Why did Germany lose WW2?

[perseus]

Hitler as micro-manager had a knack for picking the WRONG SUPER-WEAPONS. The Tiger tank, for instance, cost 800,000 Reichmarks, and took 300,000 man-hours to produce (Wilbeck: "Sledgehammers"). Now, by any country's standards - that is a super-weapon. The B-29 cost the U.S. somewhat less than $1 million each at the end of production. If you compare the strategic importance of each weapon, their ability to influence the outcome of WWII, there is no question the B-29 was one of the most important weapons systems of WWII, it led to the surrender of Japan without an invasion. What did the Tiger tanks do? They broke down A LOT! Yes, they knocked out huge numbers of Allied tanks when they were actually in combat, but they were so expensive, and broke down so frequently that few ever made it into combat.

4. The Germans made a serious mistake in NOT developing strategic bombers. This was well within their technological capabilities.

Interesting point of view, and agree with most of what you say.

Certainly strategic bombing would have made the difference for the ALLIES, but Germany and Japan was already deprived of supplies by the time large bomber fleets began to target specific objectives. Japans oil shortage was due to cutting off the shipping lanes, not strategic bombing.

The B29 was the most expensive project in WW2 costing $3 Billion before an aircraft was made. Now this was a remarkable advance in technology but was it essential? Could they have not managed bombing Japan with flying fortresses, if bombing was essential at all?

I doubt if Germany had the resources to build a strategic bomber fleet and if it did it would have been wasted due to allied air superiority during the day, and the proximity AA fuse.

Germany couldn't compete using conventional weapons. They were on the right lines with a guided bomb, a small specialised fleet of bombers could deliver this. If this could be countered using jamming. a specialised Kamakaze type weapon was probably their best bet . This could be targeted on individual ships, bridges or electricity plants and difficult to knock out in a high speed dive. Luckily for the allies Japan only got improvised low yield weapons ready in time.

 

[vrmgi]

The $3 billion dollar figure for the B-29s was the total cost of the entire B-29 program; over 3800 B-29s were built, thus each B-29 cost much less than $1 million each.

The B-29 had a range of over 3200 miles, which was over 1000 miles more than the B-24. It could easily carry 10 tons standard load over that range. The B-17s could only carry about 2 tons for their normal range which was less than the B-24.

The B-29s initially flew from bases in central China that were out of range of the B-17s and B-24s. The Marianas were at the very limits of the range of the B-17s and B-24s and they would have probably had to fly with reduced bombloads.

Okinawa is about 1000 miles away from Tokyo, about 1600 miles away from Sapporo in northern Japan. So, when Okinawa was captured, most of Japan fell within easy range of the B-17s and B-24s. The Japan invasion plans in fact included transferring the B-17 and B-24 bomb groups from Europe to Okinawa for this purpose.

Guam to Sapporo is about 2000 miles.

So the big advantage of the B-29s was its great range and payload, which came about courtesy of its powerful new engines the R-3350, which produced about 2200 hp each.

2200 hp was not a lot in an aircraft engine by the end of WWII - a lot of the smaller fighter and bomber engines like the R-2800 were eventually tweaked to produce that much power, and so the really strange thing is that by the time all of its problems were sorted out, the Wright R-3350 with its designed 2200 hp had been eclipsed already in power by the smaller Pratt-Whitney R2800 (although eventually the R-3350 would also be tweaked to produce over 3500 hp). Many of the problems of the B-29 could have been avoided very likely if another engine had been selected.

However, at the start of WWII, which was when the B-29 project started, and when Germany's Ural Bomber was being considered, there were no existing engines that powerful. So the key really was developing new engines of that power. It was just a matter of scaling up from existing radial or inline engines. It was not a huge engineering challenge to do this, Germany had the technology to build bigger and more powerful engines.

Britain was certainly able to build a fleet of heavy bombers - the Lancaster and Halifax would eventually eclipse the B-17s and B-24s in range and payload. The Lancasters were modified to carry these giant 10-ton blockuster bombs.

