Why did Germany lose WW2?

[Doppleganger]

By the time of the Russian winter offensives German operations had pretty much ground to a halt anyway, personally I think this argument shows how much valuable time and material was lost bailing out the Italians in the Balkans with even a couple of extra weeks Barbarossa may have turned out very differently.

Ground to a halt because the Germans either had to deal with Kiev or Moscow - they couldn't do both which is what they tried to do.

@lljadw It was obvious in July that the aims of Barbarossa would not be met but that's not the same as panic. I agree with you that the 2 weeks would not have made all that much difference. The Germans had barely adequate logistics to support 1 Army Group never mind 3 and this is why they either should have a) gone for Moscow or b) settled on a defensive line roughly along the Dneiper river after Kiev and resumed offensive operations in Spring 1942.

 

[MontyB]

Ground to a halt because the Germans either had to deal with Kiev or Moscow - they couldn't do both which is what they tried to do.

My point being that Kiev was the right decision that could not afford to both leave such large salients on both flanks for the sake of Moscow which was not guranteed to cause a Russian collapse nor could they afford to let an opportunity go by to capture or destroy such a large segment of a Russian army.

Lets face it the Russian losses around Kiev alone would have crippled most armies and nations.

 

[lljadw]

The German strategy for Barbarossa was based on a number of assumptions (some right,other wrong) as:

-it was impossible to eliminate the SU in a long war of attrition

-Germany could not afford such a war

thus,the strategy was to defeat the SU in a short and quick campaign in the summer,between the border and the Dvina-Dnepr line.

but,this would depend on

a) that the Red Army would go west,to the border: if it remained were it was,or retreated to the east,the Germans had lost before the battle started .


b) that it would be possible to defeat the standing Soviet forces,which it was:they fell apart while they were going west.


But:a and b would not be enough :the Germans knew that the moment they attacked,a general mobilisation would start,and that millions would arrive at the front.While these reservist would be badly equipped and leaded (and they were),the result would be that the war would last ,the Soviets could commit more men than the Germans could eliminate.

The solution (better :the conditio sine qua non ) was that in the first weeks,the Soviet state collapsed,which would have as result : no general mobilisation .

How could this happen ?

By an interaction of 2 factors : the defeat on the border would result in a palace revolution in the Kremlin:Beria would kill Stalin,Molotv would kill Beria,and would be shooted by Zhukov,etc.

This would result in a mass collaps at the front and in the hinteland : every one would go home,to kill the Jews and the local communists . It would be as in 1917.
It was impossible to defeat the SU with military means:if the Soviet state did not collaps in the summer,he would not collaps in the autumn .

Everything depended on Stalin: Stalin was the SU:if he disappeared,the Soviet state would collaps .

 

[lljadw]

About the panic at Rastenburg :

The following is from Forum Barbarossa : Operative Planungen der Wehrmacht für den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion.


After a meeting with Keitel,Bock (of AGC) wrote the following in his diary on 25 july 1941:

It seems that the hope of the Führer that Japan will intervene,will not be fulfilled.

My comment:After one month,Hitler was already that desperate that he was hoping that Japan would save him from the mess in which he had landed.

But,a quick collaps of the SU is necessary,because: we can't conquer Russia.

My comment :Bock admitted the fact that,if the war was not won near the border,in the first few weeks,it was impossible to win him. Thus,Typhoon never had a chance .

The Führer is anxious and asks : how much time do I have to finish the SU,and how much time do I need ?

My comment : If Hitler was anxious,this means that there was panic at Rastenburg :after one month,the conditio sine qua non for the success of Barbarossa (= the quick,suddenly and total collaps of the Soviet state) was only a mirage .

 

[MontyB]

I don't agree that "anxious" equals "panic", while I am not comparing what I do with the invasion of Russia there are times at the conclusion of a project or at critical points of a project where I become anxious about a result or a condition being met however that is not panic because there are contingency plans should that condition not be met.

The Führer is anxious and asks : how much time do I have to finish the SU,and how much time do I need ?

What that says to me is that Hitler recognised the conditions needed to met his target it does not mean he was panicking over the failure of any condition.

 

[lljadw]

An anxious Hitler means : a panicking Hitler;the man had the monopoly on fanaticism.

Hitler was already that desperate,which means ,he was panicking,that he was speculating on the chance that Japan would save him(while he had forbidden to tell Japan anything about Barbarossa).


For Barbarossa to have a chance to succeed,it was essential that at last after one month,the big fighting would be over,so that the Ostheer could advance to the A/A line before the winter,and,this without any problem .

