Why did Germany lose WW2?

[Doppleganger]

My question is , like the egg or the chicken anecdote , whether the Germans underestimation of the Russians had to do with Hitler's ideology and that lead to the Germans not utilizing or creating and organizing an effective spy network from which to gain the information needed ?

Or if the results of their current spy network gave to Hitler the confidence to do what ideologically he saw as his duty to do.

The issue of German or Russian spy networks is i believe an extremely important issue that was strangely not discussed here.

It had quite a lot to do with Hitler's ideology IMO, and his dismissal of the Russians as inferior on a general level. The fact that the German Spy Network was comprised so fully by the Allies is partly offset by the fact that Stalin seemed suspicious to fully heed the tips he was receiving, even when he got those tips from several sources. Richard Sorge, the Lucy Spy Ring and Churchill all warned Stalin about Barbarossa but he never chose to fully accept the warnings.

Another example is German military intelligence being seemingly utterly unware of the development and deployment of the T-34 tank.

Also at Kursk, aside from the fact that the place for the German offensive was obvious, Soviet infiltration gave the Red Army detailed information on the German OOB, deployment, lines of attack and supply situation.

Intelligence was one area where the Germans were not at their best. This is partly due to ideology and bureaucracy caused by the Nazi regime. In short, there were too many Chiefs and not enough Indians.

Edit : Another issue/question is the Red Army adapting to the field. Yes on a tactical level Germans often had better commanders. On a minor-tactical one ? I think the Russians where constantly using their environment to their advantage in a way the Germans couldn't do. I am not talking about large scale battles but about the way the Russians improvised and used the what they had on each location to create defenses and fierce resistance to the Germans. Better adaptability of the Russians in general is not to be taken for granted , and i think it was another factor for the victory of the Russians. ( there was a series of many small battles over russian positions all over Russia the Germans couldn't break , this also happened in Stalingrand i believe.)

The Russians were often adept forest fighters and excellent at using that terrain in both offensive and defensive operations. They also used clever tactics in urban warfare; for example in Stalingrad they closed up the distance between themselves and the Germans, exposing the latter to artillery banks on the other side of the Volga. They also made heavy use of snipers both to demoralise and to try and cut out the brains of German formations. In infantry tactics at least the Red Army was the match of the Germans - where the Soviets fell down was the lack of flexibility in their command structure. This is where the Germans really were head and shoulders above every other army in the world. Their command structure and doctrine was the best in the world.

Another issue i would like to be examined would be the effect of Russian artillery in the world. Everyone talks about T34 but what about Russian artillery in comparison with german artillery , and german tactics ?

Another question regarding Russian tactics. Would it been better for them to have chosen a different tactics regarding the way they organized their troops at attack , at the points in the war where they had numerical superiority ?

How so ?

I understand and i could be wrong that they still didn't use their tanks like the Germans did , as the tip of the spear that would encircle enemy lines and destroy them. They used a different approach with their army. Mass of everything in abundance (tanks ,artillery , infantry) for the victory.

(sorry about my lack of fluency as English is not my first language)

Your English is fine my friend. Basically, in 1943 onwards the Red Army began to use operational tactics that suited their strengths, namely superior firepower in artillery, increasing strength in close air support and the luxury of a large strategic reserve. The fact they had the initiative after Kursk allowed them to gather overwhelming numbers at strategic points on the battlefield and then apply them, almost in a brute force manner, against German forces that were weaker numerically and more demoralised and mentally tired.

 

[mmarsh]

I disagree completely, Stalingrad had to be taken and held to protect the northern flank of Army Group Souths drive into the Caucasus, it was in my opinion the lynch pin of the whole operation.

Not only to protect the North but to stop Red Army supplies from floating down the Volga.

But Mr.Joker is correct, if Hitler had stayed with the original plan and had driven toward Moscow instead of his sightseeing tour of the Caucasus he never would have needed Stalingrad.

Like at Dunkirk, Hitler had his oppenent on the ropes and declined to deliever the Knockout punch. He was the best General the Allies ever had.

 

[Guaporense]

But Mr.Joker is correct, if Hitler had stayed with the original plan and had driven toward Moscow instead of his sightseeing tour of the Caucasus he never would have needed Stalingrad.