The Lancasters were so well established as being capable of this mission, that when Gen. Leslie Groves, head of the Mahatten Project, started discussing with the USAAF brass about how the rather large and heavy atomic bombs were to be delivered, he advocated using the British Lancasters in this role. Grove's reasoning was that the B-29's woes had not at that point been completely solved, and nobody had yet figured out how to stuff an atomic bomb inside the B-29, but you can imagine how well Groves's suggestions went over with the USAAF.

As for Hitler choosing to forego development of a strategic bomber - it is quite clear that this decision came about because of the loss of a strong advocate within the Luftwaffe hierarchy like Gen. Wever. Both of his replacements - Udet and Kesserling, were strong proponents of medium and dive bombers.

With the Army, and with tanks, Hitler frequently stepped in and made major changes and decisions. But he rarely did this with the Luftwaffe, and I really think he could have gone either way, depending on what his advisors told him.

The large numbers of medium bombers and dive bombers did contribute to Germany's combined arms blitzkrieg success, but a strategic bomber program running during these early days of WWII would mainly have taken up engineering and design resources. Production would not have started probably until after 1940.

I think most likely what happened was that after Wever died, his succesors Udet and Kesserling killed the strategic bomber. Then when other voices tried to revive the Amerika bomber project, in 1942, German resources were starting to get taxed, and it seemed like it was too late to start this project.

Hitler probably thought that with the V-1 and V-2, Germany could leapfrog the strategic bomber stage of technology, and in a crazy very futuristic way, he was right, except that the other technologies needed to really make the V-1 and V-2 systems effective - a highly accurate guidance system, and the atomic bomb - had not been developed yet.

The whole problem with the German armed forces was that Hitler was so intimately involved in choosing and designing Germany's weapon systems. His approval was needed for every major design change in Germany's tanks, rifles, airplanes, you name it. Staff officers who really really wanted a particular weapons system often had to risk their careers to speak out, talk to Speer and convince him to go behind Hitler's back, or otherwise figure out some way to get around Hitler. One example of this was the development of the MP44 assault rifle, which was given the "machine pistol designation" during development because Hitler had apparently decreed that no new rifles should be developed. Input from the lower ranks was strictly limited, which seriously twisted Germany's arms development for the worse.

Another example - the German Army seriously needed some mine clearing tanks, but Hitler never gave much priority to this task, and so in many, many battles, especially against the Russians, especially at the critical Battle of Kursk, Hitlers' precious and highly expensive Tiger and Panther tanks were run straight into uncleared minefields in a "bull through" tactic that was a complete waste of machinery (Wilbeck: "Sledgehammmers").

Stalin certainly did not do this, leaving the details of arms development to his generals, and the Soviet generals invariably chose the path of stable and predictable technological advances over new ideas. In the freedom of the West, new ideas for war technology flourished like wildflowers, but were also rapidly evaluated and rejected if proved to be useless (e.g., one crazy idea was to arm bats with small timed incendiary bombs and air drop them over Japan to burn down the Japanese cities -this bizarre idea actually progressed to a test stage and was stopped cold when the first test of the bats ended up burning down the wrong building as the bats flew into an operational building rather than the test building - somebody actually wrote a book about this project as their "what I did in the war" memoir).

Once Hitler chose to go in a certain direction with technology, things took on a life of their own, and nobody could really change things. The V-3 giant cannons and the Sturmgeschutz tank destroyers were a classic example of this, with the V-3 being a spectacular failure (nobody would tell Hitler that giant cannons were very visible from the air and easily bombed) and the StuGs becoming this rather stunted substitute for a real tank instead of the Pzkpfw IV. The turretless StuGs and Panzerjagers would become the basis for most AFV-infantry combined actions after the very expensive Tigers and Panthers became the basic tanks for the German Army; rather than continue to produce the very capable Pzkpfw IV and just give them to the infantry, at Hitler's order, production at two Pzkpfw IV factories were shifted to making the StuG IV and Panzerjager IV to give these more limited capability AFVs to the infantry.

 

[Panzercracker]

@vrmgi

German armor is absolutely faultless, Tiger tank which you put down was the best defensive platform of the entire war and its kills show it, most mass tank destroyers (Stugs, Jgdpz IVs, Jagdpanthers, Hetzers) were prime vehicles, same for Pz IVs and Panthers.

