Why Couldnt the US win the Viet Nam conflict?
tomtom22
Chief Engineer
It happens to be the opinion of someone who was there.
Furthermore, someone who has read about and researched the war for a wider view than my own personal experience.
I suggest you read the following books for a different prospective:
"A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam" (1988) by Neil Sheehan, .
"STRANGE GROUND Americans in Vietnam 1945-1975 An Oral History" (1989) by Harry Maurer, ISBN 0380709317.
The latter was written by an admitted draft dodger and has the perspectives of many from generals to enlisted to diplomats during all phase of the war.
The first one will show how the US strategy changed over the long term of the war. It was not simply fought as you say in a WWII set piece strategy or tactics.
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tomtom22
Chief Engineer
Please review my edited post. Upon reflection I deleted that, and I apologize for it. This is a very sensitive subject for me.
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Chukpike
Banned
No, we are not just talking about tactics. The Topic is "Why Couldn't the US win the Vietnam War."
If we were, the source you used said," "Overall, the tactics used by the Australian Army in Vietnam were not successful."
As far as I am aware, Australian forces have performed well where ever they have served.
If wars were won are lost by tactics alone, the European Continent might be speaking German, if not for the ego of the "little Corporal".
Also from my previous post: On the Tet offensive.
"Although the offensive was a huge tactical failure which resulted in the decimation of whole units of Viet Cong, the end result was a moral victory for it broke the U.S. will to fight the war and public opinion in the U.S. turned against the government which resulted in the bombing of North Vietnam halted, and negotiations with U.S. officials opening as to how to end the war."
Battles may be won by tactics, wars are won by strategies. Even if it is just "outlast them".
He may have used with word tactics, however what he said were not successful were strategic. And again stop referring to it as my source. I used it to get quotes, my sources are those who said them.
Yes, however you took what I said out of context, as the context was tactics.
Wasn't this the official US strategy? Attrition, guess who outlasted who.
I didn't say that.
Well they certainly weren't winning it.
Ok well here, let me make a statement that will satisfy everybody and is as politically correct as you will get out of me.
The United States Military are experts at every aspect of warfare as long as the enemy is known to us and either wearing a uniform, or otherwiswe identified to us as a friendly.
That I can say is true and nobody can say its not cuase there have been many times we were told, " they might be friends, don't shoot till they shoot first"
The United States Military are experts at every aspect of warfare as long as the enemy is known to us and either wearing a uniform, or otherwiswe identified to us as a friendly.
That I can say is true and nobody can say its not cuase there have been many times we were told, " they might be friends, don't shoot till they shoot first"
bren122
Active member
the wikipedia references to events in Phuoc Tuy Province following the Australian withdrawal are somewhat misleading. The insurgency quickly moved into the province but by 1972 the local force unit D445 had been effectively eliminated and would take a number of years to rebuild; one source states that by 1970 D445 had been reduced to the headquarters and political cadres. the regional unit was also heavily affected but by definition drew its forces from a larger area than just Phuoc Tuy.
Australian tactics were successful to the point Australian units could leave the province in significant numbers and for extended periods in order to take part in allied operations in other provinces without affecting the tactical situation in Phuoc Tuy.
Australian tactics were a development of British tactics used in Malaya, but also with a dose of US Marine procedures. the marines in IICorps essentially used similar tactics to the Australians but with less success because of the nature of the enemy effort in the area. it should be remembered that Phuoc Tuy province was not regarded as a vital area by the Viet Cong or North Viet Namese. once the initial effort to destroy the task force was comprehensively defeated at Long Tan the Australians mostly faced D445 and regional force units, neither to be compared with main force VC or regular NVA troops. the encounters with communist forces in the later stages of the deployment, when they decided, to quote one author, "to touch up" the departing Australians were against the tougher main force and NVA units where the commander of the platoon in the last serious encounter for the Australians, the aforementioned author, said that it was a close run thing between victory and massacre.
