Was General Montgomery really overrated in WW2?
Papashah41
Active member
On Montgomery
Montgomery knew of the two WaffenSS Panzer Divisions resting and refitting in Arnhem. These two divisions weren't a couple of Eastern European grab bags or worse. These were the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg Panzer Divisions. These were elite divisions. Why did he not react to this knowledge? Possibly, Montgomery suffered from the malady of never believing a Monty plan could go wrong. The British army was notorius with an officer corp arrogant enough to act in such a stupid way. This belief has it's roots in a class system which rewarded position over merit. That he did not at least try and change the plan reeks of incompetance. It is at least the actions of one who put his strategy to work at the expense of logistics. Plans go out the window when the operation meets the enemy. Commonwealth brass suffered from the same idiotic thinking. A good example is General Guy Simonds of the Canadian forces. His mentor was Monty. At the end of Operation Totalize Simonds raged about his Armour personel whom he called inexperienced and muddled. Many junior officers were threatened because not all objectives had been met. If there had been no one to criticize, Simonds would have exploded about faulty eqipment. But he would never have brought the plan into question. One has only to look closely at the 2nd battle of El Alemain to get a glimps of Monty's brilliance. He had a fake plan put into a burned out vehicle close to the German lines. He studied Rommels tactics methodically. He placed his guns where Rommel was sure to attack and he realized he out gunned his adversary by about five to one. Could Montgomery be clever, even brilliant? Yes. Could he be plodding, slow and too cautious at times? I believe so. Could Montgomery be reckless and sacrifice men for a plan he hoped would work? You bet he could.
Montgomery knew of the two WaffenSS Panzer Divisions resting and refitting in Arnhem. These two divisions weren't a couple of Eastern European grab bags or worse. These were the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg Panzer Divisions. These were elite divisions. Why did he not react to this knowledge? Possibly, Montgomery suffered from the malady of never believing a Monty plan could go wrong. The British army was notorius with an officer corp arrogant enough to act in such a stupid way. This belief has it's roots in a class system which rewarded position over merit. That he did not at least try and change the plan reeks of incompetance. It is at least the actions of one who put his strategy to work at the expense of logistics. Plans go out the window when the operation meets the enemy. Commonwealth brass suffered from the same idiotic thinking. A good example is General Guy Simonds of the Canadian forces. His mentor was Monty. At the end of Operation Totalize Simonds raged about his Armour personel whom he called inexperienced and muddled. Many junior officers were threatened because not all objectives had been met. If there had been no one to criticize, Simonds would have exploded about faulty eqipment. But he would never have brought the plan into question. One has only to look closely at the 2nd battle of El Alemain to get a glimps of Monty's brilliance. He had a fake plan put into a burned out vehicle close to the German lines. He studied Rommels tactics methodically. He placed his guns where Rommel was sure to attack and he realized he out gunned his adversary by about five to one. Could Montgomery be clever, even brilliant? Yes. Could he be plodding, slow and too cautious at times? I believe so. Could Montgomery be reckless and sacrifice men for a plan he hoped would work? You bet he could.
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Papashah41
Active member
Did he play his cards out properly at Arnhem? With an incredible amount of men and resources at his command, he squandered the Red Devils in a reckless attempt to take Arnhem bridge. Knowing of the presence of two Waffen SS panzer divisions in the area, he didn't change his plans one iota. His attitude was criminal.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Given that there were no New Zealanders in Normandy I suspect you are off base.
The New Zealand 2nd Division served in Greece, North Africa and Italy while the 3rd Division served in the Pacific, New Zealand units would have seen combat under Montgomery from the 2nd Battle of El Alamein to the early stages of the Italian campaign as Montgomery was moved back to England for D-Day planning.
In terms of him using Commonwealth forces as bullet stoppers for the British I doubt there is a lot of support for that as even though New Zealand forces were part of the 8th Army they did have their own command structure under General Freyberg (Thanks to inepted British leadership at Galipoli) had this been the case I am certain it would have been stopped and I can't imagine that the Australians, Indians or any other Commonwealth forces would have been dissimilar.
Papashah41
Active member
Young Winston, That Model was liked by Hitler makes me suspect his abilities as a commander. The Fuhrer prized loyalty above all other things, including competence. Model did help large amounts of troops escape the Falaise pocket when he took over from General Kluge. But his reaction to the British Paras at Arnhem could be described as unconciously comedic. Maybe better choices of German comanders would be Von Manstein, Rommel, Guderian and even some SS commanders such as Paul Hausser, Felix Steiner, Wilhelm Bittrich and Sylvester Stadler.
