How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)

[Capt Frogman]

Well thank you for your detailed consideration of my plans.


Main Supply Route?

It's a big country. In fact, it's more than 2400 kilometres for a network of road / rail main supply routes something like this.

Don't quibble about the exact routes there. That was knocked up in about 20 minutes.


They are armoured lookout and firing positions, not deep holes to hide away in. So I've preferred to use the words "fortified machine gun nest or pillbox". Bunker maybe sounds too defensive a term.



Most of the time, yes.

I had posted this image in post #7 to give a picture of the concept but I note that imageshack stopped serving the image so I have re-uploaded it again.

The graphic I used is of WW2 era pill-boxes. Hopefully the budget would stretch to fortifications with armoured sights, better camouflage etc.



OK well I have never served but once worked as a maths teacher so hopefully we can complement each other's skills.


Manned 24/7.


On duty at any one time for the 1120 pillboxes,.

Yes but there are 3 shifts so that's 3 times as many needed for 24/7 operation or 10080 troops for one day's operation.

In addition there would be officers and reserves to staff a 24/7 operation.



So for a 560 km route that would be 14,000 guard force including a 25% reserve or 16,800 guard force including a 50% reserve.

Then some more support forces on top.


Right.


You didn't but I just did. The figures I just quoted include the mobile reaction depots which are where the guards spend their off duty time. The mobile reaction troops are just the very same guards who are off-duty back at the depot being called back on emergency reaction duty.


The only routine patrolling is when the guards travel to their pillboxes every day going on and off duty. For additional security, the guards could have a dog as well.

The whole zone either side of the route is watched 24/7.

Setting up a secure perimeter defence either side of a route is a completely different and better plan of security compared to intermittent patrolling of a route which leaves the route unwatched some of the time which allows enemy to plant mines, set up ambushes and doesn't really do a good job of securing a route.


Oh I think the US and allies are paying for hundreds of thousands of Afghan troops on paper but whether we are paying for good troops is another question altogether.

The green troops need to be reorganised to answer to NATO, not Karzai, as I have explained in post #11.

If there's not enough capable Afghans then employ mercenaries from surrounding countries, from the neighbouring Stans and India mostly I would suggest.


It's a different mode of operation when you are operating from an armoured position that can't be suppressed and you've no real interest in suppressing a tiny sneak attack which is hoping to sneak past to plant a few mines on the road.

There you don't want to give a small enemy group of only a few Taliban notice that they have been spotted by making a lot of noise and scaring them off. You want the enemy to come right on in, thinking they are unseen, so you that you can wait until you've got a clear shot to make the kill. Here the mode of operation has something similar to a sniper's job about it.

It's different if you are facing a full-frontal assault on the pillbox by a larger force in which case then the rapid-fire mode of the machine gun can come into its own, though the radio call for support from the mobile reaction force is equally essential.


Well I think my tactics are sound.


Crying or shouting with anger is more appropriate for all the good soldiers we have lost to road side bombs and poorly secured supply routes, bad strategy and tactics and a war run by donkey generals leading our lion troops to their deaths.

This war always was, and still is, an easy win but as well as a competent defence we also need a more aggressive attack as well but you don't seem to be asking any questions about the offensive we need.

What makes you think that you, someone who's never been in Afghanistan, never fought in Afghanistan or even been in the military, has more experience than those of us who've been there and done it?

Please do enlighten me.

 

[KevinTheCynic]

You don't use a hacksaw when you need a scalpel.
You don't use a machinegun when you need a marksman's rifle.

A machinegun by it's very design spews hundreds of bullets a minute, the idea being to fill a given area with projectiles in a given timeframe. It is not meant to be accurate, it's meant to make that given area so damned dangerous that you will get hit at least once and often, multiple times, in a few seconds.

There's only one machinegun I've ever used (I've been lucky enough to train on six different types) that had the required stability to be used as a sniping platform and that's only because it has a pretty much unique feature that allows such things to occur. But it needs an experienced sniper to make use of it.

But again, don't use hacksaws when you need scalpels - don't use snipers to man a machinegun, let the gunners do that and let the specialized marksmen/snipers provide accurate precision fire.