Also, it is said that the greatest error in the invasion of Russia was the attack on Ukraine in the sense that in barbarossa they had the opportunity to attack moscow in august 1941, when the russians weren't capable of any significant resistance.

Well, second to a paper that I read, by Glantz, if the germans tried to attack Moscow directly in august, they would have left their flanks open to the troops in Ukraine, so to attack Ukraine was a correct strategic decision at the time. I say: Maybe if it was noted that russia could mobilize 500 thousand soldiers per month, to wait 3 months is to watch the russian army to grow 1.5 million men, with was half the size of the invading german army. Time was always the central factor in the eastern front: To win the war Germany needed to defeat the soviet union before the allies attacked in the west (and they started in 1942 with the strategic bombing campaing), so to be able to allocate their entire armed forces to defend their newly-aquired european empire.

 

[Guaporense]

In fact the strategy of the germans was since the beginning to first conquer western europe (with they did), then prepare for a long attrition war agains britain and the us. In fact western continental europe had 30% of the world's industrial base around 1940, more than enough to make impossible for outiside powers to invade it. However, the British blockade prevented the importation of raw materials vital to harness the capacity of the european industrial base.

Hence, to get resources, the germans had to conquer eastern europe. Russia had all the resources they needed to wage a long attrition war agains britain and the us. The failure of operation barbarossa implied in the long run defeat of germany, sufocated by the economic isolation imposed by the maritime blockade plus the simple fact the in 1942 the urss would not export oil and rubber to germany. Also, the aerial bombing with destroyed the cities and the industrial infrastructure of the country and of some if its conquered territory (the anglo-americans bombed even germany's eastern european satellites).

The military problems in the eastern front after 1941 were secondary to the final defeat of germany, with was almost sealed in december 1941 by declaring war in the US and simultaneously, losing the opportunity to grab Moscow and cut the head of the soviet snake. The next 3 and half years were a period of long military decline in a attrition war agains't overwhelming odds, and these odds were generated essencialy because of the lack of natural resources to fuel europe's industrial might.

One of the greatest errors made by hitler was to declare war on the us. Yes, they would have declared war on germany any way, simply because the world's only superpower would not allow another country take over the european continent and become a rival (plus that fact that it would be a genocidal totalitarian rival). However, they would not declare war the next day if germany didn't do anything, they would take some time, with germany desperately needed to anex the urss and exploid its natural resources before it was too late.

 

[MontyB]

One of the greatest errors made by hitler was to declare war on the us. Yes, they would have declared war on germany any way, simply because the world's only superpower would not allow another country take over the european continent and become a rival (plus that fact that it would be a genocidal totalitarian rival). However, they would not declare war the next day if germany didn't do anything, they would take some time, with germany desperately needed to anex the urss and exploid its natural resources before it was too late.

I think there is certainly something in this especially if you take the Torch landings and USAF bombing of Germany out of the picture even for a year it may have had a major impact on the war in Russia.

I really doubt that without US troops Britain and the Commonwealth could have done much more than carry on the seesaw battles of North Africa.

 

[Doppleganger]

I think there is certainly something in this especially if you take the Torch landings and USAF bombing of Germany out of the picture even for a year it may have had a major impact on the war in Russia.

What it did was help speed up the defeat of Germany in Russia. In itself it wasn't decisive as I believe the war was already lost in 1941 for them, when they decided to assault Moscow too late in the season.

 

[MontyB]

What it did was help speed up the defeat of Germany in Russia. In itself it wasn't decisive as I believe the war was already lost in 1941 for them, when they decided to assault Moscow too late in the season.

But once again we are left with a "damned if he does and damned if he doesn't" scenario because to leave such a large Russian force on his southern flank would have been considered reckless at best especially given what we know of Russian counter offensives in late 1941 and around Stalingrad in 1942.

I tend to think the opposite in that having large concentrations of Russian forces to the north and south would have seen AGC in great peril and possibly destroyed by early 1942.

 

[lljadw]

In fact the strategy of the germans was since the beginning to first conquer western europe (with they did), then prepare for a long attrition war agains britain and the us. In fact western continental europe had 30% of the world's industrial base around 1940, more than enough to make impossible for outiside powers to invade it. However, the British blockade prevented the importation of raw materials vital to harness the capacity of the european industrial base.