Also when comparing German projects you need to take into account that the Western Allies had no good tanks at all (anyone who claims a Sherman was anything but a coffin with a gun is either ignorant or American) and Russians had good tanks but horrible crews (the training program typically consisted of basic operations and maintainance, and that was it).

Also focusing on German "superweapons" is meaningless, they started to have significant presence late in war when no amount of management or resource shifting could save Germany, they were pardon my French, a "**** YOU" type of weapon against the allies.

German weapons projects dont play a great factor in all this, in the beginning of the war Germans had weak equipment but utilized it efficiently, at the end of the war Germans had good equipment but their tactics suffered and the overall disparity was such that it didnt matter anyway.

As for SPGs, Hitler ordered their production because they could be built at a two for one price so they were still superior to Pz IVs.

Also as far as German strat bombers, what would they bomb? Factories beyond Ural with 100000000 fighters between them? Allied landings with enough AA to make the Red Baron weep?

They could not maul Britain into surrender either since they'd live their fighter cover behind and get massacred, so what would those bombers actually bomb?

 

[MontyB]

@vrmgi

German armor is absolutely faultless, Tiger tank which you put down was the best defensive platform of the entire war and its kills show it, most mass tank destroyers (Stugs, Jgdpz IVs, Jagdpanthers, Hetzers) were prime vehicles, same for Pz IVs and Panthers.

I think you are failing to take into account the lack of German tank development throughout WW2 especially considering Russian armour by late 1943 was close to parity in operational capability and certainly by 1945 Russian heavy tanks were superior to German equivalents (if you look at the battles around Budapest in 1945 you can get head to head figures).

Also when comparing German projects you need to take into account that the Western Allies had no good tanks at all (anyone who claims a Sherman was anything but a coffin with a gun is either ignorant or American) and Russians had good tanks but horrible crews (the training program typically consisted of basic operations and maintainance, and that was it).

Once again late in the war with the the likes of the Sheman Firefly and the late entry vehicles of both Britian and the USA you see a leveling of the playing field in terms of armour, on the whole I really think you are somewhat overstating German vehicles, lets face it the best German tank of the early stages 1939-40 was the Pz-35T a stolen Czech design and it was not really that much better than than the French Char B. The T-34 clearly out classed German tanks at release and it wasnt until the intoduction of upgunned and armoured PZ-IV's and Tigers that any parity was regained.

The only aspect German held an advantage in throughout most of the war was quality tank crews and its command and control.

As for SPGs, Hitler ordered their production because they could be built at a two for one price so they were still superior to Pz IVs.

I still believe that Germany from late 1943 onward should have concentrated on the Jagdpanzer IV in vast numbers as its defensive armour and the Panther in lesser numbers for its offensive armour.

 

[Doppleganger]

Monty

Bit hard to determine whether Soviet armour was superior in the end to German armour. Late model German tanks had markedly inferior armour quality (due to the Germans running low in many raw materials) than those built in 1941/1942 and earlier. Armour plate made in 1944 onwards was brittle and lacking in manganese amongst other things, making it crack far easier than designed. Also, the King Tiger was somewhat underpowered although it's wide tracks gave it excellent maneuverability. Finally, King Tigers never underwent a proper testing phase - prototype examples went straight to the front line.

Despite this, King Tigers held their own. An extract taken from Wikipedia:

"One of the IS-2's most notable engagements took place during the fighting in August 1944 to establish a bridgehead across the river Vistula around the town of Sandomierz. This was the first time the IS-2 had come up against the Tiger II. During the engagement on August 13, the 71st Guards Independent Heavy Tank Regiment's eleven IS-2s blocked an attack by fourteen Tiger IIs of the 105th Heavy Panzer Regiment. An engagement at about 700 metres (770 yd) coupled with skilled tactical handling saw four Tiger IIs destroyed for the loss of three IS-2s and seven damaged."

I would call this a draw. The King Tiger, had it been built in the way the Germans had designed, had it undergone a proper testing phase, would have been a superior tank to the IS-2.

Another reason for the superiority of German tanks and tank crews throughout the war (especially compared against the Red Army) was a radio in every tank. This had been one of Guderian's principles.

