In NO WAY is that a substantiation of your accusation of cowardice!
I ask you again - would you care to substantiate that accusation of cowardice?
So far we have bluster from you, as patiently exposed by mKenny.
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Was General Montgomery really overrated in WW2?
In NO WAY is that a substantiation of your accusation of cowardice!
I ask you again - would you care to substantiate that accusation of cowardice?
So far we have bluster from you, as patiently exposed by mKenny.
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
Montgomery was severly wounded on October, 13th 1914 at the battle of Meterenin, while leading a counter-offensive was shot in the chest by a German sniper, piercing a lung. Subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Order
Promoted to Brigade Major in 1915 after recovery from wounds sustained, began training Kitcheners New Army.
Redeployed to the Western Front as a staff officer in 1916, present during the battles of Somme, Arras and Passchendaele.
Served at the battles of the Lys and Chemin-des-Dames, where at the end of the Great War had attained the rank of "General Staff Officer 1" and chief of staff for the 47th London Division.
Not the actions of a coward
Promoted to Brigade Major in 1915 after recovery from wounds sustained, began training Kitcheners New Army.
Redeployed to the Western Front as a staff officer in 1916, present during the battles of Somme, Arras and Passchendaele.
Served at the battles of the Lys and Chemin-des-Dames, where at the end of the Great War had attained the rank of "General Staff Officer 1" and chief of staff for the 47th London Division.
Not the actions of a coward
We do well to remember that BritinAfrica. And BTW - I doubt that any other Generals in WW11 had such experience and record. Must admit I always only associated him with WW11. My respect grows at the reminder , especialy now that our awareness of WW1 burns so bright.
Thank you and Cheers.
Thank you and Cheers.
rustybolt25
Active member
I suggest a good book for "cracker" to read is "Overlord" by Max Hastings. It gives a very balanced view of all involved. Another great book is "The devil's virtuosos'" by David Downing. I had some rather negative views of Monty over the years but further reading has increased my repect for him. He had some big personality problems and made military blunders (which WW2 generals didn't?), but I believe the positives outweigh the negatives. Saying Monty was a coward is just silly. Cracker, I think your nationalistic pride and emotion have got in the way of some clear thinking on this complicated subject.
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03USMC
Active member
Monty may have been many things but a coward is not one of them, and the accusation is without merit or substance and amounts to nothing but alot of posturing.
Everyone in the anti-Montgomery Camp keeps pointing to Market Garden it was one operation that went pear shaped not his entire career. Market Garden may have suffered from some bad intel. It may have suffered from bad planning, in that it was hastily planned and executed. It may have suffered from poor terrian study, especially the route used by 30 Corps that confined their movements to improved roads and slowed them down. It did suffer from bad communication once the Airborne forces were on the ground and it may have been over reaching or as Ryan called it "a bridge to far" but all the anti-Monty's forget one thing..................................
Had Market Garden been successful it most likely would have shortened the war as Monty predicted.
That is not an Operation planned or conducted by a coward or by a weak commander. That was a gamble that Monty was willing to take to shorten the war and it failed.....operations do that some time.
Besides that the failure for Market Garden can and should be shared. After all Ike had to approve it and he apparently thought enough of it to do so, so should cop some of the blame as the approving authority yet he doesn't.
I understand how the Brit's, and other allied nations feel when I have to see an American go off on a US centric rant concerning WW2 or WWI. Got news for ya Cracker everybody US, Brit's , Aussie's, Kiwi's and Canucks , Soviets. Belgians, Dutch, Poles, French and all the other allied nations "was in it to win it" there was no choice. The US assisted the allies as part of a team and Montgomery was a big part of that team and a big reason the allies won. Ike allowed Monty alot of latitude and Ike understood the team concept.
Was Monty a prima dona? Yeah sure. But Christ the US fielded two of the biggest self promoting SOB's of the war. G.S. Patton Jr and Douglas MacArthur both of whom got the job done but created butt pain for everyone. So Monty has no corner on it.