Hence, to get resources, the germans had to conquer eastern europe. Russia had all the resources they needed to wage a long attrition war agains britain and the us. The failure of operation barbarossa implied in the long run defeat of germany, sufocated by the economic isolation imposed by the maritime blockade plus the simple fact the in 1942 the urss would not export oil and rubber to germany. Also, the aerial bombing with destroyed the cities and the industrial infrastructure of the country and of some if its conquered territory (the anglo-americans bombed even germany's eastern european satellites).

The military problems in the eastern front after 1941 were secondary to the final defeat of germany, with was almost sealed in december 1941 by declaring war in the US and simultaneously, losing the opportunity to grab Moscow and cut the head of the soviet snake. The next 3 and half years were a period of long military decline in a attrition war agains't overwhelming odds, and these odds were generated essencialy because of the lack of natural resources to fuel europe's industrial might.

One of the greatest errors made by hitler was to declare war on the us. Yes, they would have declared war on germany any way, simply because the world's only superpower would not allow another country take over the european continent and become a rival (plus that fact that it would be a genocidal totalitarian rival). However, they would not declare war the next day if germany didn't do anything, they would take some time, with germany desperately needed to anex the urss and exploid its natural resources before it was too late.

About Hitler declaring war on the USA:it took the US a year before participating effectively in the war:the first fighting between US and German ground forces was in february 1943 .On the other hand,if Hitler did not declare war on the US,they could eliminate Japan faster and then turn to Germa

 

[MontyB]

About Hitler declaring war on the USA:it took the US a year before participating effectively in the war:the first fighting between US and German ground forces was in february 1943 .On the other hand,if Hitler did not declare war on the US,they could eliminate Japan faster and then turn to Germa

This would have been a wet dream to the Germans in late 1941 though as it would have given them an extra couple of years to concentrate on defeating Russia, if they could have deployed the forces and resources they spent in 1942-1944 trying to stave off a combined USAF/RAF bomber offensive and repair its damage on tanks, guns, aircraft and troops for the Eastern front they may have had a greater chance of beating the Russians.

 

[Guaporense]

This would have been a wet dream to the Germans in late 1941 though as it would have given them an extra couple of years to concentrate on defeating Russia, if they could have deployed the forces and resources they spent in 1942-1944 trying to stave off a combined USAF/RAF bomber offensive and repair its damage on tanks, guns, aircraft and troops for the Eastern front they may have had a greater chance of beating the Russians.

.
I believe that if Britain and the US weren't attacking Germany, (you should note that armed conflict was constant between Germany and Britain) even an a attrition war Germany would have beaten the Russians because the germans had a larger industrial base. The Russians made more tanks and small arms than the germans because a larger proportion of their resources were allocated to these sectors, for example, in 1943 germany made 19,500 AFV while the Russians made 27,500 AFV, however about 6% of germany's steel in 1943 was allocated to AFV production, while the russians allocated 17% of their steel to the same end (and it was less steel, because 6% of germany's 35 million ton output was 2.1 million tons while 17% of Soviet steel output of 8.5 million tons was around 1.5 million tons, germany needed more steel per AFV because they were bigger and the soviets complemented steel with 500 thousand tons of pig iron to make various parts of the tanks).

Some facts:

1- Before 1943 germany spend more resources building up infrastruture (like the autobahns and the fortress europe project) than making weapons to fight the Soviets.

2- To make U-Boats, germany spent around 2 times more money than to make AFVs in the period 1942-1944.

3- In the period of 1942-1945 the aircraft industry corresponded to 40% of germany's armament production industry, and most of the airplanes made in the period were allocated in the western front. For comparison, while most AFV were allocated to the eastern front, their production corresponded, on average, to 5% of total AFV production in 1942-1944.

4- The second largest industry, munitions, with corresponded to around 25% of the armament production industry, had a large proportion of its output allocated to the western front too (i don't know if it was the majority). So one can really say that more resources were allocated to fight the soviets than the others? Well, by manpower certaintly, by armament production, maybe not.