Focusing on tank destroyers after 1943 wasn't a bad idea at all for Germany, especially if they had focused on Elastic Defence as a basic doctrine. However, like Guderian I would have focused entirely on the Panzer IV as my offensive tank unless the Germans had found some way to build Panthers and Tigers more cheaply and quickly. The German AFV build quality almost right up to the end was very high but they needed cheep and cheerful 'landrover' units, not Mercedes. As Josef Stalin is supposed to have said; "quantity has a quality all of its own."

 

[Panzercracker]

I think you are failing to take into account the lack of German tank development throughout WW2 especially considering Russian armour by late 1943 was close to parity in operational capability and certainly by 1945 Russian heavy tanks were superior to German equivalents (if you look at the battles around Budapest in 1945 you can get head to head figures)..

Woah there tiger, T-34 had some pretty serious issues regarding exit velocity and crew comforts, IS-2 has 12 rounds, KV series were notoriously underpowered and by the end of the war underarmored, by 45 some types of Russian heavy tanks were superior but by and large German Panthers and Tigers take this, during battles around Budapest Germans and Hungarians had around 180.000 men, Russians have over five milion and 7 to 1 supremacy in tanks vs all German armoured vehicles (i'm not even counting Russian SPGs or light tanks assigned to cavalry units).

Once again late in the war with the the likes of the Sheman Firefly

Fireflies had the ability to piece armor, sometimes even frontally at closer ranges, given APDS ammunition this could be dangerous towards heavier tanks but still more often than not they damaged the enemy tank without even incapacitating it, a single shot from any German tank upwards of Pz IV was guaranteed to put a firefly out of comission so again we have a very weak design by the Brits.

and the late entry vehicles of both Britian and the USA you see a leveling of the playing field in terms of armour,

What late entry vehicles? Are you referring to Challenger MK VIII with its weak armor? Comet comes to mind as a relatively good vehicle but it was still seriously lacking in armor on the sides and had a very slow turret traverse so again a vehicle with some extreme flaws, Centurion came in 45 so i'm not sure it counts, the only thing i could seriously include as something on par with heavier German Panzers is the Pershing, its underpowered but good all around.

on the whole I really think you are somewhat overstating German vehicles, lets face it the best German tank of the early stages 1939-40 was the Pz-35T a stolen Czech design and it was not really that much better than than the French Char B. The T-34 clearly out classed German tanks at release and it wasnt until the intoduction of upgunned and armoured PZ-IV's and Tigers that any parity was regained.

As i have written earlier, initial German designs were weak at best, we're talking about fleshed out Panzer IVs Vs and VIs, thats upwards of 42.

The only aspect German held an advantage in throughout most of the war was quality tank crews and its command and control.

And armor, and manouverability, and the ability to kill Western vehicles at leisure when not murdered by artillery or airforce.

I still believe that Germany from late 1943 onward should have concentrated on the Jagdpanzer IV in vast numbers as its defensive armour and the Panther in lesser numbers for its offensive armour.

By late 1943 Germany would lose the war regardless, it was post Kursk and Russians were on the roll, of course i agree that they should have built spgs instead of tanks but thats still fairly pointless in the post Kursk stage.

If we're discussing about what could Germany do to win the war thats a discussion about pre 1942 strategy issues, German tactics were outstanding, German equipment barring their winter fvck up was adequate despite Soviet superiority in armor and artillery departments, its the strategy that failed.

Personally i'd see them concentrate on Moscow and Caucasus oil fields while placing only enough troops near Leningrad and Stalingrad to stalemate the Russian units stationed there.

 

[MontyB]

Monty

Bit hard to determine whether Soviet armour was superior in the end to German armour. Late model German tanks had markedly inferior armour quality (due to the Germans running low in many raw materials) than those built in 1941/1942 and earlier. Armour plate made in 1944 onwards was brittle and lacking in manganese amongst other things, making it crack far easier than designed. Also, the King Tiger was somewhat underpowered although it's wide tracks gave it excellent maneuverability. Finally, King Tigers never underwent a proper testing phase - prototype examples went straight to the front line.

