Thoughts on the Russo-Ukranian War?

Yes but the Russians have been invading Ukraine since 2014 so they have taken 120000sqkm in 8 years, Ukraine has taken a month to recover it's 60000sqkm.



Umm to be fair it is a claim made by Russian troops not Ukrainian ones.



Really, given the extensive coverage of the Gulf Wars and Afghanistan how many burnt out or abandoned American APCs and Trucks did you see on the side of the road loaded with washing machines, TVs etc?

And, how many abandoned Russian trucks did you see on the side of the road loaded with washing machines, TVs,etc ?
One example of looting an abandoned house can not be generalized .
Besides, were there a lot of washing machines and TVs in Iraq and Afghanistan waiting to be looted ?
About the accusations against Russian officers made by Russian soldiers : were these soldiers not POWs of the Ukrainians ? If so :this means that one can not believe their accusations .
 
Allied air superiority did not stop the Germans from transporting supplies to the front .
And in the Spring the Russians had no air superiority,but still succeeded into conquering 20 % of Ukraine .
They would not have done better with air superiority .
Besides: I was talking about the defensive role of the air force : there is no proof that with air superiority the Russians would not have lost Kherson .

That is a dubious claim as the allied destruction of German industry did slow and reduce the supply of equipment to the front, not to mention it forced German production to devote resources to air defence.
Had the Luftwaffe maintained air superiority about 20000 Flak 8.8cm guns could have been used in anti-tank roles or converted to KwK roles instead.
 
That seems to be the initial view.



Yeah but it is Hitler he gets upset about everything, besides what has done recently.
;)

It can also be the result of the Ukrainians were jamming a Russian missile and the missile missed the initial target and hit the field in Poland instead. If it had been a deliberate attack on Poland (NATO), the missile had probably hit something more important, but the Russian aim during this war has been quite iffy
 
All armies need to have functional logistics, without it. The army cannot move nor fight.

The WP planned to reach Rhine in seven days and the rest in additional seven days. Read their planning and read more about Russian doctrine

1 The air force does not determine logistics :RAF /LW did not determine German/British logistics in NA . Although he had air superiority, Ike failed to cross the Rhine in the Autumn of 1944 .
2 Soviet and Russian doctrine are not the same .
Both doctrines are depending on the aims , on the terrain,on the strength of the opponent and on their own strength ,on the needed logistics .
And these 5 points are totally different .
West Germany is not Ukraine
Ukrainian strength is not NATO strength
Russian strength is not Soviet strength
The aims of the WP ( in reality the Soviets,because the armies of the other members would not be committed ) were totally different from the aims of Russia .
 
Allied air superiority did not stop the Germans from transporting supplies to the front .
And in the Spring the Russians had no air superiority,but still succeeded into conquering 20 % of Ukraine .
They would not have done better with air superiority .
Besides: I was talking about the defensive role of the air force : there is no proof that with air superiority the Russians would not have lost Kherson .

Ok, have you heard about the battle of Great Britain. The Yom Kippur war was also a defensive victory, but it was painful for the Israelis.

The allied air power really contributed to the destruction of the German forces in northern France in 1944.

Another war that proves how the air component is a force multiplier is the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
 
Ok, have you heard about the battle of Great Britain. The Yom Kippur war was also a defensive victory, but it was painful for the Israelis.

The allied air power really contributed to the destruction of the German forces in northern France in 1944.

Another war that proves how the air component is a force multiplier is the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Battle of Britain is an arguable case as the outcome was largely meaningless given that the Royal Navy's dominance meant that a cross chanel invasion was impossible even had the Luftwaffe gained control over Southern England, further to this the RAF was not really able to be defeated as 11 group would have withdrawn to 12 groups bases and carried on more or less out of range of German fighters.
 
The Battle of Britain is an arguable case as the outcome was largely meaningless given that the Royal Navy's dominance meant that a cross chanel invasion was impossible even had the Luftwaffe gained control over Southern England, further to this the RAF was not really able to be defeated as 11 group would have withdrawn to 12 groups bases and carried on more or less out of range of German fighters.

