Why did Germany lose WW2?

There was no British liveline in the Mediterranean :the British liveline was the Atlantic .
The outcome of the war in NA was not determined by a supply war,it was determined by the British superiority:in 1941,the strength of the Africa Corps was some 30000 men,at the end of 1942,it was even less .Even if all the supplies that arrived at Tripolis,were going to Alamein (Tripolis to Alamein =2000 km),the Germans still would loose .The outcome of the war in NA was known beforehand.
 
Strength of the Africa Corps in 1941:
march 14.500
april:19000
may:30000
june:33.500
july:42.000
august:46000
september:48.000
october:48.500
november:38000
december :32.000
Panzerstrength:
13 april :109
19 august:257
9 october:235
12 december :51
The strength of the Africa Corps was limited because 1) the Eastern front had priority 2)(the most important)the Germans could not supply a bigger force,they even could not supply the actual force :trucks transporting fuel from Tripoli to the front were consuming more fuel than the fuel they were transporting .
 
lljadw said:
There was no British liveline in the Mediterranean :the British liveline was the Atlantic .
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I suggest that you visit your library and go to the WW2 History section. How was Malta supplied if sea convoys didnt sail in the Med? And how exactly could convoys from the Atlantic suddenly appear in Malta without sailing the Med? Even the top boffins today cannot pull off a miracle. I think your watching too much Star Trek

Here are just a few examples:

September 1940 – Operation*Hats
The Mediterranean Fleet escorted a fast convoy of three transports (carrying 40,000*short tons*(36,000*t) of supplies including reinforcements and ammunition for the island's anti-aircraft defences) from Alexandria and collected another convoy from Gibraltar. En route, Italian airbases were raided. The*Regia Marina*had superior forces at sea, but missed the opportunity to exploit their advantage.

October 1940
The heavily-escorted Convoy MB6 from Alexandria reached Malta safely. The escort included four battleships and two aircraft carriers. An Italian attempt against the returning escort employing destroyers and torpedo boats ended in the*Battle of Cape Passero, favourable to the British.

November 1940 – Operations*Judgement,*White*and*Collar
A supply convoy from Alexandria arrived safely, coinciding with a troop convoy from Gibraltar and the air attack on the Italian battlefleet at Taranto (Operation Judgement).

Twelve Hurricanes were flown off*Argus*to reinforce Malta (Operation*White), but the threat of the Italian fleet lurking south of*Sardinia*prompted a premature fly-off from*Argus*and its return to Gibraltar. Eight of the planes ran out of fuel and ditched at sea. Seven pilots were lost.

A fast convoy sailed from Gibraltar to Malta and Alexandria (Operation*Collar). It was attacked by the Italian fleet at*Cape Spartivento. All transports arrived safely.

January 1941 - Operation*Excess
Operation*Excess*took place — a sequence of simultaneous supply and empty return convoys between Malta and Gibraltar and Alexandria. The transports arrived safely with 10,000 short tons (9,100*t) of supplies, but the*Royal Navy*lost a cruiser (HMS*Southampton), with another cruiser (HMS*Gloucester) and an aircraft carrier (HMS*Illustrious) badly damaged and a destroyer damaged beyond repair.This was the first action to involve the*Luftwaffe. The Italian torpedo boat*Vega*was sunk in the course of the operations.

May 1941 – Operations*Tiger*and*Splice
An urgent supply convoy from Gibraltar to Alexandria (Operation*Tiger) coincided with reinforcements for the Mediterranean Fleet, two small convoys from Egypt to Malta,*and 48 more Hurricanes flown off HMS*Ark Royal*and*Furious*(Operation*Splice).*The only loss was the 9,200 long tons (9,300*t) cargo ship*Empire Song, which hit a mine and sank with a cargo of 57 tanks, 10 aircraft and several trucks.

Tiger*was transporting tanks (Matildas*and the new*Crusader tanks) needed for the operations in North Africa, these had been intended to be sent via the Cape but were diverted via the Mediterranean. Over 200 tanks reached Alexandria on 12 May.

The Luftwaffe transferred much of its strength from Sicily to prepare for the*invasion of the USSR, relieving some of the pressure on Malta.
The Malta-based submarine*HMS*Upholder*attacked and sank the large Italian troop transport*Conte Rosso.

I suggest that you do a bit more research.


lljadw said:
The outcome of the war in NA was not determined by a supply war,it was determined by the British superiority:in 1941,the strength of the Africa Corps was some 30000 men,at the end of 1942,it was even less .Even if all the supplies that arrived at Tripolis,were going to Alamein (Tripolis to Alamein =2000 km),the Germans still would loose .The outcome of the war in NA was known beforehand.
Click to expand...


Every battle fought right from the beginning of time relies on its supply lines. Without supply lines there is no fuel, no food, no ammunition, no fresh troops or other supplies to the front. One of the major worries regarding D Day was the problem of supply, which led to the design and construction of the floating harbours.