Despite this, King Tigers held their own. An extract taken from Wikipedia:

"One of the IS-2's most notable engagements took place during the fighting in August 1944 to establish a bridgehead across the river Vistula around the town of Sandomierz. This was the first time the IS-2 had come up against the Tiger II. During the engagement on August 13, the 71st Guards Independent Heavy Tank Regiment's eleven IS-2s blocked an attack by fourteen Tiger IIs of the 105th Heavy Panzer Regiment. An engagement at about 700 metres (770 yd) coupled with skilled tactical handling saw four Tiger IIs destroyed for the loss of three IS-2s and seven damaged."

I would call this a draw. The King Tiger, had it been built in the way the Germans had designed, had it undergone a proper testing phase, would have been a superior tank to the IS-2.

But this is just it, the German armoured corps went from an all conquering juggernaut to managing a draw in the space of 4 years and the same thing was happening on the western front.

I tend to think that German conventional weapon development in all fields pretty much stopped in 1939 and they failed to realise it until mid-1944 by which time it was far too late.

 

[Panzercracker]

But this is just it, the German armoured corps went from an all conquering juggernaut to managing a draw in the space of 4 years and the same thing was happening on the western front.

I tend to think that German conventional weapon development in all fields pretty much stopped in 1939 and they failed to realise it until mid-1944 by which time it was far too late.

Sorry Monty but no, on Western front around Calais and during the armored engagements at the Siegfrieds line Germans notoriously murdered allied armor, in fact allies needed a 3 to 1 armor advantage all the way to the end of the war.

Also how did German weapon development stopped when they had the best tanks, remote controlled gun turrets, Puma AFVs (best armored cars of the entire war) first mass produced assault rifles etc.

For a country with the most modern land weapons and the fastest development rate thats a pretty bold statement for you to make.

 

[MontyB]

German armoured innovation pretty much stopped the day they met the T-34 and realised that the mobile bricks they were using were out of date, from then on German armoured development pretty much consisted of "German-ising" Russian designs.

By the way you left off the development of the first night fighting equipment for armour.

Now I am not claiming German vehicles and equipment were bad as much as I am saying the quality gap was closing rapidly between depleted German forces and experienced allied forces and this applies to their equipment as well.

PS Sorry for the rather abrupt replies but I am writing a report, listening to the boss bleat on and trying to type something sensible here all at the same time.

 

[03USMC]

You can argue the quality of Tank's, SPA, what have you all day and into the night. Regardless of the quality, armament, etc. it comes down to production.

You can design the best tank in the world.......but if you can't produce it and field it in sufficent numbers it does you no good against an enemy that can out produce you and absorb their combat losses.

The Allies out produced Germany regardless of the design and quality.

 

[vrmgi]

We are devolving into another topic - Comparison of WWII German versus Allied tanks

Well, yes, this seems to be a never ending topic for debate on all sorts of forums. It is not the original topic for this thread, and so if someone wants to start this as a new thread that would be the way to go.

I will just start off with a few facts and try my best to reference them.


1. The Tiger tanks were:

extremely expensive,
produced in very low numbers,
not invincible to Allied tank guns (especially the British 17-pounder and Russian 122mm)
had to be transported to battles by train,
could not cross most European bridges,
broke down too easily,
guzzled gas and so had limited range and endurance and often ran out of gas during combat,
highly immobile in rough terrain,
easily disabled by mines -

All of which meant that despite their average 12:1 kill ratio in some elite units, they were ineffective strategically because they could not stay in sustained combat, offensive or defensive. Anecdotes of the awesomeness of the Tiger tanks invariably talk about how they shot up a bezillion Allied tanks in such and such a battle. True, but then how did the Allies win the war? Because just as invariably, these stories leave out the fact that anywhere from one day to one month later, the entire Tiger unit would be OUT OF ACTION, and the only Tigers in the area would be dead Tigers. The cause of demise ranged from 0 - 1/2 of the Tigers knocked out by anti-tank guns or other devices and the rest ABANDONED by their crews.