But,the big fighting was not over : the big fighting had yet to start : in august,the Germans would lose 100.000 men .

On 25 july it was over for the Germans : the outcome would be : the Soviets in Berlin.And,Hitler knew it.Behind the mask of fanaticism,there was someone who was desperate .

 

[Doppleganger]

I also agree that an 'anxious' Hitler doesn't mean a panicking one. This is just your interpretation and whilst it could be correct it's not my opinion.

Bock was known as a very 'by the book' commander, an excellent administrator and organiser, but not known as a great theorist or tactician. Interestingly though, Bock sided with Guderian, favouring a direct drive to Moscow at all costs. If this relatively cautious and studious commander was advocating such an action, this speaks volumes. He realised that although Barbarossa was lost, the only chance Germany had was to capture Moscow and (ideally) knock Stalin out of the war.

Whilst I question the success of this strategy, it was the only one that any realistic chance of succeeding. To deal with first the Minsk and then Kiev encirclements would critically slow down the German advance and inflict attritional losses that they could not afford to take. Not to mention the fact that the whole point of Blitzkrieg was to avoid enemy strong-points and race to the rear of the enemy. Go straight for Moscow, hopefully cut the head off the Soviet Union and watch the Soviet state collapse. Anything else would result in a protracted war that would ultimately favour the Soviet Union.

 

[MontyB]

I also agree that an 'anxious' Hitler doesn't mean a panicking one. This is just your interpretation and whilst it could be correct it's not my opinion.

Bock was known as a very 'by the book' commander, an excellent administrator and organiser, but not known as a great theorist or tactician. Interestingly though, Bock sided with Guderian, favouring a direct drive to Moscow at all costs. If this relatively cautious and studious commander was advocating such an action, this speaks volumes. He realised that although Barbarossa was lost, the only chance Germany had was to capture Moscow and (ideally) knock Stalin out of the war.

But surely the fact that Bock was not known as either a great tactician or theorist should make you question the value of his support for Guderian's plan.

Further to that I am not convinced Guderian needed to take his entire force south in the first place as he could have left a sizable proportion of his infantry heading east given that he left them behind in the move south anyway, there is a school of thought that both targets could have been met had it not been for Guderians petulance.

Also according to Hart, Russell (2006-10-31). Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? (Brassey's Military Profiles). Potomac Books.

Hitler ordered Army Group Center to pursue a diversion southward to Kiev in August, to assist in the capture of the Ukraine. But Guderian wanted to go straight to Moscow, because he continued to believe that capture of the Soviet capital would lead to the collapse of the regime. So entrenched was his opposition to this diversion of his command that he flew to meet Hitler at Rastenberg on 23 August. But he had no success, and in fact, he did not press his case, much to the fury of Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff. Macksey claims that Guderian realized he had no prospect of prevailing. Certainly he was not prepared to jeopardize his command position for principles. He thus gave in and submitted to Hitler’s decision, much to Halder’s intense irritation. Halder and Guderian had a serious breach over this incident, the latter believing that Guderian had unnecessarily capitulated. The damage to their relationship could never be repaired. Other historians, however, emphasize that Hitler essentially “bought off ” Guderian, both by awarding him with the coveted Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross on 17 July and by promising additional reinforcements.

 

[lljadw]

Well,what do you think of the following statements (source = Stahel)?
IMHO,they are indicating that,for the Germans,Barbarossa had to be decisive in the summer,and that everything that would happen later (Typhoon) was irrelevant,without any importance on the outcome of the war .



1) Brauchitz about the coming campaign:massive frontier battles to be expected;duration up to 4 weeks.But in further development,only minor rresistance is then still to be reckoned with.


2)During the 3th phase of the wargames,it became evident that the German ground forces would hardly be sufficient strong to fan out across the tunnel-shaped Russian theater,if the Red Army was capable to offer continued resistance.

3)The lesson for Paulus seemed obvious:the WM did not enjoy a substantial quantitative superiority and could not raise reinforcements on anything like the scale of the SU.

4)The German supply system was simply incapable of adequately sustaining anything further than a penetration of about 500 km into the SU .

(I have my doubts on point 4)

 

[Doppleganger]

But surely the fact that Bock was not known as either a great tactician or theorist should make you question the value of his support for Guderian's plan.

Further to that I am not convinced Guderian needed to take his entire force south in the first place as he could have left a sizable proportion of his infantry heading east given that he left them behind in the move south anyway, there is a school of thought that both targets could have been met had it not been for Guderians petulance.