 

[Doppleganger]

But once again we are left with a "damned if he does and damned if he doesn't" scenario because to leave such a large Russian force on his southern flank would have been considered reckless at best especially given what we know of Russian counter offensives in late 1941 and around Stalingrad in 1942.

I tend to think the opposite in that having large concentrations of Russian forces to the north and south would have seen AGC in great peril and possibly destroyed by early 1942.

Hitler did both the right thing and the wrong thing in 1941. The right thing was to target Kiev and deal with the massed Soviet armies on the right flank of Centre. The wrong thing was then to also attempt to take Moscow in the same season. Some observers think that Hitler's initial preferred aim after capturing Kiev was to wait until 1942 before assaulting Moscow. With hindsight his initial instincts were correct. The only other option would have been to drive for Moscow straight after the capture of Smolensk. It might have worked but it would have been an almighty risk.

 

[MontyB]

I guess the question to be answered then is could he have taken Moscow and secured his southern flank in 1941?

 

[Doppleganger]

I guess the question to be answered then is could he have taken Moscow and secured his southern flank in 1941?

In the timescale open to him and given his supply and logistical situation, IMO no.

 

[MontyB]

Then surely he did the right thing as going into a a fighting lull without securing the south would have been incredibly bad leadership.

 

[Doppleganger]

After the Kiev operation the south was basically secured. Hitler would have been able to sit on a defensive line that included the Dnieper river to wait out the winter until Spring 42. Sure it gives the Red Army a respite but it also would have allowed the Wehrmacht to re-equip, re-supply and allow their exhausted infantry formations a much needed rest. In Spring 1942 Case Blau would have been launched with the Germans in a far better position than they were historically.

 

[MontyB]

True but I would guess that he felt once the southern flank was secure, the fall of Moscow before the close of operations (for the winter) would pretty much destroy the Russian will to fight on and given the progress they had made up to that point I doubt that too many leaders would found fault in this.

Certainly the benefit of hindsight tell us how fool hardy his plan was but I think that in December 1941 it was a perfectly rational idea to finish the war in the east rapidly or at least make the Russian position west of the Urals untenable.

 

[ranger awesomness]

I believe that it was the uncordinated axis powers. The Allies all worked together. Japan and Germany had little contact if any at all at key points durning the second World War.

 

[MontyB]

I believe that it was the uncordinated axis powers. The Allies all worked together. Japan and Germany had little contact if any at all at key points durning the second World War.

Yes and no, the European Axis partners were not uncoordinated they were just bloody useless and as such they were really more of a hindrance to the German war effort than a help.

The Japanese on the other hand were far from useless but could not realistically help the German war effort once they were engaged in the Chinese campaign, perhaps had they focused more on mainland Asia and India and less on poxy little islands in the Pacific they could have done each other some good but I think it is a debatable point.

 

[lljadw]

Hitler did both the right thing and the wrong thing in 1941. The right thing was to target Kiev and deal with the massed Soviet armies on the right flank of Centre. The wrong thing was then to also attempt to take Moscow in the same season. Some observers think that Hitler's initial preferred aim after capturing Kiev was to wait until 1942 before assaulting Moscow. With hindsight his initial instincts were correct. The only other option would have been to drive for Moscow straight after the capture of Smolensk. It might have worked but it would have been an almighty risk.

Was Hitler attempting to take Moscow after Kiew ? I thought that the aim of Typhoon was to destroy 'the last Soviet Reserves' and that Moscow was used as a baite .

 

[lljadw]

After the Kiev operation the south was basically secured. Hitler would have been able to sit on a defensive line that included the Dnieper river to wait out the winter until Spring 42. Sure it gives the Red Army a respite but it also would have allowed the Wehrmacht to re-equip, re-supply and allow their exhausted infantry formations a much needed rest. In Spring 1942 Case Blau would have been launched with the Germans in a far better position than they were historically.

I am not sure:The German casualties wer lower in the winter than during Barbarossa and the ratio German -Soviet casualties was in 1941 1-5 and in 1942 1-6 . From a military point of viewwas it not better for the Soviets not to launch their winteroffensive ? The results were minime and the costs very high,with a casualty ratio of 1-6 .Maybe the Red Army would be in a better position in 1942 .