guderian's superior. Kluge reported Guderian to Hitler for disobeying Hitler's direct orders. Kluge, in theory, could dismiss Guderian but in reality Guderian was a 'blue-eyed boy' of the Wehrmacht and only Hitler could properly sack Guderian. Rundstedt was in overall charge of Army Group South so not sure why his name has been brought up. Hoepner was sacked in January but that is within the time frame of the greater Battle of Moscow.

The 2nd part of my post was basically to say that the Red Army could afford to take casualties in the hundreds of thousands but that the Wehrmacht could not. One of the main reasons why the Red Army won was because it was able to draw upon a strategic reserve of manpower. The Germans took far greater losses in the winter of 1941 than they should have.
 
As with any purpose Germany consumed itself politically, the leadership failed in all aspects of a government. Everything else is part of the government, once the head fails, all else follows. Evil spans evil and failure. I would have to research it, but Germany had many divisions at the conclusion of the war, but they had no viable leadership.

Walter
 
I can not help but feel that if Hitler would have left the planning up to his Generals, avoided creation of para-military groups & not demanded so much change in the weapons manufacturing, Germany might have won. This is just the opinion of an arm-chair historian.
 
David_914 said:
I can not help but feel that if Hitler would have left the planning up to his Generals, avoided creation of para-military groups & not demanded so much change in the weapons manufacturing, Germany might have won. This is just the opinion of an arm-chair historian.
Click to expand...
The planning was done by the generals
Which paramilitary groups do you mean .
If there was so much change in the weapon manufacturing ,was this due to Hitler's demands ?
 
lljadw said:
The planning was done by the generals
Which paramilitary groups do you mean .
If there was so much change in the weapon manufacturing ,was this due to Hitler's demands ?
Click to expand...

The generals made the plans. Hitler chose the one that he liked.

The same with weapons. The companies made the prototypes, hitler chose the ones that he liked.

This, certainly, was bad for the war effort.
 
I always thought Hitler made the plans the Generals had to carry them out
Hitler also had the last word on what weapons made and how they should be used and where.
 
LeEnfield said:
I always thought Hitler made the plans the Generals had to carry them out
Hitler also had the last word on what weapons made and how they should be used and where.
Click to expand...
The Generals made all the operational plans but after December 1941 Hitler essentially oversaw the manner in which they carried those plans out. Hitler was obviously in charge of grand strategy which included weapons development and deployment.
 
One thing I've heard from a HUGE WWII scholar at my school is that the German Blitzkreig failed because they simply began running low on resources, especially oil for their tanks. This is one of the big causes for failing to finish off Russia, which is a big cause for failing in the war.

That's pretty much third-hand info though so there's plenty of room for error, I might be wrong.
 
After reading dozens of books about the subject I reached the following conclusion:

1- The outcome of WW2 was decided on the Eastern Front (that one should be obvious to anybody that has some decent knowledge about this war).

2- Germany lost the war because the USSR had the manpower to maintain the front even when they were losing nearly 1 million men per month. It was quantity defeating quality. If any other country was hit by the strength of Barbarossa, they would have fallen. For example, the US managed to deploy 1.5 million men in 60 divisions in Europe by early 1945, after 7 months, the USSR lost 4.3 million men in 220 divisions in 5 months.
 
Last edited:
Guaporense said:
After reading dozens of books about the subject I reached the following conclusion:

1- The outcome of WW2 was decided on the Eastern Front (that one should be obvious to anybody that has some decent knowledge about this war).

2- Germany lost the war because the USSR had the manpower to maintain the front even when they were losing nearly 1 million men per month. It was quantity defeating quality. If any other country was hit by the strength of Barbarossa, they would have fallen. For example, the US managed to deploy 1.5 million men in 60 divisions in Europe by early 1945, after 7 months, the USSR lost 4.3 million men in 220 divisions in 5 months.
Click to expand...
yes and no:all fronts were interdependent:a collapse of the SU in 1941 would have made it very difficult fot the US and UK to win ,but a German victory in the Battle of the Atlantic(and the elimination of the UK) would have been desastrous for the SU
there was already a second front in june 1941 :only a third of the wehrmacht was committed in the east
2:quantity defeating quality :this is an exageration :the quantity had also a quality :the red army was not a horde of untrained men ,it was not cannon-fodder;the German losses were enormous in 1941 :an average of 31000 a year and the quality of the Wehrmacht was not that superior .
What is exact is that the SU survived in 1941,because it was able to send to the front some 6 million men AND weapons and supply
 
I dont entirely agree, had Britain not been in the war it would have freed up 50-60 divisions for the Eastern Front however the bulk of these were not well trained or equipped so while they may have made an impact in the East I doubt they would have changed the result.
Had the Soviet Union been taken out of the war though the Western Allies would never have defeated a full strength German Army to get ashore in Europe.

So I tend to believe that the war was lost in the East.
 
MontyB said:
I dont entirely agree, had Britain not been in the war it would have freed up 50-60 divisions for the Eastern Front however the bulk of these were not well trained or equipped so while they may have made an impact in the East I doubt they would have changed the result.
Had the Soviet Union been taken out of the war though the Western Allies would never have defeated a full strength German Army to get ashore in Europe.

So I tend to believe that the war was lost in the East.
Click to expand...
on the other hand :the bulk of the Luftwaffe committed to the defense of the Reich,also thousands of 88 mm guns,in june 1944 :OKH theatres ( east):2.6 million,OKW :1.6 million
 
lljadw said:
there was already a second front in june 1941 :only a third of the wehrmacht was committed in the east
Click to expand...
A third? That ain't right. By 'Wehrmacht' do you mean all the armed services of Germany or just the Army (Heer)? I'm pretty sure that almost all of the front line combat strength of the Heer and Luftwaffe was committed to Barbarossa. The vast majority of the divisions not committed in 1941 were in other theatres, i.e Africa or 2nd echelon or training formations. In other words they were not front line combat capable.

lljadw said:
2:quantity defeating quality :this is an exageration :the quantity had also a quality :the red army was not a horde of untrained men ,it was not cannon-fodder;the German losses were enormous in 1941 :an average of 31000 a year and the quality of the Wehrmacht was not that superior .
What is exact is that the SU survived in 1941,because it was able to send to the front some 6 million men AND weapons and supply
Click to expand...
The Red Army may not have been a horde of untrained men, but due to the officer purges of the late 1930s most of the best brains had been cut out of the Red Army. Many of the divisional and corps commanders facing the Germans in 1941 were either green or politically reliable officers who may not have been the best field commanders. There were some good commanders at the army level like Dimitri Lelyushenko, Boris Shaposhnikov and of course, Zhukov but most of the Red Army commanders were substandard compared to their contemparies in the Wehrmacht. The one thing in their favour was that they were on average 10 years younger and thus fitter and better able to withstand the demands of intense warfare.

Due to the staggering losses suffered in the field by the Red Army in 1941, they resorted to sending in troops with the minimal of basic training. They were also thrown piecemeal into useless offensives in late 1941 in a futile attempt to stem the march of the German Army. The Germans did suffer some significant losses but compared to the Red Army they were minimal. I no longer have my copy of 'Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century' by Krivosheev but if you check the force losses for each side in 1941 you'll see that the Red Army and VVS (Soviet Airforce) numerically lost a lot more than the Germans did. The Soviets eventually won because they were able to replace their losses whereas the Germans were not.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top