Also according to Hart, Russell (2006-10-31). Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? (Brassey's Military Profiles). Potomac Books.

It wasn't just Bock who agreed with Guderian. It was notable that the other senior panzer commander in AGC, Hermann Hoth, also agreed that a decisive drive to Moscow was essential for success. Manstein also agreed that the capture of Moscow would be decisive. In fact, I think the only major commander in AGC who didn't agree with Guderian was von Kluge and how much of that was down to genuine hatred for each other? It can be argued that von Kluge's failure to support the second phase of Typhoon with 4th Army was one of the major reasons for its failure although I don 't 100% buy that.

I can understand why Guderian gave in to Hitler. It wasn't much a of a choice given the type of man Guderian was. Of course he was petulant and abrasive but he was also almost all of the time correct. The displacement of his infantry divisions was not decisive. It was the loss of forward momentum for his panzers. Hitler was going to get Panzer Group 2 to drive south whether Guderian was in command or not. And as for splitting up his forces that goes against the grain of what in the west was called Blitzkrieg and also would have been wrong. The reason why the Germans were so successful in France and initially in Russia was because they concentrated their armour and drove into the interior of the enemy with an armoured fist. Why change those tactics? Splitting up the panzers would have diluted their power and there's no way half of Panzer Group 2 without Guderian would have had any decisive effect on a drive to Moscow. More importantly, the Germans did not have the logistical network to support 2 major offensives at once. It was either Target Kiev OR Target Moscow and the Germans chose the wrong target.

@lljadw Well the war games did spell out what a mammoth undertaking it was to invade Russia but Hitler was going to attack regardless. Hitler thought that the SU would collapse if their armies west of the Dvina and Dnieper were destroyed. Of course he was utterly wrong in this and it was only then that a capture of Moscow was seriously considered. Even now I don't think Hitler thought that Moscow was that important. He wanted to deprive the Russians of their Ukrainian breadbasket. It was the more far-sighted and aggressive generals that wanted to go for the jugular, i.e. Moscow and they were correct. Whether or not it was possible is a different matter but it's the only play the Germans had in July 1941.

 

[MontyB]

@lljadw Well the war games did spell out what a mammoth undertaking it was to invade Russia but Hitler was going to attack regardless. Hitler thought that the SU would collapse if their armies west of the Dvina and Dnieper were destroyed. Of course he was utterly wrong in this and it was only then that a capture of Moscow was seriously considered. Even now I don't think Hitler thought that Moscow was that important. He wanted to deprive the Russians of their Ukrainian breadbasket. It was the more far-sighted and aggressive generals that wanted to go for the jugular, i.e. Moscow and they were correct. Whether or not it was possible is a different matter but it's the only play the Germans had in July 1941.

I still have yet to see any evidence that the loss of Moscow was going to lead to state collapse just a lot of speculation, Napoleon captured Moscow and the Russians never surrendered in fact it lead to the destruction of the French Army personally I think the same result would have rewarded the Germans had they done the same.

Stalin claimed he was never going to leave Moscow but I doubt that is true he was a politician they rarely go down with the ship (I am even surprise Hitler stayed on in Berlin for that matter) and while Moscow is a transport hub I would suggest that for the Red Army Stalingrad was a bigger hub in terms of Ukrainian grain and oil from the Caucasus so the loss of Moscow would only really have caused issues for the defense of Leningrad and Kola Peninsula.

(sorry for the simplistic response I have visitors so it is a passing post)

 

[Doppleganger]

I still have yet to see any evidence that the loss of Moscow was going to lead to state collapse just a lot of speculation, Napoleon captured Moscow and the Russians never surrendered in fact it lead to the destruction of the French Army personally I think the same result would have rewarded the Germans had they done the same.

Stalin claimed he was never going to leave Moscow but I doubt that is true he was a politician they rarely go down with the ship (I am even surprise Hitler stayed on in Berlin for that matter) and while Moscow is a transport hub I would suggest that for the Red Army Stalingrad was a bigger hub in terms of Ukrainian grain and oil from the Caucasus so the loss of Moscow would only really have caused issues for the defense of Leningrad and Kola Peninsula.