I somewhat disagree. If the German air force had been able to defeat or push the RAF away from the south of GB, the German navy had the resources to close the channel, but the navy must have used all of their subs and surface ships with air support keeping the RN out for the time the Germans needed to conduct the amphibious operation. However, it is doubtful if the Germans had the naval logistics to support the amphibious operation
 
I somewhat disagree. If the German air force had been able to defeat or push the RAF away from the south of GB, the German navy had the resources to close the channel, but the navy must have used all of their subs and surface ships with air support keeping the RN out for the time the Germans needed to conduct the amphibious operation. However, it is doubtful if the Germans had the naval logistics to support the amphibious operation

You just have to look at the logistics required to support D-Day, Torch, Anzio or Salerno to see how ad hoc and under prepared the German Sealion plans were.
But we digress.
 
Ok, have you heard about the battle of Great Britain. The Yom Kippur war was also a defensive victory, but it was painful for the Israelis.

The allied air power really contributed to the destruction of the German forces in northern France in 1944.

Another war that proves how the air component is a force multiplier is the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

A German landing in Britain was out of the question after September 1940,even if the LW had defeated the RAF:
British Home Army could easily defeat the German landing forces .
And even without the Home Army, Germany could not land the needed forces because it had not the needed transport fleet .
Besides : there was also the weather : invasion after September was impossible .
That the allied air power contributed to the destruction of the German forces in Northern France is an exaggeration and generalization : it played a role, but a subordinated role .When,in September 1944 the Germans stopped the allied advance , the allied air power failed to destroy the German forces at the border with Germany .
The truth is that the allies would also have destroyed the Germans in Northern France with a weaker air force or without air force .
There is also no proof that Azerbaijan would have lost with a weaker air force or without air force .
Those who claim that the Russian air force is co-responsible for the Russian retreat, must explain how the Russians could conquer 20 % of Ukraine with the same air force .
After the war everyone claimed to have the decisive role in the defeat of Germany : FC,BC, RN, ground forces, SOE, etc,but they all forgot intentionally ,thus hided ,the role of the Germans ( and this is not Hitler ):victory or defeat in a war between A and B ,are not the work of A or of B , but the work of A and B .
Allied strength, aims, .. are as responsible for the victories of the Germans as are German strength and aims .
The same for the German defeats .
Alamein was not the victory of Montgomery or the defeat of Rommel ,but a combination of both .
That's why it is totally wrong to talk of the air force as force multiplier .It is very possible that the victory of Azerbaijan was more caused by the weakness of Armenia than by the drones from Azerbaijan .
 
That is a dubious claim as the allied destruction of German industry did slow and reduce the supply of equipment to the front, not to mention it forced German production to devote resources to air defence.
Had the Luftwaffe maintained air superiority about 20000 Flak 8.8cm guns could have been used in anti-tank roles or converted to KwK roles instead.

But German air superiority does not mean a bigger German war production ,and a bigger German war production does not mean that the front troops would have more supplies .
Notwithstanding the allied air attacks, the German tank and aircraft production continued to increase ,but this increase did not help the Germans .
About the FLAK ( the importance f it has always been underestimated ) :
1The Germans had already a lot of FLAK before the start of the allied air attacks .
2 There was a big difference between the LW FLAK and the army FLAk .
 
All armies need to have functional logistics, without it. The army cannot move nor fight.

But 'better '' logistics = more supplies,does not mean a faster or bigger advance . See COMPASS, Taifun, the broad/small front discussion in September 1944, see Arnhem :The allied failure of Market/Garden was not a problem of logistics .
Logistics do not exist in a nothingness .There are other factors which are as or even more important than logistics .
 
But 'better '' logistics = more supplies,does not mean a faster or bigger advance . See COMPASS, Taifun, the broad/small front discussion in September 1944, see Arnhem :The allied failure of Market/Garden was not a problem of logistics .
Logistics do not exist in a nothingness .There are other factors which are as or even more important than logistics .

Your Market Garden argument is not all that accurate as it was a lack of ammunition, equipment and supplies capable of sustaining 1st Airborne against German heavy forces (armour and artillery) that ultimately lead to its withdrawal, in the end it was a problem with logistics, where supplied adequately airborne troops held their own well.
 
But 'better '' logistics = more supplies,does not mean a faster or bigger advance . See COMPASS, Taifun, the broad/small front discussion in September 1944, see Arnhem :The allied failure of Market/Garden was not a problem of logistics .
Logistics do not exist in a nothingness .There are other factors which are as or even more important than logistics .

