As always with Vietnam debates, it slowly trickles away from a mild discussion of military and social principles and becomes a quasi-political gaggleflop. Really now, can we back away from the inflamed opinions, not to mention do some decent research and possibly come to a discussion? Going on about causes alone isn't enough to declare a victory/loss, there are other factors involved which make or break the fight. Unless you're talking about the cause leading into developing the morale and determination of the fighters. So much for a preamble. And because of GFaqs' TOS, I can't use the time proven NCO style of explaining things, so I'll have to be astute and eloquent in my case.
Now, I'll freely admit my personal experience and that of my parents is quite limited about the war itself. In order to clear up any possible confusion of the sort in the future regarding my hand in this.
I'm a 1st generation born American (Ah-ha, I didn't say Vietnamese-American or American-Vietnamese or any of those other racial euphamisms that people use. Just a minor quirk of mine, not that I'm particularly shameful of being Vietnamese, it's just that I'm not a citizen of the Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Viet Nam [Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the current name of what was North Vietnam]) of Vietnamese descent. I'm pretty young generational wise in relation to the war, as well as my parents. I'm on the verge of graduating high school, and next year I'm entering the United States Army. My MOS is going to be 11B: Infantryman, Rifleman, GI, Grunt, Groundpounder, Doughboy if you will. So I take a big interest in how Vietnam was carried out by all parties. I also happen to be an amatuer student of history (military history, specifically WWII and Vietnam), by no means an expert, but I try nonetheless. My parents on the other hand, were mere children during the time of the war. Also, they were raised in far off areas of the countryside (although my mom was born in Saigon on the second day of the Offensive); my dad in Dao Nam Du (little bitty hellhole of an island far down south, doubt anyone has gone there, doubt anyone knows about it. I've been there a few times, great loads of fun [in a pig's eye]. Brownie points for any
congnoscenti {Speaking of Latin, I should be working on my Latin assignments instead of this, but the discussion's too rich to pass up}), my mom grew up in Nam Binh (it's a ways nearby Vung Tau, a city many people will be familiar with in one way or another. Nice beaches, well, used to.). My extended family with a couple of exceptions were removed from the war, they saw it through the eyes of civilian bystanders in far off places (my dad's side of the family lived out in the boonies for this express reason, so he's got no experience whatsoever about Charlie's rule.). My mom was in school when Victor Charles took over, and she remembers getting a primer in air raid procedures during the height of the Khmer Rouge fiasco in which the Vietnamese went in and kicked the hell out of Pol Pot and faced threats of invasion by China. My parents are both 'boat people,' they went on those dinghy-wannabe excuses for boats and went off to Thailand and other similar places and were stuck in refugee camps until they were sponsored over to the US (they're both citizens now, and quite proud of it). So all in all, my family history's only a small glimpse into the aftermath of the war. I've been back there four times in my life, Charlie (I just call the Cong San [Communists] that for the hell of it) is a perpetual pain in the ass. He expects bribes out the ass everywhere you go, whatever you do, and there's also that lovely lack of freedom of movement. But that's enough of personal recollections, onto the meat of the post: my thoughts on why the US and RVN collectively lost the pot in Vietnam.
One book that really stands out in my mind as a good insight into why the war was slanted downhill (not to mention being just a damned good autobiography) is Colonel David H. Hackworth's
About Face: The Oddssey of An American Warrior. He was a helluva combat leader in both Korea and Vietnam and is up there on my list of people. He's got a pretty good website and group called Soldiers For the Truth:
www.sftt.org . Check it out sometime.
Yes, the US won all the battles in Vietnam. Face it, Charles couldn't stand up to the US in an
open battlefield, hands down. Once the smoke and dust from an artillery barrage cleared up, the US was still standing on the plain. But therein lies the folly. The US may have won the territory in that battle, but the North took it back in the night once the US left the land. The North owned the night, and in that they were able to take control of the people (by fear or other reasons). The US wasn't able to provide enough incentive through programs or protection to convince the people to fight it out on their own against the North (with the exception of Montangards and the like, who are on their own anyways and are still considered second class by Vietnamese in general). Sure, the Americans were generous and were powerful combatants, but that didn't help much when you wake up in the middle of the night to get castrated and strangled with piano wire. That's one step into the rabbit hole.