The American Army performed so poorly (possibly not the best word but i can't think of a better one) because it wasn't in Viet Nam for ten years; it was in for one year ten times. the operational and personnel experience was constantly being relearnt and a soldier returning even a year later would have been hard pressed to find significant change in the tactics or strategy of the American forces. add to this the loss of institutional experience engendered by each batch of conscripts being replaced. by the end of the war American tactics and strategy had changed, but not so much that a soldier in 1963 transported forward in time to 1973 would not have fitted in relatively easily. the same could not be said of the two world wars. ten years is a long time to be fighting without significant changes to the structure of the army, but by being forced to constantly relearn the basics it kept the institution in status quo. a more free flowing development of tactics by troops in longterm postings would have produced different results.
it is also a significant factor that at no point did the Viet Nam conflict significantly detract from American commitment to Europe and a potential conflict there. i might be mistaken, but i recall at least one source saying that more conscripts served in Europe over the course of those ten years than in Viet Nam. Westmoreland and Abrams were both highly regarded officers but it would be a bit of a stretch to compare their support to that of their counterparts in Supreme Allied Command Europe.
another factor that i don't think gets addressed in sufficient strength is the cause of the disillusionment; the constant promise of one last push to win the war. i think if the American government had left the conflict more of an open ended commitment and allowed for setbacks like Tet to upset the timetable the civilians and conscripts might have been far more patient and certainly more willing to accept political changes forced on the South Viet Namese in order to win the war. as it was any decision to change the government would only have further undermined confidence at home. the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan might be used as an indication of what it could have been like; there are hardly any protests and certainly no riots in America at the moment precisely because the military and politicians are saying that each could require a commitment of a decade or more, plus there is widespread acceptance of the need to replace Karzai in Afghanistan in order to win the war. of course the fact that these conflicts fall on a volunteer army might be a mitigating factor.
Australian tactics were successful to the point Australian units could leave the province in significant numbers and for extended periods in order to take part in allied operations in other provinces without affecting the tactical situation in Phuoc Tuy.
Australian tactics were a development of British tactics used in Malaya, but also with a dose of US Marine procedures. the marines in IICorps essentially used similar tactics to the Australians but with less success because of the nature of the enemy effort in the area. it should be remembered that Phuoc Tuy province was not regarded as a vital area by the Viet Cong or North Viet Namese. once the initial effort to destroy the task force was comprehensively defeated at Long Tan the Australians mostly faced D445 and regional force units, neither to be compared with main force VC or regular NVA troops. the encounters with communist forces in the later stages of the deployment, when they decided, to quote one author, "to touch up" the departing Australians were against the tougher main force and NVA units where the commander of the platoon in the last serious encounter for the Australians, the aforementioned author, said that it was a close run thing between victory and massacre.
The American Army performed so poorly (possibly not the best word but i can't think of a better one) because it wasn't in Viet Nam for ten years; it was in for one year ten times. the operational and personnel experience was constantly being relearnt and a soldier returning even a year later would have been hard pressed to find significant change in the tactics or strategy of the American forces. add to this the loss of institutional experience engendered by each batch of conscripts being replaced. by the end of the war American tactics and strategy had changed, but not so much that a soldier in 1963 transported forward in time to 1973 would not have fitted in relatively easily. the same could not be said of the two world wars. ten years is a long time to be fighting without significant changes to the structure of the army, but by being forced to constantly relearn the basics it kept the institution in status quo. a more free flowing development of tactics by troops in longterm postings would have produced different results.
it is also a significant factor that at no point did the Viet Nam conflict significantly detract from American commitment to Europe and a potential conflict there. i might be mistaken, but i recall at least one source saying that more conscripts served in Europe over the course of those ten years than in Viet Nam. Westmoreland and Abrams were both highly regarded officers but it would be a bit of a stretch to compare their support to that of their counterparts in Supreme Allied Command Europe.
another factor that i don't think gets addressed in sufficient strength is the cause of the disillusionment; the constant promise of one last push to win the war. i think if the American government had left the conflict more of an open ended commitment and allowed for setbacks like Tet to upset the timetable the civilians and conscripts might have been far more patient and certainly more willing to accept political changes forced on the South Viet Namese in order to win the war. as it was any decision to change the government would only have further undermined confidence at home. the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan might be used as an indication of what it could have been like; there are hardly any protests and certainly no riots in America at the moment precisely because the military and politicians are saying that each could require a commitment of a decade or more, plus there is widespread acceptance of the need to replace Karzai in Afghanistan in order to win the war. of course the fact that these conflicts fall on a volunteer army might be a mitigating factor.
A Can of Man
Je suis aware
Again, all the things the US needed to do in order to win the war - take the fight up to the north and fight on America's terms - were ruled out and that pretty much ruled out victory.
mmarsh
Active member
TomTom
I am curious on something. Can you answer me a question?