As of 2012, the standing army of Afghanistan has 200,000 troops. Given that for most armies, fully two thirds will be Service troops to support the Arms, we're talking roughly 67,000 actual combat troops.
Patrolling:
The only way to prevent any enemy from seizing unoccupied ground is by permanently occupying that ground or aggressive patrolling to ensure it stays clear.

But you don't have enough Afghan troops left from the pillbox scheme to supply troops for this, one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army. In fact, you're in deficit to the tune of at least 30,000 more combat troops and another 60,000 Service troops to keep them supported.

There is a basic lesson to be learnt from all this: -
Amateurs talk strategy and tactics.
Professionals talk logistics.

 

[brinktk]

You don't use a hacksaw when you need a scalpel.
You don't use a machinegun when you need a marksman's rifle.

A machinegun by it's very design spews hundreds of bullets a minute, the idea being to fill a given area with projectiles in a given timeframe. It is not meant to be accurate, it's meant to make that given area so damned dangerous that you will get hit at least once and often, multiple times, in a few seconds.

There's only one machinegun I've ever used (I've been lucky enough to train on six different types) that had the required stability to be used as a sniping platform and that's only because it has a pretty much unique feature that allows such things to occur. But it needs an experienced sniper to make use of it.

But again, don't use hacksaws when you need scalpels - don't use snipers to man a machinegun, let the gunners do that and let the specialized marksmen/snipers provide accurate precision fire.


As of 2012, the standing army of Afghanistan has 200,000 troops. Given that for most armies, fully two thirds will be Service troops to support the Arms, we're talking roughly 67,000 actual combat troops.
Patrolling:
The only way to prevent any enemy from seizing unoccupied ground is by permanently occupying that ground or aggressive patrolling to ensure it stays clear.

But you don't have enough Afghan troops left from the pillbox scheme to supply troops for this, one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army. In fact, you're in deficit to the tune of at least 30,000 more combat troops and another 60,000 Service troops to keep them supported.

There is a basic lesson to be learnt from all this: -
Amateurs talk strategy and tactics.
Professionals talk logistics.

BINGO! Especially the last part. I wouldn't bother arguing with this guy. He's clueless how ludicrous he sounds and stupidly naive and self righteous he is about his own military expertise. The bean counters tried something similar in Vietnam known as the "trace" to the grunts and as the McNamara line to the politicians...It was entirely too expensive and a total failure. Or the Maginot line in France...static defense takes away all options. He doesn't get this. You don't defeat an enemy by sitting on your hands, you do it by kicking in their doors and taking over their homes. Can't do that from a "reinforced machine gun nest". But hey, we're only the experts...what the hell do we know?

 

[BritinBritain]

There's one in every litter.

 

[Peter Dow]

What makes you think that you, someone who's never been in Afghanistan, never fought in Afghanistan or even been in the military, has more experience than those of us who've been there and done it?

Please do enlighten me.

It's a different skill set to be a commander in chief. It's like the difference between a brickie and an architect.

Or in computer games terms, it is like the difference between a first person shooter and a real time strategy game.

Or in politics it's like the difference between the guy who delivers leaflets and the leader of the party.

You guys are great at the actual firing at the advancing enemy but you'd never think to stop off at the London home of one of the enemy commanders Pakistani General Musharraf and pack him off to Guantanamo. (Too late now because he has gone back to Pakistan to stand in the elections)

You put all your faith in idiot politicians to tell you who the enemy is, who is controlling and financing and supplying the Taliban. You'd simply never think of stopping pro-jihadi TV satellite broadcasts on satellites controlled by Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. That's not what soldiers do, but it is what we need to do to win.

This war is not just a fire-fight. It's a political war as much as it is a military war and so long as we are in bed with the enemy commanders we can't win. But you guys can't see that. You trust too much in your superior officers to lead you and they trust too much in the political leadership we have, which is lame.

 

[Peter Dow]

You don't use a hacksaw when you need a scalpel.
You don't use a machinegun when you need a marksman's rifle.

A machinegun by it's very design spews hundreds of bullets a minute, the idea being to fill a given area with projectiles in a given timeframe. It is not meant to be accurate, it's meant to make that given area so damned dangerous that you will get hit at least once and often, multiple times, in a few seconds.

There's only one machinegun I've ever used (I've been lucky enough to train on six different types) that had the required stability to be used as a sniping platform and that's only because it has a pretty much unique feature that allows such things to occur. But it needs an experienced sniper to make use of it.