That is so wrong on so many levels. You really need to study war more for your conclusions are wrong.
 
A German landing in Britain was out of the question after September 1940,even if the LW had defeated the RAF:
British Home Army could easily defeat the German landing forces .
And even without the Home Army, Germany could not land the needed forces because it had not the needed transport fleet .
Besides : there was also the weather : invasion after September was impossible .
That the allied air power contributed to the destruction of the German forces in Northern France is an exaggeration and generalization : it played a role, but a subordinated role .When,in September 1944 the Germans stopped the allied advance , the allied air power failed to destroy the German forces at the border with Germany .
The truth is that the allies would also have destroyed the Germans in Northern France with a weaker air force or without air force .
There is also no proof that Azerbaijan would have lost with a weaker air force or without air force .
Those who claim that the Russian air force is co-responsible for the Russian retreat, must explain how the Russians could conquer 20 % of Ukraine with the same air force .
After the war everyone claimed to have the decisive role in the defeat of Germany : FC,BC, RN, ground forces, SOE, etc,but they all forgot intentionally ,thus hided ,the role of the Germans ( and this is not Hitler ):victory or defeat in a war between A and B ,are not the work of A or of B , but the work of A and B .
Allied strength, aims, .. are as responsible for the victories of the Germans as are German strength and aims .
The same for the German defeats .
Alamein was not the victory of Montgomery or the defeat of Rommel ,but a combination of both .
That's why it is totally wrong to talk of the air force as force multiplier .It is very possible that the victory of Azerbaijan was more caused by the weakness of Armenia than by the drones from Azerbaijan .

You can google the word contribute to see what it means. You need to read more about the latest war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
 
No, I think in this war the role of MBTs has changed but they are far from obsolete.

They work in open terrain when they have air cover. They can support the infantry in urban terrain. But they don't work well in mountainous and thick forests

I have heard similar thoughts about attack helicopters, but it also depends on how they are used.
 
Your Market Garden argument is not all that accurate as it was a lack of ammunition, equipment and supplies capable of sustaining 1st Airborne against German heavy forces (armour and artillery) that ultimately lead to its withdrawal, in the end it was a problem with logistics, where supplied adequately airborne troops held their own well.

NO : the failure of MG was caused by the Germans .The Germans ad hock formations ( artillery and armour intervened only after the failure of the paratroopers ) prevented the paratroopers to make a connection with the ground forces ( Garden ) .
In last instance, success or failure depended on the opponent :if ''the Hun was on the Run '' as it was hoped and thus expected,supply problems would be irrelevant .If ''the Hun was fighting '',MG was doomed .
MG (as Crete ) proved that without a fast intervention of the ground forces,paratroopers were doomed .
Of course,after the war , the airborne lobby hided this .
 
Market Garden could have succeeded with less supplies than those who were available in the HTL, if the Germans gave up on the first day .
There is no fixed amount of supplies that is needed to win .
MG could succeed with one airborne division or even without an airborne division, if the Germans gave up the moment the attack started .
To say : it was logistics is an attempt to deny the German victory : MG was a German victory, not an allied defeat .
Model was responsible for the German victory, Montgomery was not responsible for the allied defeat .
 
Market Garden could have succeeded with less supplies than those who were available in the HTL, if the Germans gave up on the first day .
There is no fixed amount of supplies that is needed to win .
MG could succeed with one airborne division or even without an airborne division, if the Germans gave up the moment the attack started .
To say : it was logistics is an attempt to deny the German victory : MG was a German victory, not an allied defeat .
Model was responsible for the German victory, Montgomery was not responsible for the allied defeat .

Yeah, no.
Let's assume Montgomery wasn't an idiot, let's also take a giant leap of faith and assume his staff we also relatively competent.
As such I am confident none of them made the assumption we just need to drop into Arnhem and the Germans will do nothing except surrender apon contact (I make this assumption because they sent them with ammunition which would been unnecessary had they planned for a German capitulation) now while there is not a fixed amount of supplies needed, there is a need for adequate supplies and the right equipment without which the plan fails.

But we have moved off topic, this is a discussion better suited to the WW2 section.
 
Back
Top