It's may considered belief that most if not all the ill will directed at Montgomery has it's basis in the Patton feud that has been fueled by Georges biographers and on film. IMHO most Americans would do well to explore other sources on both Patton and Montgomery and especially Market Garden if they truely wish to have a well rounded view.
Everyone in the anti-Montgomery Camp keeps pointing to Market Garden it was one operation that went pear shaped not his entire career. Market Garden may have suffered from some bad intel. It may have suffered from bad planning, in that it was hastily planned and executed. It may have suffered from poor terrian study, especially the route used by 30 Corps that confined their movements to improved roads and slowed them down. It did suffer from bad communication once the Airborne forces were on the ground and it may have been over reaching or as Ryan called it "a bridge to far" but all the anti-Monty's forget one thing..................................
Had Market Garden been successful it most likely would have shortened the war as Monty predicted.
That is not an Operation planned or conducted by a coward or by a weak commander. That was a gamble that Monty was willing to take to shorten the war and it failed.....operations do that some time.
Besides that the failure for Market Garden can and should be shared. After all Ike had to approve it and he apparently thought enough of it to do so, so should cop some of the blame as the approving authority yet he doesn't.
I understand how the Brit's, and other allied nations feel when I have to see an American go off on a US centric rant concerning WW2 or WWI. Got news for ya Cracker everybody US, Brit's , Aussie's, Kiwi's and Canucks , Soviets. Belgians, Dutch, Poles, French and all the other allied nations "was in it to win it" there was no choice. The US assisted the allies as part of a team and Montgomery was a big part of that team and a big reason the allies won. Ike allowed Monty alot of latitude and Ike understood the team concept.
Was Monty a prima dona? Yeah sure. But Christ the US fielded two of the biggest self promoting SOB's of the war. G.S. Patton Jr and Douglas MacArthur both of whom got the job done but created butt pain for everyone. So Monty has no corner on it.
It's may considered belief that most if not all the ill will directed at Montgomery has it's basis in the Patton feud that has been fueled by Georges biographers and on film. IMHO most Americans would do well to explore other sources on both Patton and Montgomery and especially Market Garden if they truely wish to have a well rounded view.
Fine post, that.
It seems that Monty's problem was a personality trait. He was the most difficult of the generals for Ike, more problematic even than Patton. He showed scant respect for his boss, reprimanding him for smoking in his presence at their first meeting. 'Nice chap - no soldier'; Ike's performance in controlling his posse proved otherwise I suggest.
Despite being a highly professional soldier, Monty suffered from tremendous conceit, probably due to an inferiority complex.
"My beret (hat) is worth 3 divisions. The men see it in the distance. They say 'There's Monty - and then they will fight anybody."
At the same time he had an extrordinary showman's knack which usually radiated confidence to his troops.
(source : D-Day Antony Beevor.)
It seems that Monty's problem was a personality trait. He was the most difficult of the generals for Ike, more problematic even than Patton. He showed scant respect for his boss, reprimanding him for smoking in his presence at their first meeting. 'Nice chap - no soldier'; Ike's performance in controlling his posse proved otherwise I suggest.
Despite being a highly professional soldier, Monty suffered from tremendous conceit, probably due to an inferiority complex.
"My beret (hat) is worth 3 divisions. The men see it in the distance. They say 'There's Monty - and then they will fight anybody."
At the same time he had an extrordinary showman's knack which usually radiated confidence to his troops.
(source : D-Day Antony Beevor.)
rustybolt25
Active member
Brilliant post O3. You appear to have a solid knowledge of the subject.
Panzercracker
Active member
Failing to take responsibility for killing your men in mindless incompetently planned operations amounts to moral cowardice, your post lacks merit or substance and mounts to nothing but alot of posturing.
And Goodwood and Totalize, three of his plans, three failiures.