LeEnfield. Most every piece of history I have read on Montgomery and Market Garden suggests Montgomery knew very well there were two panzer divisions resting and refitting in the Arnhem area. I should expect someone with as much of an emperor complex that he had, would not tolerate information being kept from him. And I also believe there wasn't too many junior officers around who would have with-held such important information from some one of Montgomery's prestige. They might find themselves posted to Burma or Labrador with no explanation of why.
LeEnfield. Most every piece of history I have read on Montgomery and Market Garden suggests Montgomery knew very well there were two panzer divisions resting and refitting in the Arnhem area. I should expect someone with as much of an emperor complex that he had, would not tolerate information being kept from him. And I also believe there wasn't too many junior officers around who would have with-held such important information from some one of Montgomery's prestige. They might find themselves posted to Burma or Labrador with no explanation of why.
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Young Winston was "shot by firing squad" on this forum several months ago for showing disrepect on this forum. He won't be replying!
You may wish to read an excellent book called "Overlord" by Max Hastings. It details the Caen battles in detail, going into Monty's short comings and his strengths. The New Zealanders were not in Normandy. Monty didn't shield British divisions.
If Monty was well supplied, equiped and prepared, he did well. Monty was not well prepared for MarketGarden, he rushed it and took some bad risks. It was not characteristic of his usual approach.
His miltary reaction at the Battle of the Bulge was brilliant but he spoilt it all afterwards by shooting his mouth off to the press.
Model had great experience on the Ostfront (but he was accused of war crimes) with some success. He was a ruthless general and a tough nut for the Allies to crack.
Papashah41
Active member
errol, I believe Model's expertise was his ability in rebuilding mauled and broken units and shoring up fronts which where near cracking. If I'm not mistaken he brought stability to the Eastern Front in May and June of 1944. But it appears he was of the school of no retreat. His un-elastic approach to defensive warfare would inevitably lead to more waste, ala Stalingrad. It appears to be an unrealistic position he shared with his Fuhrer. But I have only read of model's escapades quite a while ago. Would you suggest further reading.
What is meant by the term Blitzkrieg? A trans-literation from the German means lightning war. This German expression is used to describe the movement of massed armour with fighter and tactical bomber support, shored up by motorized and / or mechanized infantry. When first introduced in 1939 in Poland and spring of 1940 in the Low Countries and France, it was novel, brilliant and completely de-moralized the enemy.
When you suggest that not every operation of striking fast is neccesarily blitzkrieg warfare, I agree. I could be totally wrong here but I believe certain elements had to exist within the kampfgruppe to produce Blitzkrieg. In all cases of successfull lightning war the armour and aircraft were on their way even before the artillery was employed to shorten the pause between artillery and follow up massed armour with fighter and dive-bomber suport. The motorized or mechanized infantry would be hot on the heels of the armour to support against enemy infantry and anti-tank elements usually bypassed.
Most armies in Europe at the time thought militarily in 1st World War terms, viz: tanks were parcelled out to infantry units as a supporting arm of the infantry. And except for the Germans and the Brits, most aircraft was obsolete.
And yes, Guderian, Rommel, Manstein and other German commanders aquired inspiration from British armour thinkers such as Liddell-Hart and J.F.C. Fuller. The irony here is that the British military establishment did not.
Also, unless someone is a skinhead fruitcake full of ethnocentric and racist nonesense or a nazi-phile who believes all of that MeinKampf refuse we can all agree that the nazi regime was reprehensible.
But if we close our eyes to the incredible strides the German military took in military doctrine and weapon's design we are not doing ourselves any favors.
That the Nazi regime was a blight on all civilized nations at that time is certainly true. But let us not let over zealous propaganda blind and / or prejudice our thinking.
What is meant by the term Blitzkrieg? A trans-literation from the German means lightning war. This German expression is used to describe the movement of massed armour with fighter and tactical bomber support, shored up by motorized and / or mechanized infantry. When first introduced in 1939 in Poland and spring of 1940 in the Low Countries and France, it was novel, brilliant and completely de-moralized the enemy.
When you suggest that not every operation of striking fast is neccesarily blitzkrieg warfare, I agree. I could be totally wrong here but I believe certain elements had to exist within the kampfgruppe to produce Blitzkrieg. In all cases of successfull lightning war the armour and aircraft were on their way even before the artillery was employed to shorten the pause between artillery and follow up massed armour with fighter and dive-bomber suport. The motorized or mechanized infantry would be hot on the heels of the armour to support against enemy infantry and anti-tank elements usually bypassed.