Much of this comes from Christopher Wilbeck's excellent "Sledgehammers". The hard numbers and details of what happened to each and every Tiger tank fielded by the Germans are in Wolfgang Schneider's "Tigers in Combat" Vols I and II (it's amazing how many Tigers were lost to such things as falling into bomb craters, crashing through bridges, getting hit by phosphorus smoke rounds from M4s, disabled by mines, and of course, through mechanical breakdown....it's also amazing how many were knocked out by Allied tanks... Tigers were NOT invincible). Thomas Jentz's 3-volume set of Tiger books are also excellent, with Vol. 3 "Combat Tactics" giving the most useful data.


2. The Panther tank had better frontal armor than the Tiger I, and its 75mm L/70 gun had more punch than the Tiger I's 88mm L/56 gun. The Panther's side and rear armor were weaker than the Tiger I, but it was also lighter and more maneuverable than the Tiger I. This data comes from penetration range data in Thomas Jentz's Panther book, and in Vol.3 of Jentz's Tiger book.

So overall, the Panther was a much better and more lethal tank than the Tiger I. Nevertheless, the Panther usually gets less respect on tank forums than the Tiger I. Why? It did not do so well in France, getting shot up by, of all things, US 75mm M4 Shermans at the Battle of Arracourt, and by combined tactics (mostly aircraft) in Operation Luttich. Except for a few experienced tank aces like Ernst Barkmann, Panthers crews tended to be stocked with new, inexperienced soldiers, unlike most Tiger tanks, which were usually crewed by experienced tankers. This made a definite difference in the outcome. Sources: Steven Zaloga - Panther vs. Sherman, Armored Thunderbolt.

The Panther was originally specified to be a 30-35 ton tank, which would have made it in the same weight class as the M4 and T34, but Hitler insisted on an increase in armor - it eventually became a 45 ton tank, about the same as the heavy JS 2 tanks.


3. The Stug III was the most produced AFV of the German Army! About 10,000 produced. However, it was semi-useless for any role except in a defensive ambush, or as support in a second wave of an offensive attack. If caught in the open against a turreted tank, it had serious problems unless the enemy tank was right in front of it. The Stug III was also (until late in the war), poorly equipped against infantry with only one exposed machine gun on top for fighting enemy infantry. From Spielberger's "Sturmgeschutz and its Variants".

Assigned to the artillery divisions, it was the most common AFV to accompany German infantry (turreted tanks were reserved for the elite Panzer regiments), but it was at best a mediocre infantry support.

The Germans should have simply upgraded the Pzkpfw IV by sloping its armor, and then mass-produced it as an infantry support tank. As it was, the Pzkpfw IV, with the same tank gun, had a much higher kill ratio against enemy tanks than the Stug III, and had three machine guns, two of which were armor protected. It was a superb infantry support tank, but it was only assigned to the Panzer divisions and came to be used increasingly as support armor for the Panthers and Tigers.

The development of the Tiger I tank and the evolution of the Panther tank from a 30 ton tank to a 45 ton tank with terrific frontal armor changed German Army tactics, mostly for the worse. Panzer-infantry combined tactics deteriorated as increasingly these highly touted tanks were sent off on missions with little infantry support (with only a few Panzergrenadiers). German tank doctrine came to see these tanks as breakthrough weapons, or as mobile fortresses to stop an enemy tank attack. The fact that these were expensive tanks and there were few of them meant that the Germans could not afford to use them freely as infantry support tanks.


4. The reason Pzkpfw IV production dropped off was not to produce Panthers. Of the three factories producing Pzkpfw IVs, one was diverted to produce the StuG IV after the Alkett factory producing StuG IIIs was bombed. A second factory was later converted to produce the Panzerjager IV. (Spielberger: "Sturmgeschutz...")

Wouldn't it have been easier to just keep producing the Pzkpfw IVs and just give them to the infantry? For, despite the varying claims of how much cheaper the StuGs were, the total numbers of StuG IVs and Panzerjager IVs produced were not much higher than the numbers of Pzkpfw IVs those factories had been producing. One source (don't remember where) says that the Stug IIIs were only about 80% of the cost of a turreted Pzkpfw IV, which seems about right.