But again, don't use hacksaws when you need scalpels - don't use snipers to man a machinegun, let the gunners do that and let the specialized marksmen/snipers provide accurate precision fire.

The M2 Machine Gun or Browning .50 Caliber Machine Gun, is a heavy machine gun ... It is the primary heavy machine gun of NATO countries, and has been used by many other countries.
...

M2 as a sniper rifle

The M2 machine gun has also been used as a long-range sniper rifle, when equipped with a telescopic sight. Soldiers during the Korean War used scoped M2s in the role of a sniper rifle, but the practice was most notably used by US Marine Corps sniper Carlos Hathcock during the Vietnam War. Using an Unertl telescopic sight and a mounting bracket of his own design, Hathcock could quickly convert the M2 into a sniper rifle, using the traversing-and-elevating (T&E) mechanism attached to the tripod and a bolt on pistol grip kit that converts the M2 to fire semi-automatically by activating the trigger on the side plate to assist in aiming at stationary targets.[citation needed] When firing semi-automatically, Hathcock hit man-size targets beyond 2000 yards—twice the range of a standard-caliber sniper rifle of the time (a .30-06 Winchester Model 70). In fact, Hathcock set the record for the longest confirmed kill at 2,460 yards or 1.3 miles (2,250 m), a record which stood until 2002.​

As of 2012, the standing army of Afghanistan has 200,000 troops. Given that for most armies, fully two thirds will be Service troops to support the Arms, we're talking roughly 67,000 actual combat troops.

Well the typical figures I have in mind as I mentioned above are

25 infantry per kilometre, 40 infantry per mile (that's for a 25% reserve)

So if I had 60,000 ...

(say we leave 7,000 actual combat troops for Karzai's national army which Afghanis pay for themselves, we don't give them a penny or cent for that force. The 60,000 would be the NATO auxiliary force comprised of mostly Afghans but could also include Indians, Pakistanis, Tajiks, Uzbeks other "stans" mercenaries who want a good salary - I have been talking about)

... 60,000 actual combat troops to deploy to secure our bases and supply routes between our bases I could defend 2400 km or 1500 miles of bases and supply routes between bases which could be arranged maybe something like this

Patrolling:
The only way to prevent any enemy from seizing unoccupied ground is by permanently occupying that ground or aggressive patrolling to ensure it stays clear.

The rest of Afghanistan, outside our bases and secure supply routes, we use as no more than a free fire zone which we hit with air power, maybe heavy bombers, maybe drones, maybe attack helicopters, maybe on rare occasions we send in a helicopter air assault raid - we can hit any target of opportunity we see in it this outer zone but we don't bother actually trying to "occupy it" per se. It's really up to the local Afghans who want to live in that outer zone to provide us with good intelligence about the enemy if they want us to know where to hit the enemy in that zone. But otherwise, what we don't know about this outer zone won't kill us.

That outer zone of Afghanistan gets treated exactly the same as Pakistan. If we know where the enemy is concentrated in that outer zone we bomb them.

But you don't have enough Afghan troops left from the pillbox scheme to supply troops for this,

For what? All we do with ground troops is control our bases and supply routes. Plus some air-borne troops for raids now and then. We don't need to do anything else.

one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army. In fact, you're in deficit to the tune of at least 30,000 more combat troops and another 60,000 Service troops to keep them supported.

No, one of the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army is not to get sucked into a quagmire which trying to secure the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan most certainly is. It's bandit country and always will be. So what?

There is a basic lesson to be learnt from all this: -
Amateurs talk strategy and tactics.
Professionals talk logistics.

Well the professionals ought to be talking about ratcheting up the military pressure on the Pakistani ISI and military hardliners (the ones supporting the Taliban and other terrorist groups) to make them look weak and ripe for arrest by the Pakistanis who are loyal to us - the politicians, police, judges, conventional military who hate the ISI for backing the Taliban and other terrorists, and who will hate the ISI 100 times more after we take control over all TV satellites beaming into Pakistan and start telling the Pakistanis the truth about the ISI enemy within.

Professional military need to take a long hard look at the military intelligence and start going on the offensive in Pakistan and stop fighting only a defensive war in Afghanistan.