The British defeat in Singapore was partially caused by the inadequate supply of modern aircraft and other equipment. The Chindits in Burma only managed to do what they did because of supplies dropped by air.

As a matter of interest, supply units suffer extremely heavy casualties from enemy air and artillery attacks because they are so vital to front line units
 
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BritinAfrica said:
I suggest that you visit your library and go to the WW2 History section. How was Malta supplied if sea convoys didnt sail in the Med? And how exactly could convoys from the Atlantic suddenly appear in Malta without sailing the Med? Even the top boffins today cannot pull off a miracle. I think your watching too much Star Trek

Here are just a few examples:

September 1940 – Operation*Hats
The Mediterranean Fleet escorted a fast convoy of three transports (carrying 40,000*short tons*(36,000*t) of supplies including reinforcements and ammunition for the island's anti-aircraft defences) from Alexandria and collected another convoy from Gibraltar. En route, Italian airbases were raided. The*Regia Marina*had superior forces at sea, but missed the opportunity to exploit their advantage.

October 1940
The heavily-escorted Convoy MB6 from Alexandria reached Malta safely. The escort included four battleships and two aircraft carriers. An Italian attempt against the returning escort employing destroyers and torpedo boats ended in the*Battle of Cape Passero, favourable to the British.

November 1940 – Operations*Judgement,*White*and*Collar
A supply convoy from Alexandria arrived safely, coinciding with a troop convoy from Gibraltar and the air attack on the Italian battlefleet at Taranto (Operation Judgement).

Twelve Hurricanes were flown off*Argus*to reinforce Malta (Operation*White), but the threat of the Italian fleet lurking south of*Sardinia*prompted a premature fly-off from*Argus*and its return to Gibraltar. Eight of the planes ran out of fuel and ditched at sea. Seven pilots were lost.

A fast convoy sailed from Gibraltar to Malta and Alexandria (Operation*Collar). It was attacked by the Italian fleet at*Cape Spartivento. All transports arrived safely.

January 1941 - Operation*Excess
Operation*Excess*took place — a sequence of simultaneous supply and empty return convoys between Malta and Gibraltar and Alexandria. The transports arrived safely with 10,000 short tons (9,100*t) of supplies, but the*Royal Navy*lost a cruiser (HMS*Southampton), with another cruiser (HMS*Gloucester) and an aircraft carrier (HMS*Illustrious) badly damaged and a destroyer damaged beyond repair.This was the first action to involve the*Luftwaffe. The Italian torpedo boat*Vega*was sunk in the course of the operations.

May 1941 – Operations*Tiger*and*Splice
An urgent supply convoy from Gibraltar to Alexandria (Operation*Tiger) coincided with reinforcements for the Mediterranean Fleet, two small convoys from Egypt to Malta,*and 48 more Hurricanes flown off HMS*Ark Royal*and*Furious*(Operation*Splice).*The only loss was the 9,200 long tons (9,300*t) cargo ship*Empire Song, which hit a mine and sank with a cargo of 57 tanks, 10 aircraft and several trucks.

Tiger*was transporting tanks (Matildas*and the new*Crusader tanks) needed for the operations in North Africa, these had been intended to be sent via the Cape but were diverted via the Mediterranean. Over 200 tanks reached Alexandria on 12 May.

The Luftwaffe transferred much of its strength from Sicily to prepare for the*invasion of the USSR, relieving some of the pressure on Malta.
The Malta-based submarine*HMS*Upholder*attacked and sank the large Italian troop transport*Conte Rosso.

I suggest that you do a bit more research.





Every battle fought right from the beginning of time relies on its supply lines. Without supply lines there is no fuel, no food, no ammunition, no fresh troops or other supplies to the front. One of the major worries regarding D Day was the problem of supply, which led to the design and construction of the floating harbours.

The British defeat in Singapore was partially caused by the inadequate supply of modern aircraft and other equipment. The Chindits in Burma only managed to do what they did because of supplies dropped by air.

As a matter of interest, supply units suffer extremely heavy casualties from enemy air and artillery attacks because they are so vital to front line units
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And,I suggest you do some reading tests:where did I write that there was no sailing in the Mediterranean?
I REPEAT :between june 1940 and may 1943,the convoys to the Far East/India,did not use the Mediterranean,as such,the Mediterranean was no liveline for Britain.
 
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When the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were goning to Singapore,they did NOT use the Mediterranean route .
 
lljadw said:
When the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were goning to Singapore,they did NOT use the Mediterranean route .
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Oh For F*&* Sake.

I KNOW the Prince of Wales and the Repulse did not use the Mediterranean/Suez route.

The route became of greater importance to the Far East as the Allies pushed further and further north.
 
lljadw said:
And,I suggest you do some reading tests:where did I write that there was no sailing in the Mediterranean?
I REPEAT :between june 1940 and may 1943,the convoys to the Far East/India,did not use the Mediterranean,as such,the Mediterranean was no liveline for Britain.
Click to expand...