No it was not, read about Goodwood and Totalize, the two other operations planned out exclusively by Montgomery.
Market Garden had lots of good intel, allies knew that there are tanks in the area, they knew that there's significant mechanized and armored forces, multiple officers including general Sosabowski warned Montgomery that the operation is doomed to fail given the circumstances.
Intel was good but Montgomery ignored it and pushed on regardless which is yet another proof of his utter incompetence.
It suffered from all these.
Most experienced para officers expressed doubts about the chances, some were pretty harsh about it, Market Garden had very very little chance to succeed and it was apparent even then without hindsight yet Montgomery wanted to be a star at the expense of his men and pushed on.
True, the only time he got to be a daring commander he proved extremely incompetent.
Intel showing tanks, senior troopers telling the guy "sir success is unlikely", failing to secure enough planes to dump them all at once, yes it was carried out by an atrociously weak commander.
It was an operation that was not thought out, carried out ignoring intel and advice, thats not a gamble, thats utter incompetence.
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
I'd say 03's assement of Monty was pretty much correct.
Operation Overlord was Monty's. I wouldnt call that a failure.
Montgomery returned to Britain to take command of the 21st Army Group which consisted of all Allied ground forces that would take part in Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy. Preliminary planning for the invasion had been taking place for two years, most recently by COSSAC staff (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander). Montgomery quickly concluded that the COSSAC plan was too limited, and strongly advocated expanding the plan from a three-division to a five-division assault. As with his takeover of the Eighth Army, Montgomery travelled frequently to his units, raising morale and ensuring training was progressing. At St Paul's School on 7 April and 15 May he presented his strategy for the invasion. He envisaged a ninety day battle, ending when all the forces reached the Seine, pivoting on an Allied-held Caen, with British and Canadian armies forming a shoulder and the US armies wheeling on the right.
Montgomery's initial plan was, most likely, for an immediate break out toward Caen. Unable to do so, as the British did not get enough forces ashore to exploit the successful landing, Montgomery's advance was checked. When it appeared unlikely that the British Second Army would breakout, Montgomery's contingency was designed to attract German forces to the British sector to ease the passing of United States Army through German defences to the west, during Operation Cobra. This series of battle plans by the British, Canadian and American armies trapped and defeated the German forces in Normandy in the Falaise pocket. The campaign that Montgomery fought was essentially attritional until the middle of July with the occupation of the Cotentin Peninsula and a series of offensives in the east, which secured Caen and attracted the bulk of German armour there. An American breakout was achieved with Operation Cobra and the encirclement of German forces in the Falaise pocket at the cost of British sacrifice with the diversionary Operation Goodwood.
So in effect operation Goodwood was a diversion.
Montgomery was often accused of being slow and overcautious. Examples cited include before El Alamein, afterwards in the pursuit of Rommel, the Battle of Normandy, and in the counter-offensive in the Ardennes. In North Africa, prior to Montgomery taking command, the history of the campaign in North Africa had see-sawed as each offensive outran its supply lines: both sides won battles but neither gained a decisive advantage.
Similarly, during the Battle of Normandy, the fear of stalemate made the supreme command in Britain pressure Montgomery to push harder. At one point in July 1944, it was thought that Churchill was flying to France to personally sack Montgomery at Eisenhower's request.[35] Air Marshal Tedder complained that Montgomery had not captured suitable airfields from which to operate.Much is made of the fact that many of Montgomery's initial targets were not met, especially the failure to capture Caen on the first day or even for weeks after D-Day (criticism that was compounded after the war when Montgomery insisted that all elements had gone "according to plan", which clearly was not the case, although it should be noted in fairness that the bulk of the German panzer divisions, including SS units, were stationed on the Caen sector).
However his predictions, the so called "phase lines" on the maps, were never intended to be a rigid guarantee but a guide, as would be clear from previous opposed landings at Salerno and Anzio. Much of the criticism resulted from Montgomery giving his superiors and the press the impression that he was trying to achieve large-scale breakouts while actually fighting an attritional campaign.