Based on your experiance, Would you say that the Jungle guerilla-war aspect of Vietnam was similar to that of WWII? Or was it completely different. I am curious because there were some like my Great-Uncle who actually fought in both wars.
If they were similar, then why wasnt the tactics used in WWII as successful when they were tried on the Vietnamese.
I am curious on something. Can you answer me a question?
Based on your experiance, Would you say that the Jungle guerilla-war aspect of Vietnam was similar to that of WWII? Or was it completely different. I am curious because there were some like my Great-Uncle who actually fought in both wars.
If they were similar, then why wasnt the tactics used in WWII as successful when they were tried on the Vietnamese.
Chukpike
Banned
Most was in the India, Borneo, China region. This tends to be forgotten or overshadowed by the large actions in Europe, North Africa and Russia.
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
Spot on. The British 14th Army was always referred to as "The forgotten Army."
A Can of Man
Je suis aware
Nope, but at least it ended in a pretty solid stalemate. Better than losing the whole neighborhood.
Plus it wasn't simply Chinese intervention alone. The Chinese managed to strike with absolute surprise with tactics that stunned the combined UN forces. Probably wouldn't have been the case for the Chinese if they tried to enter Vietnam. Plus, Vietnam (including North Vietnam) and the Chinese were absolute enemies, unlike the North Koreans who had been comrades with the Chinese Communists throughout the war against Japan. Cooperation and coordination between the two would have been far more complicated and difficult.
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When confronted by Colonel Harry Summers with the fact that the Communists had never beaten U.S. Troops in a battle, a North Vietnamese officer replied,” that is correct, it is also irrelevant”.
Propping up a corrupt military dictatorship that treated 'the people' like dirt was never going to win their support (it was their country remember) ...
Air power and insensible ground troops obliterated peaceful ancestral villages, making conversions of the peoples “Hearts and Minds” impossible.
Without the Vietnamese peoples support - the Norths message of Nationalism was always going to win out.
Unleash the full might of the US juggernaut if you will - even reducing the country to a moonscape, wouldn't have 'won' the war.
Nation building doesn't work if the population doesn't buy what you are selling.
In this case liberal Democracy - wrapped up as it was in a stinking package.
A horrible waste of lives.
Propping up a corrupt military dictatorship that treated 'the people' like dirt was never going to win their support (it was their country remember) ...
Air power and insensible ground troops obliterated peaceful ancestral villages, making conversions of the peoples “Hearts and Minds” impossible.
Without the Vietnamese peoples support - the Norths message of Nationalism was always going to win out.
Unleash the full might of the US juggernaut if you will - even reducing the country to a moonscape, wouldn't have 'won' the war.
Nation building doesn't work if the population doesn't buy what you are selling.
In this case liberal Democracy - wrapped up as it was in a stinking package.
A horrible waste of lives.
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Panzercracker
Active member
In Russia and Poland, both had guerilla forces the size of regular militaries.
vrmgi
New Member
Vietnam was a civil war, and a proxy war. The U.S. couldn't win because
1. The Vietnamese people were fighting amongst themselves, basically. It was an internal conflict, and there was no good way to separate out who was fighting for the North, and who was fighting for the South. The South was constantly being infiltrated as a result. The U.S. needed a strong dictator in the South who could control the army and whip the South Vietnamese into fighting shape. For whatever reason, unlike the Korean war, such a dictator never appeared on the scene in South Vitenam. Probably the CIA-approved assassination of Diem had a lot to do with it. All subsequent Vietnamese leaders knew that they had to do whatever the US wanted; this made them weak in the eyes of their own people. A strong leader could not emerge in such a situation, only somebody willing to be a puppet of the US. The South Vietnamese army remained a corrupt and incapable institution. The North Vietnamese had worked for a long time to infiltrate the South, and the final withdrawal peace agreement that the US signed and force South Vietnam to sign - the "leopard spot" treaty, basically allowed the North to retain all the areas that they controlled already in the South. This was just a roadmap for the day that the North was going to come in and roll over the South with their tanks. The US never built up a strong enough government or army institution in the South that could withstand the North by itself. Korea was a civil war and a proxy war too, but it was fought more conventionally, and the S. Koreans had a brutal dictator who started and finished the war and kept the S. Koreans in line throughout.
2. As a proxy war, Russia and China were going to supply the North Vietnamese with an endless supply of all the high tech weapons they needed to make victory impossible for the U.S. The longer the US fought in Vietnam, the more weapons the USSR and China were going to pour into Vietnam. The US could never shut off the supply of weapons to N. Vietnam, unlike in WWII, because they would have had to declare war on the USSR and China. The U.S. did the same thing to the USSR when they invaded Afghanistan in 1980.