5. The British 17-pounder was a terrific tank gun! It was better than the Russian A19 122 mm gun on the JS2 tank, better than the 90mm gun on the M26 Pershing, better than the Panther 75mm L/70 gun, better than the Tiger I 88mm L/56 gun. Only the Tiger II's 88m L/71 gun topped it in WWII. The 17-pounder could blow holes in the frontal armor of the Tiger I easily. The 17-pounder could punch through the gun mantlet of the Panther but not the glacis plate. This comes from the penetration range data in Thomas Jentz's Panther book and Vol. 3 Tiger book.

Michael Wittman, Tiger ace, was killed in his Tiger I by a British Firefly with a 17-pounder. British Fireflies with their weak armor could get knocked out if ambushed first, but they were deadly when ambushing German tanks.


6. The T34 is probably the most overrated tank ever on these "Best tank" forums!

The T34 was indeed the champion Best Tank in 1941, and into 1942, until the Tiger I came into being. But by 1944, it was useful mainly as an infantry support tank, much like the M4 Sherman, having been outclassed by the German tanks and replaced as a heavy tank in the Russian Army by the JS 2.

And in fact, the penetration range data in Jentz's Panther book and Vol. 3 Tiger book show that the armor and firepower of the T34/85 and the M4/76 are fairly similar -

The 76mm M4 gun actually had more punch than the 85mm gun of the T34/85. The T34 armor was slightly stronger than the M4 Sherman, but it was still easily penetrated by the Panther's 75mm gun and the Tiger I's 88 mm gun. The T34 armor WAS NOT THAT GREAT by 1944 standards, just like the M4 armor sucked big time by 1944.

The two tanks had many, many design differences with different strengths and weaknesses which overall tended to cancel each other out. Read Dmitriy Loza's "Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks" to get a feel for the differences between the two tanks. Loza fought in both tanks, and loved the M4 tanks!


Whew! So there! Time to go to bed and let's see what that stirred up!

 

[MontyB]

You may be right, so maybe it is time to create a new thread titled "Comparison of WW2 tank design and operational doctrine"?

On the whole I tend to think that Germany came within an ace of winning the war in 1942 and was still in with a chance until late 1943 had they implemented a better defensive doctrine. However the primary reason they lost was poor planning for a war economy and logistics.

 

[Doppleganger]

On the whole I tend to think that Germany came within an ace of winning the war in 1942 and was still in with a chance until late 1943 had they implemented a better defensive doctrine. However the primary reason they lost was poor planning for a war economy and logistics.

I would say they came within in ace of winning in 1941, not 1942. By 1942 it was too late because of the losses suffered at Moscow. The Wehrmacht was so stretched in taking on the Soviet juggernaut that it could not afford either serious losses or a protracted war. After 1941 it ended up with both.

I would expand on what you said and state that the ultimate reason that Germany lost was due to a myopic and faulty grand strategy, that included poor planning for a war economy and inadequate logistics for the tasks asked of the Wehrmacht.

 

[MontyB]

I would say they came within in ace of winning in 1941, not 1942. By 1942 it was too late because of the losses suffered at Moscow. The Wehrmacht was so stretched in taking on the Soviet juggernaut that it could not afford either serious losses or a protracted war. After 1941 it ended up with both.

I would expand on what you said and state that the ultimate reason that Germany lost was due to a myopic and faulty grand strategy, that included poor planning for a war economy and inadequate logistics for the tasks asked of the Wehrmacht.

There certainly doesn't appear to have been any real "grand" strategic plan to fight and win a global war.

As far as winning the war in 1942 goes I am still convinced that had the 6th Army operated with speed they could have taken Stalingrad and beyond which would have made the defence of the southern oilfields almost impossible for Russia, this I believe would have spelled the end of Russia.

I am still convinced that the weeks leading up to Stalingrad when the 6th Army took a holiday were the defining moment of WW2 on the Eastern Front.

 

[ddg2sailor]

A very interesting topic.

Most people would seem to agree that hitlers failure to take russia was a major issue , I cant argue with that. But suppose that Germany and Russia had signed a non aggression pack and then followed it up? If Russia had remained neutral what would have happened?

Personaly I think the over extended supply lines were a major factor. To me at any rate hitler simply bit off more then he could chew.

What if the Japanese empire diddnt attack the USA on Dec 7 , but rather held off for another 6 months. Granted at the time we were lend-leasing to the UK but while folks in the USA where concerned about the war.. Historicly Im not sure the USA was ready to go to war.