However, in the end Montgomery's success was achieved in less time than planned.
Montgomery was not a dashing general, and deliberately methodical, usually not willing to sacrifice military effectiveness for other people's agenda. The realities of the wartime Britain must also be remembered. It had seen severe early defeats, an economy almost crippled, shortages caused by constant German U-boat attacks, and dwindling supplies of manpower to fight on fronts ranging from the Far East to the Mediterranean. There simply were no more big armies to commit wholesale in Normandy or elsewhere. Montgomery thus carefully husbanded the troops he had left.
Furthermore, much of his apparent caution sprang from his regard for human life and a desire not to throw the lives of his troops away in the manner of the generals of the First World War.
Therefore, for El Alamein, Normandy and the Ardennes, he was not prepared to go into an offensive until there was complete readiness of both men, equipment, and logistics. This approach sometimes exasperated his superiors, but it generally brought success, and ensured his popularity with his men.
The criticism of slowness and caution has been taken further with Montgomery being called primarily a "general of matériel" one who emerged at the right time and place to take advantage of the massive outpouring of American and British war production, ensuring the Allies local material superiority against their opponents. But this charge is hard to maintain in a war during which material weight counted above almost all factors. It was a mass production war in every theatre, and the same "matériel" criticism of Montgomery must then need to apply to the great Russian commanders of the Eastern Front like Zhukov or Konev, as well as to the American effort.
Equally, it ignores the successful improvised actions in North Africa, Normandy, and the Ardennes, and yet as stated above, Montgomery did not have the man power or equipment to achieve those scale victories; so in essence one could say he was doing more with what he had, than any other general in Europe.
Operation Overlord was Monty's. I wouldnt call that a failure.
Montgomery returned to Britain to take command of the 21st Army Group which consisted of all Allied ground forces that would take part in Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy. Preliminary planning for the invasion had been taking place for two years, most recently by COSSAC staff (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander). Montgomery quickly concluded that the COSSAC plan was too limited, and strongly advocated expanding the plan from a three-division to a five-division assault. As with his takeover of the Eighth Army, Montgomery travelled frequently to his units, raising morale and ensuring training was progressing. At St Paul's School on 7 April and 15 May he presented his strategy for the invasion. He envisaged a ninety day battle, ending when all the forces reached the Seine, pivoting on an Allied-held Caen, with British and Canadian armies forming a shoulder and the US armies wheeling on the right.
Montgomery's initial plan was, most likely, for an immediate break out toward Caen. Unable to do so, as the British did not get enough forces ashore to exploit the successful landing, Montgomery's advance was checked. When it appeared unlikely that the British Second Army would breakout, Montgomery's contingency was designed to attract German forces to the British sector to ease the passing of United States Army through German defences to the west, during Operation Cobra. This series of battle plans by the British, Canadian and American armies trapped and defeated the German forces in Normandy in the Falaise pocket. The campaign that Montgomery fought was essentially attritional until the middle of July with the occupation of the Cotentin Peninsula and a series of offensives in the east, which secured Caen and attracted the bulk of German armour there. An American breakout was achieved with Operation Cobra and the encirclement of German forces in the Falaise pocket at the cost of British sacrifice with the diversionary Operation Goodwood.
So in effect operation Goodwood was a diversion.
Montgomery was often accused of being slow and overcautious. Examples cited include before El Alamein, afterwards in the pursuit of Rommel, the Battle of Normandy, and in the counter-offensive in the Ardennes. In North Africa, prior to Montgomery taking command, the history of the campaign in North Africa had see-sawed as each offensive outran its supply lines: both sides won battles but neither gained a decisive advantage.