Another point is to the cost at which it took to maintain that ground (which I'll refer to as World War II style thinking at the moment: viewing terrain as critical and the condition of victory/defeat in a war), it was ultimately ridiculous. The guerilla forces only whittled away US manpower in the American efforts to maintain terrain that NVA forces could plausibly break through had they had any large standing formations (big no-no with the American big-stick of artillery and bombers). And in the pursuit of 'body count,' ridiculous amounts of munitions were used in order to get just one, the resources used to confirm the body count put many infantrymen into absurd risks, and was ultimately a lousy means of determining success (via means of attrition). A greater effort should have been placed into civil programs, especially involving Special Forces to take back the night from the North and let the people eventually take over their own defense. Further Alice.
The Americans and RVN both take the next point. The RVN and ARVN and AFRVN (Republic of Vietnam, Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Air Force of the Republic of Vietnam respectively) were largely corrupt, especially in the officer ranks. Not to dismiss the young volunteers, but you can't have jack without good leadership. So it was a large waste of resources and morale overall once the US left, which brings me to the point. RVN was all too willing to let the US take over everything, and the US was all too eager to do so. So ARVN and AFRVN kicked back and relaxed while the foreign Americans killed themselves while they leeched off of the 'Horn of Plenty from the Land of the Big PX,' never imagining the day where the US would pull the plug. But lo and behold, one day the US did, under the title of 'Vietnamization (which was trying to get the RVN armed forces off of their asses and into shape before ultimately leaving them to the hands of the NVA).' Some of the RVN forces got the message and were able to put up an adequate fight, but others didn't and collapsed as the NVA launched their first WW2 style offensive in 1975 (after the Americans left of course, now they can't be battered from afar).
And the most important factor of all, morale. Victor Charles (not specifically referring to the VC, but the North in general. VC is short for Viet Cong San: Vietnamese Communist anyways.) was drilled politically 'round the clock to the merits of his side of the war. Thus, he knew what he was fighting for (unification and all that other communist jazz). The US and RVN forces were largely in confusion in terms of a specific ideal (except freedom, but for most people, that isn't enough. A pity.). So people flocked to the NVA's banner, if only to end the long years of fighting.
So the US could have used a lot of work in waging the guerilla war, along with letting ARVN do more of its fair share of the work. If the war was going to be fought WWII style, it should have invaded the North and taken Hanoi. Which brings up the question of Chinese and Russian involvement.
Honestly people, you need to do some more reading into the relations that the Chinese and Vietnamese have had with each other. Vietnam didn't spend a thousand years to kick China out on its ass for nothing. If anything, it probably would've sped up unification under god knows what in order to hurry up and kick the Chinese out of the country, ICBMs be damned. I'll have you know that when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in the 80's to kick out Pol Pot, the Chinese were threatening Vietnam with invasion if it didn't pull out, so much for the great communist brotherhood. I'm not sure about how Russian involvement would've played out, but it wouldn't be so simple as 'Russia and China unite with Vietnam to boot out the Capitalist invaders.' There's too much enmity (societal and cultural, not easily replaced by ideological, communism) between the three of them. So real sketchy speaking there. As for the precedent in Korea, eh. Korea's always been the hind tit of China or Japan in the past millenium anyways. But that's beside the point.
Alrighty, I think I've wrapped up my points enough (as far as I can think of at 10 am). I don't particularly feel like getting into a right/wrong discussion, because that's not the point of the discussion question. The question is asking why was the war lost, and there's the plain and simple answer. No need to get the emotionally charged stories out and in the open. They aren't going to turn the tide of the battle which finished decades ago in the past. There's a time and place for that, but it's not in the discussion of the question presented.
My response might be a bit crude, but it's being a Private I aspire to, not a General.
-Cadet Cpl. Ho, N. C. USMCJROTC