 

[Peter Dow]

BINGO! Especially the last part. I wouldn't bother arguing with this guy. He's clueless how ludicrous he sounds and stupidly naive and self righteous he is about his own military expertise. The bean counters tried something similar in Vietnam known as the "trace" to the grunts and as the McNamara line to the politicians...It was entirely too expensive and a total failure. Or the Maginot line in France...static defense takes away all options. He doesn't get this. You don't defeat an enemy by sitting on your hands, you do it by kicking in their doors and taking over their homes. Can't do that from a "reinforced machine gun nest". But hey, we're only the experts...what the hell do we know?

We go on the offensive in Pakistan using air power. There's no point invading with our troops near the Pakistani capital to kick in the doors of the University of Jihad, the Taliban HQ or the ISI building - that's a job for our loyalists in the Pakistani state which they might well do if the clear alternative we pose is that if they don't kick in those doors we will level those buildings using bombs, missiles etc with a PS. to stand down the Pakistani air defences while we are at it or else they will become targets too, we're not bluffing, our nukes are bigger than your nukes etc. Common sense will prevail and the ISI enemy and their proxy terrorist forces will fall. Game over, we win.

 

[senojekips]

Fcuk! the armchair General has returned

 

[Yossarian]

Fcuk! the armchair General has returned

Quickly! Forum! Atttaaaacccckkk!:horsie:

 

[MontyB]

Quickly! Forum! Atttaaaacccckkk!:horsie:

Screw that I am digging a mote, buying a deck chair and warming up the popcorn maker, this could get interesting.

Just as long as the crazies stay on the other side of the mote this could be entertaining.

 

[KevinTheCynic]

Just a few queries.
You want three men to man an outpost that's armed with a .50cal M2 but they should also move to other outposts to keep the enemy confused.
How fast are you expecting three men to move carrying a .50 cal, its ammo and all its attendant equipment?
Do you know anything about 'dead ground'?
With all those huge gaps in-between each manned post (1000m between each manned outpost), how are you going to stop the enemy from sneaking through the gaps and getting to the road anyway? And for that matter, how are you going to stop them from sneaking up and capturing an unmanned post and using it to attack one of the manned posts?

If we attack Pakistan, a country that we are nominally allied with, do you expect them not to use everything in their arsenal to defend themselves? Who is going to make absolutely certain they cannot use their nuclear weapons?

And as for "...the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army is not to get sucked into a quagmire..."
It's not the army's task to make governmental/political decisions. The army's task is to carry out the will of the government even if the government's will is flawed. It's the task of the populace to correct the government and stop them from dragging the military into a quagmire.

 

[BritinBritain]

Don't confuse his reality, he'll have a brain fart and his head will explode.

 

[D.J]

After reading this post, I thought "Every man to his own trade"
But after looking at the date today I realize that it is the one he has been waiting for. There can be no other explanation.
The man has no understanding of warfare nor asymmetric warfare.

 

[Peter Dow]

Just a few queries.
You want three men to man an outpost that's armed with a .50cal M2

Well the actual choice of machine gun will likely be dictated by what's in the arsenal already and what the budget is like to buy new weapons or to adapt existing machine guns to operate in sniper mode too. What Hathcock did with his M2 proves that a sniper-modified M2 is a really good choice of weapon for such guard posts.

but they should also move to other outposts to keep the enemy confused.

It's the being in a position that the enemy is uncertain about that's desired though while moving the guards are more vulnerable than they are under cover and behind fortifications.

The guards routinely move into position as they go on duty at the beginning of their shift. While moving in they are covered by the "clocking-off" shift and they cover the clocking-off shift as they move out.

This change of shift where for a time there is double manpower available would be a possible time to move the main gun to another fortified position so that the team doing the moving could be covered by the other team who could use their personal weapons or perhaps a secondary reserve machine gun for the task if that was available.

You wouldn't move the gun at every shift change. You'd pretend to move the gun a lot more than you actually moved it, in case of enemy spies watching the guards to try to report to the enemy where the guards are.

You can also add to enemy confusion by building dummy outposts and making them more visible than the real fortifications which are better camouflaged.

How fast are you expecting three men to move carrying a .50 cal, its ammo and all its attendant equipment?

Well the speed of movement depends on what the method of carrying the gun is - on foot, donkey, quad-bike, APC, whatever - and the terrain will dictate what carrying methods are most suitable.

