Here's a follow on post by richto90 that maybe of interest:
Montgomery orders to Second Army and in turn the orders from Second Army to 8 Corps and the 8 Corps operational plan make it very clear that GOODWOOD was never intended to be a "strategic breakout."
Second, the 11th Armoured Division did not suffer "huge" losses. Its losses on 18 July were actually recorded as 333 men, a rate of 2.3 percent-per-day, not inconsiderable, but certainly not "huge" (GD Pz-Div suffered greater numerical losses during the battle of Kursk on three of the first five days of the battle and much higher rates have been suffered by division-size forces on many occasions). Tank "losses" were higher, with only 137 operational at last light on 18 July as compared to 296 the preivous evening, but replacement tanks were readily available. By last light on 20 July the division had 178 operational and 269 by 28 July. Neither were losses in the total force committed to GOODWOOD excessive by standards of the day.To summarize, UK forces began with approximately 139,000 men, 1,369 tanks, and at least 732 artillery pieces. Losses were 4,120 men (2.97%) (844 KIA, 2,951 WIA, 325 MIA) and 493 tanks (35%). But only 361 of the tanks were "knocked out" - that is, they were either written off or were so damaged as to require long-term repair, 132 were damaged - that is, they required less than 24 hours for repair. At the end of the battle tank strength was 1,047.
Third, the objective of the 11th AD was not "Falaise" it was - initially - the line Bras-Rocquancourt-Beauvoir Ferme. Neither was the 8 Corps or GOODWOOD objective "Falaise." The actual objectives were given as:
"Notes on Second Army Operations
16th July-18th July
1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.
To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.
Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel."
At 0300 hours 16 July the 8 Corps Operations instruction was issued. The intention laid down in the instruction was:
"On 18th July, 8 Corps will debouch from the existing bridgehead east of the River Orne with a view to:
(a) Dominating the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville-sur-Laize.
(b) Destroying any enemy armour or other forces encountered en route to this area.
(c) If conditions are favourable, subsequently exploiting to the south."
On 17 July Dempsey issued the following summary to all of his corps commanders:
"Second Army Operations
Commencing on 18th July
....
4. 8 Corps will establish armoured divisions in the areas:
(a) Vimont
(b) Garcelles-Secqueville
(c) Hubert-Folie-Verrieres.
The task of these three divisions will be to get their main bodies so established that there can be no enemy penetration through the ring, to destroy all enemy troop concentrations and installations in the area; to defeat enemy armour which may be brought against them.
Vigorous patrolling and exploitation will be carried out to the east and south-east to the line of the Dives-to the south in the direction of Falaise-to the south-west as far as the River Orne at Thury Harcourt.
Main bodies of the three divisions will not be moved from areas (a), (b) and (c) without reference to me."
It may be fairly asked if those objectives were met. In general, the answer would be - with a few exceptions - yes. Most of the objectives on the ground were reached by the end of the operation and all German counterattacks were either repulsed or contained. And in its primary purpose of "writing down" German armor and strength in general, the objective was most definitely achieved. Overall German forces engaged may be estimated as about 79,750 men, 325 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT, and 291artillery pieces (not including infantry guns), 160 heavy Pak (including at least 51 8.8cm Pak 43/41), 56 8.8cm Flak (note that the generally accepted "144" 88's on Bourgebuis Ridge may include both the Pak 43/41 and an exaggeration), and about 230 Nebelwerfer.
Fragmentary loss reports indicate that total German losses were about 6,500 men (8.15%), 86 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT (26.5%), and at least 72 Nebelwerfer, Pak, and artillery pieces (9.77%). So German personnel losses in both numerical and percentage terms were greater than the British, while the percentage losses in armored vehicles "knocked out" were probably about the same. And, unlike the British losses, it appears that almost none of the German personnel or equipment losses were replaced before the Germans began their withdrawal from Normandy.
Was it a British "victory"? Tactically at least in a very narrow sense - no. Operationally and strategically - yes. Did Rommel have much to do with it - yes, in the sense he directed the forces to be concentrated there, which was pretty much a "no brainer." But the German tactical success was a product of good terrain, a sensible and efficient defensive doctrine and high quality equipment rather than Rommel's influence.
Thanks to richto90
