I'll never forgive myself, I just couldn't ignore this...
Well thank you for your detailed consideration of my plans.
A chain of bunkers that stretch along an MSR
Main Supply Route?
that runs for hundreds of kilometres.
It's a big country. In fact, it's more than 2400 kilometres for a network of road / rail main supply routes something like this.
Don't quibble about the exact routes there. That was knocked up in about 20 minutes.
They are armoured lookout and firing positions, not deep holes to hide away in. So I've preferred to use the words "fortified machine gun nest or pillbox". Bunker maybe sounds too defensive a term.
per kilometre to be manned while all others are left empty and it's manned by only three personnel!
Most of the time, yes.
I had posted this image in post #7 to give a picture of the concept but I note that imageshack stopped serving the image so I have re-uploaded it again.
The graphic I used is of WW2 era pill-boxes. Hopefully the budget would stretch to fortifications with armoured sights, better camouflage etc.
Call me simple, after all I'm only from a family that has had at least one member from every generation for the last 120 years serve in the military and when I joined I only served in the Reserve for a decade (and "only" in Infantry and Recce at that!) so my maths are obviously completely wrong here...
OK well I have never served but once worked as a maths teacher so hopefully we can complement each other's skills.
The distance from Herat to Khandahar is approx 560km so that's 560 manned bunkers multiplied by two for two sides of the MSR = 1120 manned bunkers total.
Manned 24/7.
Multiply that by three men per bunker = 3360 troops.
On duty at any one time for the 1120 pillboxes,.
Yes but there are 3 shifts so that's 3 times as many needed for 24/7 operation or 10080 troops for one day's operation.
In addition there would be officers and reserves to staff a 24/7 operation.
For a 25% reserve of 5 reserves per kilometre, 8 reserves per mile
Force including reserves is 25 infantry per kilometre, 40 infantry per mile
For a 50% reserve of 10 reserves per kilometre, 16 reserves per mile
Force including reserves is 30 infantry per kilometre, 48 infantry per mile
So for a 560 km route that would be 14,000 guard force including a 25% reserve or 16,800 guard force including a 50% reserve.
Then some more support forces on top.
That's just one section of road.
Right.
We haven't even calculated the "mobile reaction depots".
You didn't but I just did. The figures I just quoted include the mobile reaction depots which are where the guards spend their off duty time. The mobile reaction troops are just the very same guards who are off-duty back at the depot being called back on emergency reaction duty.
I'm just wondering who will be left to actually go out on patrol?
The only routine patrolling is when the guards travel to their pillboxes every day going on and off duty. For additional security, the guards could have a dog as well.
The whole zone either side of the route is watched 24/7.
Setting up a secure perimeter defence either side of a route is a completely different and better plan of security compared to intermittent patrolling of a route which leaves the route unwatched some of the time which allows enemy to plant mines, set up ambushes and doesn't really do a good job of securing a route.
Does Afghanistan even have that many soldiers!
Oh I think the US and allies are paying for hundreds of thousands of Afghan troops on paper but whether we are paying for good troops is another question altogether.
The green troops need to be reorganised to answer to NATO, not Karzai, as I have explained in post #11.
If there's not enough capable Afghans then employ mercenaries from surrounding countries, from the neighbouring Stans and India mostly I would suggest.
And then, then!, he discusses a mode of operation for a machinegun that totally defeats it's raison d'être!
It's a different mode of operation when you are operating from an armoured position that can't be suppressed and you've no real interest in suppressing a tiny sneak attack which is hoping to sneak past to plant a few mines on the road.
There you don't want to give a small enemy group of only a few Taliban notice that they have been spotted by making a lot of noise and scaring them off. You want the enemy to come right on in, thinking they are unseen, so you that you can wait until you've got a clear shot to make the kill. Here the mode of operation has something similar to a sniper's job about it.
It's different if you are facing a full-frontal assault on the pillbox by a larger force in which case then the rapid-fire mode of the machine gun can come into its own, though the radio call for support from the mobile reaction force is equally essential.
But what would I know, I only crewed a machinegun for half a decade as No2, Gunner and SFMG leader and instructed on the theory of machinegun fire.
<facepalm>
Well I think my tactics are sound.
I don't know whether to laugh or cry...
Crying or shouting with anger is more appropriate for all the good soldiers we have lost to road side bombs and poorly secured supply routes, bad strategy and tactics and a war run by donkey generals leading our lion troops to their deaths.
This war always was, and still is, an easy win but as well as a competent defence we also need a more aggressive attack as well but you don't seem to be asking any questions about the offensive we need.