I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
The best way for the Germans to have been successful should have been not to commence any military activities at all. They could have stayed home and do other things instead.
Could Germany have defeated Russia?
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
But that was never going to happen once Hitler was elected, in fact, the main reason he gathered the support base he did was through his "Make Germany Great Again" campaign which was geared almost exclusively towards war.
The failure of WW1 to secure a conclusive result guaranteed a WW2, it was really a case of when not if.
The failure of WW1 to secure a conclusive result guaranteed a WW2, it was really a case of when not if.
Last edited:
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
Yes, It was a bad joke. The Germans had no chance to win the war. Their opponents were too strong. One aspect of the war was the German lack of strategic bombers, they weren't able to touch the Russian war industries at the Urals, while the British and the Americans had some influence on the German war industries.
Another pondering. Should the Germans have focused their resources on economic/logistic targets from the beginning of the war. They couldn't do both. Hitler changed his mind on Moscow when he ordered units from the Army Group Center to turn south.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Perhaps had they focused less attention on ideological targets they would have been better off, as far as strategic bombers go I don't think one would have helped significantly the Luftwaffe would have been better off with a good long range escort fighter than a bomber.
Indeed the Lodzen decision is one debated as the turning point of the war yet I still think the decision to turn south and cut off the Russians in the south was the best military decision Hitler ever made especially when there was no guarantee of Moscow falling or Russia surrendering if it did.
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
Can you elaborate more on why you think the long range fighters had been better than strategic bombers?
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Because the German military was not geared towards long wars therefore it had no use for a strategic bomber, however a fighter that could escort its medium bombers to the target and back would have been far more useful.
Had the Luftwaffe fighter arm been able to spend a significant amount of time over England for example it would have been far more dangerous.
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
Yes, I agree with that. I was thinking about if the German luftwaffe was able to reach out and touch the Russian factories at the Urals, but if the Germans were able to reach them the Russians had probably moved them further east. It had required a strategic bomber fleet and probably long range fighters as escorts. The British and the Americans suffered heavy losses when their bombers were without fighter escorts.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Germany's biggest problem is that they were always going to be a continental army, they had no capacity to project power unless they had a land border.
One of the biggest mistakes they made in my opinion was going to war with Russia, while they were allied the power of the Royal Navy was negated but once war broke out with Russia Germany became hemmed in by the much more powerful Royal Navy.
The Germans had long-range bombers : from the coast of France these bombers attacked Belfast and Glasgow and returned (= 1200 km) ,from Norway they attacked the east coast of Britain and returned(= 2000 km), what thet did not have in 1941 (neither did Britain) were long-range fighters .
There were no turning points in WWII,and at the moment of the Lötzen decision, Germany had already lost the war in the east (in the summer ) .:wink:
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
If we consider the distance between Moscow and Chelyabinsk (Tankograd) which is about 1500km and then add a few clicks more because the Germans couldn't have their airbases too close to the front line. The Germans would need aircraft's able to fly +3000km.
In addition to that, the months after the Germans commenced Operation Barbarossa, they were even further away from it. Another thing to think about is if the Germans were aware of the relocation of the industries. The Germans didn't make any extended attempts to destroy the logistical hubs closer to Moscow and additional railroad hubs to the Trans-Siberian railroad.
In addition to that, the months after the Germans commenced Operation Barbarossa, they were even further away from it. Another thing to think about is if the Germans were aware of the relocation of the industries. The Germans didn't make any extended attempts to destroy the logistical hubs closer to Moscow and additional railroad hubs to the Trans-Siberian railroad.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
That may be true (I do believe there was a window of opportunity for Germany to have defeated Russia but by the time Barbarossa launched it had passed) I still however believe that the Lotzen decision was the right call, when you get an opportunity to destroy an enemy force one third the size of your invading army you take it.
Lets not forget that it is 8000km from the Crimea to Japan, so they did have aircraft with that range.
Last edited:
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
I agree with if the Germans had attacked Russia earlier, they might have been more successful, but in the long run. Russian were too many and the country is really big. The Soviet Union might have surrendered earlier after the initial blows. But with a leader like Stalin....
What kind of aircraft did they fly between Crimea and Japan? How many and could it been used as a bomber (with some modifications)
About the Lötzen decision (which was already discussed here 5 years ago) , a lot of people are arguing that on august 2 1941,the decision was taken to stop the advance to Moscow ; but this is not correct . Already BEFORE the Lötzen decision, AGC was stopped by the Soviet resistance :in the last 10 days of july, the Ostheer had lost 77586 men, the highest number in 1941.As a new advance could only start in the last 10 days of august,the decision was made to delay the advance to the last days of september and meanwhile to go for Leningrad, the Crimea, the Don Bassin and the Caucasus (which was too ambitious .