Then what the hell was it when it was used to supply Malta, which was, like it or not vital to the Allied war effort, not only during the fight for North Africa but also for the Allied landings in Sicily and Italy. The route then became became vital for Allied landings in the Far East .:bang:
 
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BritinAfrica said:
Oh For F*&* Sake.

I KNOW the Prince of Wales and the Repulse did not use the Mediterranean/Suez route.

The route became of greater importance to the Far East as the Allies pushed further and further north.
Click to expand...
If Britain had lost the Mediterranean,it would not have lost the War,the convoys to the Far East would have continued ...along South AFrica .
If Britain had lost the Battle of the Atlantic ,Britain had lost the war .
Now,which of both were vital:the Mediterranean,or the Atlantic .
And,saying that Malta was vital for the landings in Italy and Sicily,is saying,that without Malta,these landings were impossible,and that's nonsens .
About the Prince of Wales and the Repulse:if they did not use the Mediterranean to go to Singapore,that means that the Mediterranean was not vital for the war in the East:that's obvious .
 
lljadw said:
If Britain had lost the Mediterranean,it would not have lost the War,the convoys to the Far East would have continued ...along South AFrica
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If Britain had lost the Mediterranean, it would have put days or even weeks on the route to the Far East, using valuable fuel, which would mean more fuel tankers being brought into operation as well as other logistical problems. Have you ever spent time on Landing ships full of trucks and other equipment? I have and I can tell you its not a pleasant experience for the crews or troops on board. The shorter the route the better.

lljadw said:
If Britain had lost the Battle of the Atlantic ,Britain had lost the war .Now,which of both were vital:the Mediterranean,or the Atlantic .
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Of course the Atlantic was vital which does not detract from the importance of the Mediterranean for the advance through Italy. Besides which RAF bases on Cyprus needed vital supplies such as fuel, food, ammunition and other equipment :bang:


lljadw said:
And,saying that Malta was vital for the landings in Italy and Sicily,is saying,that without Malta,these landings were impossible,and that's nonsense
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I never said it would be impossible, I said it was vital. Ask any poor bugger who was there whether air cover from Malta was vital or not

229 squadron reformed on 3 August 1942 at Takali, Malta, this time as a Spitfire squadron using aircraft provided by No.603 Squadron. The squadron took part in the last months of the siege of Malta, before in January 1943 going onto the offensive, flying fighter sweeps over Sicily. Fighter-bomber aircraft arrived in May, and were used to cover the landings on Sicily, but the squadron was then retained on Malta for defensive duties and didn't move to Sicily until January 1944. On 1 April, after three months on Sicily, the squadron was withdrawn and transferred back to the UK, re-assembling at Hornchurch on 24 April.

From troops on the ground point of view who are having the crap shelled and shot out of them, they need and want all the air cover they can get.

You are talking out of your rectum.
.
lljadw said:
About the Prince of Wales and the Repulse:if they did not use the Mediterranean to go to Singapore,that means that the Mediterranean was not vital for the war in the East:that's obvious .
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Again you are talking total crap. Sending Naval ships and their crews the long way round is no where comparable to sending troops packed in troop ships for weeks on end.
 
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lljadw said:
I see that you are out of arguments,but not out of insults .:cen:
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I can keep this going for years if you so wish. I'm not out of arguments, I'm out of patience.

This is akin to trying to explain to a five year old why they shouldn't play with matches.
 
Any chance we can move back to topic?

We have lasted 56 pages so far it would be a shame to screw it up now.
 
Here's my point of view.
The Germans kicked to many asses and were very brutal in the occupied countries. Their supreme leader , Hitler, was a disaster in military warfare.
I don't know if Churchill new that Hitler would change plans in the Battle of Britain with that bombing raid in Berlin, but it surely saved the RAF. Hitler also changed plans when Moskow was within reach and lost his 6th Army in Stalingrad out of stubbornness. But he was also lucky, the bickering among the allied commanders prolonged the war unnecessary.
 
That's a lot of wrong things :
The LW never had a chance to win in the Battle of Britain.
There is no proof at all that the Germans could capture Moscow in 1941,and very unlikely that this would be decisive.
About Stalingrad :the truth is much more complicated.
About the bickering among the allied commanders :you could maybe give some explanations ?
 
lljadw said:
About the bickering among the allied commanders :you could maybe give some explanations ?
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There were bickering's between Monty and Patton, or rather Patton complained that Monty got the lions share of equipment and troops for Market Garden
 
These bickerings had no influence on the outcome of the war,because,it is not proved that,with more men,Patton could do better.On the other hand,while the execution of MG left much to be desired,the idea was not bad;whatever,MG resulted in the gaining of some terrain,with few losses.
The only chance the Allies had to force a decisive victory on the western front ,in the autumn of 1944,was, by starting a big offensive(some 50 divisions) on a small front,and this was logistically impossible;thus,the decision by Eisenhower to advance on a broad front was justifiable and defensible.
 
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