In very difficult terrain and where nothing is available to assist the guards who must do the heavy lifting by hand, one option would be to arm those outposts with a medium machine gun to make the move easier.

Do you know anything about 'dead ground'?

Yes and it is important that the military engineers who site the fortified positions choose spots which give the best line of sight into the approaches from the directions the enemy would be expected.

With all those huge gaps in-between each manned post (1000m between each manned outpost), how are you going to stop the enemy from sneaking through the gaps and getting to the road anyway? And for that matter, how are you going to stop them from sneaking up and capturing an unmanned post and using it to attack one of the manned posts?

CCTV video cameras mounted suitably to cover all blind spots and dead ground feeding into the guard posts which would have at least 3 LCD TV screens and buttons to switch between cameras. That way the team can keep a good view on the ground along their line of responsibility.

Hopefully the enemies are spotted well before they reach an empty outpost and if necessary reinforcements come from the depot to man the empty posts.

 

[Peter Dow]

If we attack Pakistan,

We need to get the politics right. It's not smart politics to talk about "attacking Pakistan". We talk about defending Pakistan from Pakistan's enemies, the Taliban and other terrorist groups paid for, armed and directed by Pakistan's enemy within, the ISI and the military hardliners who have been directing a war by proxy to enslave Pakistan and Pakistan's friends and neighbours.

We do our talking on Pakistani satellite TV which we seize.

a country that we are nominally allied with,

Sure, but we are going to have to help our friends in Pakistan to run Pakistan in such a way as it is a country that remains a loyal ally. Helping our friends in Pakistan means killing and arresting our enemies in Pakistan.

do you expect them not to use everything in their arsenal to defend themselves?

Pakistan's best defense is to side with us who are their true friends after all.

Who is going to make absolutely certain they cannot use their nuclear weapons?

That would be our commander in chiefs, the US President, the NATO supreme commander, the French President, the UK PM, making it plain to Pakistan that they can be most certain about the fact that should any foolish military faction come to power in Pakistan which opted to use nuclear weapons against us they could be certain we would retaliate with our nuclear weapons sufficiently to make their first use of nuclear weapons suicidal. Our tactical nuclear weapons are more accurate and more than sufficient to destroy the Pakistani military.

It's really important that we don't allow the fact of Pakistan being a nuclear power to deter us from facing down any Pakistani military faction that fancies seeing what they can achieve via proxy terrorists. We have to face nuclear terrorism down and see this war through to the end where the leaders of those foolish military factions, the ISI mostly, who set up terrorist groups that waged global jihad in our homelands, naively believing they were going to bomb everyone and no-one was going to bomb them, get what they deserve.

And as for "...the most fundamental tasks of any conventional army is not to get sucked into a quagmire..."
It's not the army's task to make governmental/political decisions. The army's task is to carry out the will of the government even if the government's will is flawed. It's the task of the populace to correct the government and stop them from dragging the military into a quagmire.

You are confusing my use of the word "quagmire" with others use of the word to describe the invasion and the war per se.

I meant "quagmire" only in terms of the foolish command decisions taken, such as defending the strategically meaningless border between Afghanistan and Pakistan via very-hard to supply international border outposts and letting one of the main enemy commanders General Musharraf do a book tour in the US and have a home in London without arrest or any intention to cage him in Gitmo where he belongs.

Like I said, this war is potentially an easy win. It's not a quagmire if we fight it strategically. The quagmire only happens if we leave it to the leaders who have made such a poor job of it so far.

Yes there is a lot of politics involved but if we understand and can outline a strategy for victory as I have done here that can inform the political debate.

What is the task for military folks is to keep an open mind and an open forum for discussing military strategy. Closing minds and closing down discussion of the military options leaves a political debate that is ill-informed.

 

[D.J]

You are trying to design a military utopia. You try to defend everything. In fact you are defending nothing. All I need to get through your "impenetrable" defense system is intelligence. And when that backdoor is found, you are dead!!!

 

[KevinTheCynic]

You are confusing my use of the word "quagmire" with others use of the word to describe the invasion and the war per se.

I meant "quagmire" only in terms of the foolish command decisions taken, such as defending the strategically meaningless border between Afghanistan and Pakistan via very-hard to supply international border outposts and letting one of the main enemy commanders General Musharraf do a book tour in the US and have a home in London without arrest or any intention to cage him in Gitmo where he belongs.