For the Lötzen decision to be a turning point, one should be able to prove
a ) that a successful advance to Moscow was possible at the end of august
b) that this advance could result in the capture of Moscow
c) that the capture of Moscow would result in the collaps of the SU .
My conclusion is that AGC was stronger at the start of Typhoon than in august and that an attack in august would be a complete failure .
If AGC could not go to Moscow before the Lötzen decision, why should it be able to advance if there was no Lötzen decision ? Til 10 august the Ostheer had already lost 994 tanks and a lot of other tanks were out for mechanical defects .In the period between the Lötzen decision and the start of Typhoon, the Ostheer lost 415 tanks .
For the Lötzen decision to be a turning point, one should be able to prove
a ) that a successful advance to Moscow was possible at the end of august
b) that this advance could result in the capture of Moscow
c) that the capture of Moscow would result in the collaps of the SU .
My conclusion is that AGC was stronger at the start of Typhoon than in august and that an attack in august would be a complete failure .
If AGC could not go to Moscow before the Lötzen decision, why should it be able to advance if there was no Lötzen decision ? Til 10 august the Ostheer had already lost 994 tanks and a lot of other tanks were out for mechanical defects .In the period between the Lötzen decision and the start of Typhoon, the Ostheer lost 415 tanks .
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
The Italians flew one in 1942 using a Savoia Marchetti S.75and the Germans reportedly used Ju-290 and 390's plus Me 264s.
Part of the problem is that urban myth is also involved in this so it is difficult to pull out fact from fiction.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
I don't disagree with any of this however I still believe the decision to turn south was the right one.
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
I have read about flights from Norway and Finland to Japan and they were flying over the Arctic. The Germans were flying BV222 and Fw 200K from these locations. The Ju 390 also flew from Northern Norway to Japan over the north pole if we can believe Albert Speer. But all these flights were for transporting VIP's to Japan and back. They might have been able to rebuild some of them as bombers, but not in that numbers required for having a huge long range bomber force. Hitler planned (or rather wanted) to use the Ju 390 to bomb New York City.
The info I have about the Italian plane is it flew from Rostov to Manchuria in 1942.
If we go back to the thread. The Germans produced a lot of rather complicated stuff instead of produce fewer but reliable machines and maybe upgrading them later. I have always viewed some of their tanks as expensive and a nightmare for the German maintenance groups. They spent a lot of resources on a high sea fleet, which can have been used to produce more submarines.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
I go with a yes and no approach on this one.
Producing complicated stuff was a problem for Germany but not because they produced it but rather they could not properly test it before putting it into frontline service.
Let's face it had they known the limitations through testing of the Elephant it probably would never have made it off the drawing board.
Personally I believe Germany should have focused on the Panther in small numbers and spent the majority of its resources retooling the Pz IV into the Jagdpanzer IV, this would have given them a cheap, powerful armoured vehicle with good crew survivability characteristics that could have been mass produced while still producing a high-quality MBT capable of footing it with anything on the battlefield.
One thing I think people tend to forget is that despite Guderians wanting to focus on the PzIV it was outdated and would have been a death trap up against the tanks of 1945.
I also think they really needed to put some focus on the Luftwaffe fighter wing as early as 1939, it more or less just stopped development between 1938 and 1942, but until they could wrestle back some level of air parity over Europe the war was as good as lost.
As for the surface Navy, despite its poor combat performance with the exception of my favourite ship the Prinz Eugen it was not the waste of resources people seem to believe it was, the number allied resources tied up in making sure the Tirpitz didn't break out was phenomenal, far greatter than the amount of resources that went into making the Tirpitz.
As for more submarines, not a lot of point in more tanks, subs or aircraft unless you have trained crews to operate them, and by 1944 the Germans didn't, therefore, they needed quality rather than quantity, they needed to keep inexperienced crews alive long enough to become quality.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Most ethnic clensing programs are fairly successful because by the time there is enough evidence to do something about it, it is already done.
If you focus on minorities first few raise a hand against it through fear of being next and lets face it the Germans were only planning on invading as far as the Urals which would have left Siberia as a vast Gulag for the remaining Russians.