3. The US thought the war in Vietnam was to stop Communism. It was never about Communism. Right after N. Vietnam invaded and took over South Vietnam, they got into wars with the Khmer Rouge, and then China, both supposedly on the same Communist side. This bipolar view of the world that the US had at the time was totally wrong. It was all about nationalism, and historical cultural disputes. Communism had almost nothing to do with the war in Vietnam.
4. Nixon figured he could sign the crappy "leopard spot" peace treaty with the North Vietnamese and still enforce it - had they invaded South Vietnam while he was in office, he would have sent the B-52s in for sure. But Watergate intervened, and Ford was too weak to send the B-52s in. After the peace treaty was signed, and the US withdrew all its troops, there was a period of peace where it almost looked like South Vietnam was going to make it. Then Nixon resigned, and the North Vietnamese saw their chance - they knew the US was too distracted and anguished by the Watergate scandal to do anything more in Vietnam. They sent their regular army in full force, with tanks rolling into South Vietnam. A real blunder, that the US had not anticipated this possibility and given the South Vietnamese Army massive quantities of the anti-tank weapons they could have used to fight off these tanks. Nixon was counting on using American forces to respond, and this just never happened. American air power would have easily crushed the regular army force that the North sent in, especially the tanks.
1. The Vietnamese people were fighting amongst themselves, basically. It was an internal conflict, and there was no good way to separate out who was fighting for the North, and who was fighting for the South. The South was constantly being infiltrated as a result. The U.S. needed a strong dictator in the South who could control the army and whip the South Vietnamese into fighting shape. For whatever reason, unlike the Korean war, such a dictator never appeared on the scene in South Vitenam. Probably the CIA-approved assassination of Diem had a lot to do with it. All subsequent Vietnamese leaders knew that they had to do whatever the US wanted; this made them weak in the eyes of their own people. A strong leader could not emerge in such a situation, only somebody willing to be a puppet of the US. The South Vietnamese army remained a corrupt and incapable institution. The North Vietnamese had worked for a long time to infiltrate the South, and the final withdrawal peace agreement that the US signed and force South Vietnam to sign - the "leopard spot" treaty, basically allowed the North to retain all the areas that they controlled already in the South. This was just a roadmap for the day that the North was going to come in and roll over the South with their tanks. The US never built up a strong enough government or army institution in the South that could withstand the North by itself. Korea was a civil war and a proxy war too, but it was fought more conventionally, and the S. Koreans had a brutal dictator who started and finished the war and kept the S. Koreans in line throughout.
2. As a proxy war, Russia and China were going to supply the North Vietnamese with an endless supply of all the high tech weapons they needed to make victory impossible for the U.S. The longer the US fought in Vietnam, the more weapons the USSR and China were going to pour into Vietnam. The US could never shut off the supply of weapons to N. Vietnam, unlike in WWII, because they would have had to declare war on the USSR and China. The U.S. did the same thing to the USSR when they invaded Afghanistan in 1980.
3. The US thought the war in Vietnam was to stop Communism. It was never about Communism. Right after N. Vietnam invaded and took over South Vietnam, they got into wars with the Khmer Rouge, and then China, both supposedly on the same Communist side. This bipolar view of the world that the US had at the time was totally wrong. It was all about nationalism, and historical cultural disputes. Communism had almost nothing to do with the war in Vietnam.
4. Nixon figured he could sign the crappy "leopard spot" peace treaty with the North Vietnamese and still enforce it - had they invaded South Vietnam while he was in office, he would have sent the B-52s in for sure. But Watergate intervened, and Ford was too weak to send the B-52s in. After the peace treaty was signed, and the US withdrew all its troops, there was a period of peace where it almost looked like South Vietnam was going to make it. Then Nixon resigned, and the North Vietnamese saw their chance - they knew the US was too distracted and anguished by the Watergate scandal to do anything more in Vietnam. They sent their regular army in full force, with tanks rolling into South Vietnam. A real blunder, that the US had not anticipated this possibility and given the South Vietnamese Army massive quantities of the anti-tank weapons they could have used to fight off these tanks. Nixon was counting on using American forces to respond, and this just never happened. American air power would have easily crushed the regular army force that the North sent in, especially the tanks.