Most armies in Europe at the time thought militarily in 1st World War terms, viz: tanks were parcelled out to infantry units as a supporting arm of the infantry. And except for the Germans and the Brits, most aircraft was obsolete.
And yes, Guderian, Rommel, Manstein and other German commanders aquired inspiration from British armour thinkers such as Liddell-Hart and J.F.C. Fuller. The irony here is that the British military establishment did not.
Del Boy, I do not believe anyone is worshipping Germany's WW 2 prowess. It would just be remiss to take such a naive view to suggest that because they took a thrashing and lost the war, we shouldn't take and use what was brilliant in their military doctrine. We must remember, the reason for Germany's brubbing can be traced back to the idiotic decisions of that madman Adolph Hitler, and not the military neccessarily. He bit off more than he could chew, let alone swallow.
Also, unless someone is a skinhead fruitcake full of ethnocentric and racist nonesense or a nazi-phile who believes all of that MeinKampf refuse we can all agree that the nazi regime was reprehensible.
But if we close our eyes to the incredible strides the German military took in military doctrine and weapon's design we are not doing ourselves any favors.
That the Nazi regime was a blight on all civilized nations at that time is certainly true. But let us not let over zealous propaganda blind and / or prejudice our thinking.
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The Devil's Virtuosos by David Downing is an excellent book about the German generals of ww2. It has an interesting section on Model. It may be hard to get a copy but you can try on the net. I've have a copy sitting in a box in my spare room.
http://www.alibris.com/search/books/qwork/1637940/used/The Devil's Virtuosos
The Battle for Moscow by Albert Seaton is a terrific book which I mentioned on the other thread.
http://www.amazon.com/Battle-Moscow-Albert-Seaton/dp/096276132X
Papashah41
Active member
perseus, As a Canadian I will direct my attention to their losses in Europe from 42 to fall 44. The losses at Hong Kong will be mentioned at another time. At Dieppe the casualty rate was over 900 killed, 2000 taken prisoiner, many of whom were badly wounded. They lost 70% of their force of almost 5000 men. In the Moro, Ortona battles the cost was 2339 all ranks killed and wounded. Sickness and battle fatigue cost a further 1617 men. I cannot list the American losses at the western end or the British, Indian and New Zealanders fighting beside the Canadians. But they were fighting their own battles and I'm sure the casualty rate was quite high. In the 5 weeks it took to clear the Scheldt estuary the 1st Canadian army lost 12,873 men. Of these losses half were Canadian citizens. Note, I have left several battles unmentioned. By any stretch of the imagination, these are not small numbers when you consider Canada's population and the amount of personel they supplied in Italy and North-West Europe.
LeEnfield, Reading some comments by members, I came across one you submitted on March 9, 2006. When you refer to children's divisions I think you are referring to the 12TH SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. There were no children in this division. The bulk of the private soldiers and a few NCO's were 18 and 19 years of age. There were a few 17 year olds but these men were nearly 18, and there weren't very many of them. Most NCO's were in their twenties and thirties and a few in their early forties. Their officers were all in their late twenties and mid to late thirties. All NCO's and officers had extensive experience on the Ostfront. This was one of the best led, couragous and even fanatical Kampfgruppes at that time. They were a very professional killing machine. They murdered prisoners early in the campaign causing a terrible reaction with the allied troopers. Little or no quarter was ever given by either side in this campaign.
LeEnfield, Reading some comments by members, I came across one you submitted on March 9, 2006. When you refer to children's divisions I think you are referring to the 12TH SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. There were no children in this division. The bulk of the private soldiers and a few NCO's were 18 and 19 years of age. There were a few 17 year olds but these men were nearly 18, and there weren't very many of them. Most NCO's were in their twenties and thirties and a few in their early forties. Their officers were all in their late twenties and mid to late thirties. All NCO's and officers had extensive experience on the Ostfront. This was one of the best led, couragous and even fanatical Kampfgruppes at that time. They were a very professional killing machine. They murdered prisoners early in the campaign causing a terrible reaction with the allied troopers. Little or no quarter was ever given by either side in this campaign.