Like I said, this war is potentially an easy win. It's not a quagmire if we fight it strategically. The quagmire only happens if we leave it to the leaders who have made such a poor job of it so far.

Yes there is a lot of politics involved but if we understand and can outline a strategy for victory as I have done here that can inform the political debate.

What is the task for military folks is to keep an open mind and an open forum for discussing military strategy. Closing minds and closing down discussion of the military options leaves a political debate that is ill-informed.

Please don't make such assumptions about my level of understanding, I understood perfectly well what was meant and again I'll state that the military does what their government asks them to do - if that means defending a "strategically meaningless border" then that's what happens. The military isn't as free to execute it's tasks as you might think and they certainly are not so free as to make politically charged decisions.

 

[KevinTheCynic]

Well the actual choice of machine gun will likely be dictated by what's in the arsenal already and what the budget is like to buy new weapons or to adapt existing machine guns to operate in sniper mode too. What Hathcock did with his M2 proves that a sniper-modified M2 is a really good choice of weapon for such guard posts.

What Hathcock did with an M2 came about only because the M2 has a particular feature that allowed it to operate in single-shot mode. The vast array of modern machineguns do not have this feature and they are in fact designed to be less accurate than a rifle.

Hathcock was able to make use of this feature of the M2 because he was a supremely competent sniper. He was also able to pre-register the target and therefore had plenty of time to do all the ballistics calculations for the range he was shooting at - an enemy position that was well known with all the required distances to target already calculated.

It certainly was not something that he did in five minutes after spotting an enemy. As an analogy, what you're asking a bunch of local soldiers to do with a machinegun is like asking a Sunday driver to win the Formula One by driving a delivery truck.

 

[Peter Dow]

You are trying to design a military utopia.

No it's a different, better military plan than what's been tried so far.

You try to defend everything.

No. I am specifically concentrating on defending our bases and supply lines.

In fact you are defending nothing.

No in fact my plan would indeed defend the bases and supply lines. They've not been properly defended in Afghanistan, nor in Iraq - many were lost to road-side bombs and ambushes.

Rather it is the poor plan to secure the Afghanistan / Pakistan border area by stationing a thin line of very-hard-to-supply forward operating bases along the Afghan side of the AfPak border in the naive hope that that would defend all of Afghanistan which has had more of a "trying to defend everything but defending nothing" outcome.

All I need to get through your "impenetrable" defense system is intelligence. And when that backdoor is found, you are dead!!!

I'd be better able to respond to that if you would give specifics as directly related to the plan I have described which also includes offensive measures against the enemy, attacking bases deep in Pakistan with air power, seizing satellites to educate Pakistanis about their treacherous ISI, arresting enemy commanders instead of giving them diplomatic status etc.

My plan is not purely a defensive plan. I can assure you that if my plan is put into operation, the measures we take to secure our bases and supply lines will not even get a mention in the international media who will be stunned when we take over TV satellites, arrest Pakistani military leaders, bomb Jihadi universities, the ISI HQ etc. The defensive part will be relegated to the news media websites. They won't even discuss the defensive parts of the plan on live TV such will be the fuss over the offensive measures.

No-one is disputing the general importance of military intelligence but can you be more specific as regards to any specific weaknesses of my plan to defeat the Taliban and their backers?

 

[Peter Dow]

Please don't make such assumptions about my level of understanding, I understood perfectly well what was meant and again I'll state that the military does what their government asks them to do - if that means defending a "strategically meaningless border" then that's what happens. The military isn't as free to execute it's tasks as you might think and they certainly are not so free as to make politically charged decisions.

I was referring to this

It's the task of the populace to correct the government and stop them from dragging the military into a quagmire.

Now the popular pressure on stopping the government "dragging the military into a quagmire" is never detailed military strategic alternatives as I've described. It's along the lines of "Bring our boys home".

On the other side, the populace don't specify a battleplan to go in either. Those for a war will say something like "Get those who did 9/11 and stop them doing anything like that again".

The battleplans we've employed were dreamed up in the Pentagon, perhaps with input from the UK MOD, or NATO.

It's not the populace's job to offer strategic options to the political leaders. It's the military's job to offer options so military folks need to be discussing the options in an open way and not closing down the debate, saying "it's not our business to question the strategy". Sure it is.