(sorry for the simplistic response I have visitors so it is a passing post)

Moscow was of far more strategic importance in 1941 than it was in 1812. Any capture of Moscow, as well as severing a major North/South railroad link, would mean the capture of a major transport hub, the loss of major industrial facilities that either couldn't or weren't moved east in time but more than that, the loss of a most powerful symbol of prestige which might have had huge ramifications. If the Germans had gone for Moscow in August, they might have captured a national capital with much of the organs of state intact. This would be an entirely different situation to that which Napoleon faced, an empty capital stripped of supplies and partly put to the torch. It has to be remembered also that it was St Petersburg that was considered the spiritual capital of Russia at the time, whereas in 1941 it was most definitely Moscow.

Stalin was much more than just a mere politician. In 1941 Stalin was the Soviet Union. In very real terms he was the state and the state was him. Consider his stubbornness to refuse a city named after him to fall into German hands in 1942/1943. Moscow would have been defended to the end where possible. It is well documented that Stalin's decision to stay in Moscow was a major factor in quelling the panic that was rolling through Moscow in October 1941. His speech on 19th October stiffened the resolve and bolstered the resolve of ordinary Muscivites who were certain that German panzers were about to roll through the streets. Had the Germans attacked 2 months earlier perhaps the panic would have been overwhelming. When you mention Stalingrad you are forgetting that it was much about the symbol of what Moscow represented as it was any strategic importance it had. Any loss of the capital might have meant the end of the Soviet Union.

(it's late here so will expand tomorrow)

 

[koalaburger]

Churchill said the only thing that really scared him in WW2 were the U boats. If Hitler had built submarines instead of ego driven battleships Britain would have been starved into surrender in under a year. With the extra divisions in France and Norway freed up the Russian offensive would have been interesting.

 

[MontyB]

Churchill said the only thing that really scared him in WW2 were the U boats. If Hitler had built submarines instead of ego driven battleships Britain would have been starved into surrender in under a year. With the extra divisions in France and Norway freed up the Russian offensive would have been interesting.

I think the U-Boat menace was vastly over rated, I have little doubt that more submarines would have helped I don't think it would have been decisive.

As I recall the statistic for WW2 was that 99% of all merchant ships reached there ports safely, now obviously that is an "overall" statistic and the threat to merchantmen from U-Boats was far less in 1945 than it was in 1940.

If you look at the German North African campaign where in the worst month 70% of supplies made it through between Italy and North Africa you can see just how many more U-Boats would have been needed to effectively starve Britain into submission and then determine whether from a German point of view those resources would have not have been better spent elsewhere especially the fuel.

 

[koalaburger]

Doenitz said he could have done it with 300 subs. During the first "happy time" before the allies had decent radar and escorts I think it would have been game over very quickly. If you take the stats to include later when aircraft with radar and sub destroyer groups with hedgehogs it is lopsided. Churchill was a man not easily frightened so I take his words to be deeply meant.

 

[MontyB]

Doenitz said he could have done it with 300 subs. During the first "happy time" before the allies had decent radar and escorts I think it would have been game over very quickly. If you take the stats to include later when aircraft with radar and sub destroyer groups with hedgehogs it is lopsided. Churchill was a man not easily frightened so I take his words to be deeply meant.

All true but then Goering said he could bring Britain to its knees in a month and that the Luftwaffe could supply Stalingrad with all that it needed, German commanders seemed to have a habit of either over estimating their abilities or underestimating the enemy.

I would also suggest that Churchill being the consumate politician would say anything to further his cause or improve his stature and "fighting through insurmountable odds" was a trait he seemed to want to cultivate for himself despite the fact that Britain was under absolutely no threat of invasion.

 

[anaisbored]

The main reason they lost is that they were weirdos, freaks and nutcases and not really people. Their leaders went to psychics and mediums and all kinds of things to get help and it was basically insane and weird. It was a war against satanis :box:

 

[lljadw]

That's a lot of nonsense .

 

[lljadw]

Doenitz said he could have done it with 300 subs. During the first "happy time" before the allies had decent radar and escorts I think it would have been game over very quickly. If you take the stats to include later when aircraft with radar and sub destroyer groups with hedgehogs it is lopsided. Churchill was a man not easily frightened so I take his words to be deeply meant.

No : on 31 december 1940,the British merchant navy had gained more GRT than it had lost due to U Boats ,because the merchant ship navies of Norway,Holland and Belgium had joined Britain : the Germans had lost .

Besides : Dönitz was wrong .

 

[-- Dusty]

Without reading the entire 100 pages of this thread, I think the biggest problem Germany had was when they tried to take Russia. They would have faired much much better had they stayed away from taking on Russia. That along with more smaller & faster cruisers & destroyers and more submarines, they would have won.