Similarly, during the Battle of Normandy, the fear of stalemate made the supreme command in Britain pressure Montgomery to push harder. At one point in July 1944, it was thought that Churchill was flying to France to personally sack Montgomery at Eisenhower's request.[35] Air Marshal Tedder complained that Montgomery had not captured suitable airfields from which to operate.Much is made of the fact that many of Montgomery's initial targets were not met, especially the failure to capture Caen on the first day or even for weeks after D-Day (criticism that was compounded after the war when Montgomery insisted that all elements had gone "according to plan", which clearly was not the case, although it should be noted in fairness that the bulk of the German panzer divisions, including SS units, were stationed on the Caen sector).
However his predictions, the so called "phase lines" on the maps, were never intended to be a rigid guarantee but a guide, as would be clear from previous opposed landings at Salerno and Anzio. Much of the criticism resulted from Montgomery giving his superiors and the press the impression that he was trying to achieve large-scale breakouts while actually fighting an attritional campaign.
However, in the end Montgomery's success was achieved in less time than planned.
Montgomery was not a dashing general, and deliberately methodical, usually not willing to sacrifice military effectiveness for other people's agenda. The realities of the wartime Britain must also be remembered. It had seen severe early defeats, an economy almost crippled, shortages caused by constant German U-boat attacks, and dwindling supplies of manpower to fight on fronts ranging from the Far East to the Mediterranean. There simply were no more big armies to commit wholesale in Normandy or elsewhere. Montgomery thus carefully husbanded the troops he had left.
Furthermore, much of his apparent caution sprang from his regard for human life and a desire not to throw the lives of his troops away in the manner of the generals of the First World War.
Therefore, for El Alamein, Normandy and the Ardennes, he was not prepared to go into an offensive until there was complete readiness of both men, equipment, and logistics. This approach sometimes exasperated his superiors, but it generally brought success, and ensured his popularity with his men.
The criticism of slowness and caution has been taken further with Montgomery being called primarily a "general of matériel" one who emerged at the right time and place to take advantage of the massive outpouring of American and British war production, ensuring the Allies local material superiority against their opponents. But this charge is hard to maintain in a war during which material weight counted above almost all factors. It was a mass production war in every theatre, and the same "matériel" criticism of Montgomery must then need to apply to the great Russian commanders of the Eastern Front like Zhukov or Konev, as well as to the American effort.
Equally, it ignores the successful improvised actions in North Africa, Normandy, and the Ardennes, and yet as stated above, Montgomery did not have the man power or equipment to achieve those scale victories; so in essence one could say he was doing more with what he had, than any other general in Europe.
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Yes of course it is true. Just like the truth of an earlier claim you made
overall Germany never devoted more than 10% of its overall military strength to the West, even during the Ardennes offensive.
Panzercracker
Active member
Sorry Kenny how about you post something honest and of value instead of bias and your "would like to be" version of history, i stand by my claims and prove them whereas you just keep on yapping.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ardennes_offensive
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3633
I dont mean to be offensive but you're lying, you're biased and posting out of your ass, you're out of place in a discussion which requires knowledge.
Also i will continue my discussion with Monty but as for you there's nothing to discuss with someone who replaces knowledge with his own opinions.
Only because other commanders were overlooking various sectors, where Montgomery was commanding there was a slow clumsy grind.
I'm beating a dead horse here, Goodwood has specified goals none of which included diversion, Montgomery simply used the fact that Germans had to divert forces to avoid flak for clumsy execution of the operation.
There was no pursuit of Rommel, Rommel was in Berlin and the Axis was commanded by Stumme or Stummer (dont remember), Rommel was ten times the commander and its his absence that likely caused Montgomery to succeed.
Again, Rommels absence and significant build up of equipment made a difference, there was no tactical brilliance to it.
Because thats exactly what he was trying to do, achieve large scale breakouts, all of his operations and specifically Goodwood had such stated as their operational goals, only afterwards when faced with fruits of his incompetence he would claim them a diversion or an atrition tactic.
Yep, thanks to Americans.