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LeEnfield
Active member
Papashah 41 there was a Junior SS Battalion with many only in the their early teens in the Battle around Caen and this SS Battalion fought around the airfield that the Canadians were trying to take, when they were eventually over run there was just six survivors from this battalion. Also it should be remembered that out of the nine German Division in action opposing the allied landings six of these Germen Divisions were dug in and in depth opposite the British & Commonwealth lines. When the Americans made their break out they were opposed by three German Division, and no I am not knocking what the Americans did as we were all in the same fight. Still this is one of the reasons that it took the British & Commonwealth Forces so much longer to close the Falsie pocket as we had to fight far heavier defences.
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I agree with you. The Caen area was the tough nut to crack at and after D-Day. Most of the armour was put piecemeal into the Caen battles. And yes Carpiquet was a tough objective. It was being held by members of the 12th SS panzer division Hitlerjugend.
I had read that these Hitler Youth were mostly 18 and 19 years of age with some as young as 17. If you have any accounts of the division using younger soldiers I would love to see them. Its quite possible the Nazi's used younger soldiers in Normandy.
As you can see I have a slight name change now.
LeEnfield
Active member
Now if call a 700 tank advance peicemeal then what do you call a mass attack. Rommel and Montgomery were old foes since 1941. Now they faced off once again in Normandy. Operation Goodwood was the largest tank assault in the Normandy campaign, as over 700 tanks in three British armoured divisions attempted to bust out of the bocage country. After all, the objectives were only seven miles distant. Rommel, his forces armed with over 200 tanks including Tiger I and Tiger IIs, plus more than 75 dreaded 88mm guns, ripped apart Montgomery's plans. Soon the wheatfields ran red with blood and burned with hundreds of British tanks.
See the link for a report on the fighting
http://mars.wnec.edu/~grempel/tours/normandy/battle.html
.
See the link for a report on the fighting
http://mars.wnec.edu/~grempel/tours/normandy/battle.html
.
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Sorry if my post wasn't clear. I was describing the German armour which was put into battle piecemeal, because of confusion, bad intel and supply problems. Not to mention the complete superiority of the Allied airforce and the disappearing act of the Luftwaffe. But even with these problems the German soldier usually outsoldiered his Allied opponent.
I think there were no Tiger 2's in Normandy. Not at that time anyway. All the same it must have been quite terrifying at times for Sherman tank crews to operate those machines. German armour could defeat them at 1500 to 2000 meters and the Sherman had to get within 400 to 500 meters to defeat a Panther and a side or rear shot was usually needed. Of course the Firefly was a different ball of wax. The crews of the Shermans called their tank the Ronson. The Germans called them Tommycookers.
I got my material from Michael Reynold's excellent book, Steel Inferno, a number of books by Tim Ripley and numerous others including Kurt Meyer's Grenadiers. It may be just me but I think Meyer was prone to exaggeration. I have yet to read Hasting's Overlord. I can't seem to find a copy. I must order one. A friend gave me a copy of Hasting's Armageddon. But I dont wish to read it before Overlord. I'm currently reading, Fields of Fire by Terry Copp. Its a short history of the Canadians in Normandy. I'm only to chapter 4. But seems to be an excellent work so far.
Wittman - had a Canadian killer
Enfield,
An "Unsolved History" show on the History Channel just before Christmas 2008 featured Wittman's final day. Wittman led a group of 4 Tiger I's and none survived.
However on the other side of the farmers field Wittman's Tiger was within 150 m for 3 to 4 Sherman tanks (regular short barrel Shermans) of the Canadian 27th Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers Armoured Regiment) which were hidden behind a stone wall.
The show interviewed Gordon's gunner and also Col Walter Radley of the Fusiliers. French farmers who owned the field where Wittman & crew were killed had pieces of his tank and accompanied the surveying crew which confirmed distance and lines of site.
Reddale
Enfield,
An "Unsolved History" show on the History Channel just before Christmas 2008 featured Wittman's final day. Wittman led a group of 4 Tiger I's and none survived.
A great British gunner from the tank commanded by Sergeant Gordon of the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry nailed 3 of the Tiger I's at about 500 to 680 metres range. These 3 were accompanying Wittman but Wittman was too far even for their Firefly.
However on the other side of the farmers field Wittman's Tiger was within 150 m for 3 to 4 Sherman tanks (regular short barrel Shermans) of the Canadian 27th Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers Armoured Regiment) which were hidden behind a stone wall.
The show interviewed Gordon's gunner and also Col Walter Radley of the Fusiliers. French farmers who owned the field where Wittman & crew were killed had pieces of his tank and accompanied the surveying crew which confirmed distance and lines of site.
Reddale