All of my surmise is of course based my hear-say historical data and If I have made an error , Il be more then happy to consider another viewpoint.

Robert

 

[MontyB]

I tend to agree that the biggest issue in Russia was a logistical one, I have read many accounts of logistics officers having to make decisions as to what would be sent to the front and how it came down to the most pressing need first. There were even cases of winter equipment sitting in supply depots through out winter because it was more important to get ammunition, reinforcements, food etc. to the front.

 

[Doppleganger]

The shortage that really did in Germany in 1941 when they were battering the gates of Moscow was a chronic lack of fuel.

An example. At the start of Operation Typhoon (the German name for the assault on Moscow), 4th Panzer Division, attached to Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army, had only 162m3 of fuel, which is 162000 litres of fuel plus 80000 litres in reserve. The basic load of fuel determined to allow a Panzer Division to advance 100km is 125m3 or I V.S. German doctrine stated that a Panzer Division should have 4 V.S (500m3) worth of fuel for offensive operations. So we can see that right at the start of the operation this particular division had less than half the amount of fuel (162m3+80m3) it should have had.

Some divisions were worse than this but overall it meant that German spearheads were often stuck waiting for tankers to come back from distant fuel depots when instead they should have been advancing. It gets worse when you consider German tank engines often had to be run day and night due to the freezing conditions later on in the operation.

 

[MontyB]

I have read that a lot of this problem was caused by the lack of Russian infrastructure, rail lines and high capacity roads but I am not convinced as the Russians did not seem to have the same issues in 1943-44.

My impression is that it was German logistics that failed them in Russia not the conditions.

 

[Doppleganger]

I have read that a lot of this problem was caused by the lack of Russian infrastructure, rail lines and high capacity roads but I am not convinced as the Russians did not seem to have the same issues in 1943-44.

My impression is that it was German logistics that failed them in Russia not the conditions.

That's a slightly simplistic way of looking at things Monty. The lack of Russian infrastructure was a REAL problem and affected the Germans badly in 1941, although there's no doubt that the German logistical operation was not up to the job in any shape, way or measure.

From 1941 a great deal of the Soviet railroad was rebuilt to German scale and Lend-Lease helped out the Soviet railroad system too. The Soviets were also naturally far more accustomed to their own railroad scale than the Germans were. The Russians also did not advance in the same way the Germans had. After Kursk, the Wehrmacht was mainly clumped around several strategic objectives of high worth. The Red Army had more time to move up their forces to wherever they were needed next - Bagration is a good example.

 

[Panzercracker]

From 1941 a great deal of the Soviet railroad was rebuilt to German scale

No it was not, to this day Russia has less railroads then even the poorest European countries.
http://www.russia-ukraine-travel.com/images/map-russia-roads-rail.gif

and Lend-Lease helped out the Soviet railroad system too.

No it did not, LL send 11.000 railcars and 1200 locomotives, Russian stocks at the time consisted of 600.000 railcars and 28.000 locomotives.

Thats 1/60th of the railcars and 1/28th of the locos the Russians already had, please stop with this lend lease crap its getting old.

The Soviets were also naturally far more accustomed to their own railroad scale than the Germans were.

First and foremost the Soviet rail had a different track width which means that initially German trains that were not captured from Russia were useless, it also means that much of LL equipment was initally useless, second of all the bulk of tranport was done via road, Russians activated major rail routes only in case of stationary battles or buildups like Leningrad or Kursk.

The Russians also did not advance in the same way the Germans had. After Kursk, the Wehrmacht was mainly clumped around several strategic objectives of high worth. The Red Army had more time to move up their forces to wherever they were needed next - Bagration is a good example.

And that sir is the only valid point and also the only relevant one, Russia took 2.5 years to move across spaces that Germany had first covered within several months, German logistics were great and outside idiotic mass education programs like discovery channel no one claims otherwise, the only problem was the speed of advancement, the argument about horse traction is also rubbish since Russians used it en masse till the end of the world as well and it worked, neither Wehrmacht nor the Red Army were ever fully mechanised, that applies only to the Western Allies.