Which is why he sacrificed military effectiveness for his own agenda.
You contradict yourself, first you claim he fought an attrition war which is anything but carefull force preservation then you claim he "carefully husbanded his troops."
Sorry buddy this is a history forum not a propaganda newscast, the fact is all his offensives carried huge losses and all failed to achieve intended goals.
Which is why he had such high losses and so little results, Africa was in reality his only true achievement, everywhere else the man ranged from mild to drastic failiure.
I consider the rest of your post just continous propaganda but if you see something i should adress further please do so.
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Hey I did not know you had (gasp!) WIKI as a source.
Gosh how on earth can puny references like:
Müller-Hillebrand,
ration strength report from Hgr. B/OQu., 1. March 1944 at BA-MA)
BA-MA, N69/18
Materialien zum Vortrag des Chefs des Wehrmachtführungsstabes vom 7.11.1943 "Die strategische Lage am Anfang des fünften Kriegsjahres", (referenced to KTB OKW, IV, S. 1534 ff.)
stand in the light of a reference on Wilki!!!
You are completely out of your depth and it is comical to see you thrash around trying to justify your fiction.
Here are the tank figures for December 15th 1944
West 1632
East 2108
Italy 279
Norway 69
total 4088
West = 40%
East = 52%
The fiollowing also gives the lie to your absurd '10% 'claims
1. Date: 7.11.1943 (situation of 15.10.1943)
East: 3,900,000
Finland: 180,000
Norway: 315,000
Denmark: 110,000
West: 1,370,000
Italy: 330,000
Balkans: 610,000
Sum: 6,815,000
Source: Materialien zum Vortrag des Chefs des Wehrmachtführungsstabes vom 7.11.1943 "Die strategische Lage am Anfang des fünften Kriegsjahres", (referenced to KTB OKW, IV, S. 1534 ff.)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 5.5.1944 (situation likely of April 1944)
East: 3,878,000
Finland: no figure given
Norway: 311,000
Denmark: no figure given
West: 1,873,000
Italy: 961,000
Balkans: 826,000
Sum: 7,849,000
Source: "Strategische Lage im Frühjahr 1944", Jodl, Vortrag 5.5.1944. (referenced to BA-MA, N69/18.)
--------------------------------------------------------
From Müller-Hillebrand, Heer 3, p. 173:
"Ration strength in the West", 1. March 1944 (referenced to OKW War diary)
Army (obviously both field and replacement army, M.): 806,927
SS and Police: 85,230
Foreign volunteers, mainly Eastern troops: 61,439
Allies: 13,631
Luftwaffe (air force): 337,140
Kriegsmarine (navy): 96,084
Wehrmachtgefolge (auxiliary civil personnel): 145,611
Sum: 1,546,062
-----------------------------------------
. From the MGFA’s "official" campaign history (within the WW2 series, Vol. 7, p. 476/477, referenced to a ration strength report from Hgr. B/OQu., 1. March 1944 at BA-MA)
Army (obviously both field and replacement army, M.): 865,180
Luftwaffe (air force): 326,350
Marine (navy): 102,180
SS and Police: 102,610
Sonstige: 91,110
Wehrmachtgefolge (auxiliary civil personnel): 157,210
sum: 1,644,640
-----------------------------------------------
Summer 1944
West: 1,370,000
East: 3,878,000
Montgommery completely destroyed the German Army in Normandy. It fled in panic throwing away all its equipment in a mad dash to safety. Some 2000 tanks left behind in the fields of France. The advance was faster than planned for-hence the outrunning of the supply lines.
Typicaly the fan-boys ignore this and instead make up stories about Barkmann holding up the US advance-he claimed a dozen Shermans when in fact he only manged to get 2 Stuarts!
Panzercracker
Active member
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3633
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_701844085/wehrmacht.html
http://books.google.pl/books?id=0fD...esult&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false
All online sources quote the Wehrmacht as between 8 and 11 milion strong in 1944.
Since you have proven yourself a liar before i must ask for an online version, otherwise lets just let it slide as another post you made up.
Ps. i will check it out but i'm not expecting to find data you're quoting given your attitude of inventing arguments to fit your view.
Another of your lies comes up when you contradict yourself.
First you claim that the tank numbers were:
West 1632
Italy 279
A total of 1911 tanks (this figure is also your own invention by the way)
Then you claim that and i quote:
Some 2000 tanks left behind in the fields of France
So was it 1900? 2000? Please make up your mind when inventing stories to fit your version.
Thats it, i'm done with you unless you come back with online sources.
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_701844085/wehrmacht.html
http://books.google.pl/books?id=0fD...esult&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false
All online sources quote the Wehrmacht as between 8 and 11 milion strong in 1944.
Since you have proven yourself a liar before i must ask for an online version, otherwise lets just let it slide as another post you made up.
Ps. i will check it out but i'm not expecting to find data you're quoting given your attitude of inventing arguments to fit your view.
Another of your lies comes up when you contradict yourself.
First you claim that the tank numbers were:
West 1632
Italy 279
A total of 1911 tanks (this figure is also your own invention by the way)
Then you claim that and i quote:
Some 2000 tanks left behind in the fields of France
So was it 1900? 2000? Please make up your mind when inventing stories to fit your version.
Thats it, i'm done with you unless you come back with online sources.
I have an idiot quoting Osprey titles for authority.
I really think you should check out all those funny little names behind my figures. Tell me you what you think of 'Müller-Hillebrand' as a source?
Make me laugh and tell me you don't accept it!
I am sorry but the documents I quoted are not online. They are in the BMA if you wish to double check though.
The first figure is for Dec 1944 (The Bulge to 'Osprey' experts like your good self)
The ' some 2000' figure is the Normandy 'summer' total. You really should think before posting.
See above
A wise move on your part. Any further bluster would only serve to confirm your complete inability to understand the difference between Wehrmacht and Army, Navy and Air Force.
Thus 50% of the Wehrmacht is not 50% of the Army.
The 'Army' is further sub-divided. See if you can find an Osprey title that explains it all in pictures.
Doppleganger
Active member
Not getting into your discussion (argument) with Panzercracker except to wish you luck. But I am gonna call you on your very throwaway statement. With the benefit of muddled German decision-making, Allied airpower, chronic lack of fuel for the Wehrmacht and it having to fight on several fronts the Western Allies (not just Monty) did decisively defeat the Germans in Normandy. The thread title is whether Monty was overrated and I tend to think that he probably was.
Panzercracker
Active member
So do you have any online sources that would back up your outlandish claims? Any at all? I can keep throwing links at you, you will continue to ridicule them and invent your own "facts" without any source data, is there a point to discussing with you if you make stuff up?
I'm willing to take any link thats not some kind of a blog or a forum post as a source, come on man if you didnt make it all up
I'm willing to take any link thats not some kind of a blog or a forum post as a source, come on man if you didnt make it all up
Which is an opinion and thus arguable. It is a reasonable opinion that could be supported or denied. However we have others with completely idiotic claims about cowardice ect. They have no reedeming features and deserve to be treated with contempt.
Let me get this straight.
You refuse to accept the figures from
Müller-Hillebrand, Heer 3, p. 173.
and want an internet link instead?
Do you even know what this code means when given as a reference:
BA-MA, N69/18
Do you have any idea of what you are claiming?
It is a bit like someone viewing the original Declaration Of Independence but saying that until they get a hyperlink confirming its authenticity they wont accept its real!
If you had a case then you should be giving me chapter and verse from a reputable author who has real OKW figures. You seem not to have this ability. Why am I not suprised.
Do not insult me with a 48 page Osprey pot boiler. Until you can produce figures (with that funny little BA prefix ) then you are pi**ing in the wind.