Was General Montgomery really overrated in WW2?

schoolnoob said:
Aussie John - I like your suggestion on books about Patton. I never quite thought of that. Perhaps i could also look at books on Ike and other US generals.

I've been sifting around for material on key battles involving Monty. So far ive found plenty on D-day and El Alamein but books on Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge come up short. It seems to me that a lot of them are narrative books dealing with soldiers experiences rather than an analytical book which accounts for the battle and offers opinions on certain leaders etc. Any Suggestions.

I certainly agree to the point that market garden may be the reason why US does not like Monty as it was a dismal failure and in my opinion an ill conceived plan. Not too sure about the Bulge, i dont quite know enough about his role there.

btw, what exactly did Monty say about the American high command?
Click to expand...

Sorry about the delay!!!!!!!! You wanted information on Monty’s insensitive press conference in January, 1945.

I will quote directly from the paperback edition of Alun Chalfont’s book “Montgomery of Alamein”. Chalfont served in the British Army but never under Monty. It’s a great book and easy to read.

There should be other sources on this press conference about on the internet. I haven’t looked as yet.

While reading the following, please keep it in context with the other troubles occurring between Monty and Eisenhower during these months. Monty wanted Eisenhower to change the command structure, including the idea that he should take over a larger northern front, from the Ardennes to the sea. He was so thoughtless in the way he pushed this idea, particularly during the “Battle of the Bulge” that it nearly got him the sack.

P.305-307

“There is no doubt that Montgomery enjoyed the Ardennes campaign. It was the type of battle for which he was ideally suited, with the accent on defence; and his liaison officer system gave him a constant and accurate view of the situation. He awoke from the torpor which had seemed to take hold of him during November, and was radiant with the challenges he faced. On 18 December, de Guingand described his chief as being at the ‘top of his form’ when he spoke to him on the telephone.

On 13th December he had pleaded to be given just the command which he had held from the 20th; he felt that the “Battle of the Bulge” proved his case conclusively. And so when he appeared at Hodge’s headquarters on 21st December with his Union Jack and his outriders, he gave an impression of having come like Christ to cleanse the temple. On this occasion the feelings of the Americans were further alienated when the Field Marshal, as usual, refused to have lunch in the mess, but ate sandwiches in his car outside. Any bruised feelings during the actual fighting of the battle, however, were dwarfed by comparison with two problems which arose out of Montgomery’s attitude to the lessons to be learnt. One of these, perhaps the less important of the two, was caused by a press conference he held on the 7th January.

Montgomery was dressed in red beret and paratroop combat jacket, and in buoyant mood. Perhaps understandably, he overestimated the role of the British Forces. And he implied that he and his 21st Army Group had had to save the Americans. ‘General Eisenhower placed me in command of the whole northern front. I enjoyed the whole available power of the British group of armies. You have this picture of British troops fighting on both sides of American forces and who have suffered a hard blow. This is a fine Allied picture.’ A ‘fine Allied picture’ it might have been, but this view displeased Bradley immensely. Bradley was smarting in any case because he had, against advice, pitched his own headquarters so far south that he had lost contact with Hodges as soon as the battle began. He complained that Montgomery was making him look ridiculously unprepared when in fact the British were just as unready (Montgomery was playing golf when the offensive began, and his message to the troops on 16th December had read: ‘The enemy situation is such that he cannot stage major offensive operations’).

The American generals were also aware that, privately, Montgomery was very critical of their command structure and the way it dealt with the break-through. He wrote to Brooke as the Battle was opening: ‘The situation in American area is not – not – good’. On 25th December he told the CIGS: ‘The American armies in the north were in a complete muddle.’ American officers found many of his remarks at the press conference a thinly veiled version of this.

So although the New York Times said that ‘no handsomer tribute was ever paid to the American soldier’, the account of the opening of the battle caused grave offence. So did Montgomery’s version of the way the Germans were halted. He said he had put his men ‘into battle with a bang’. But he did not begin offensive operations until 3rd January – twelve days after Patton, from the south, had counter-attacked, and effectively sealed the fate of the German armies.

As the news of his overall command in the northern theatre was not publicly released until 6th January, this press conference was seized on by the British and American newspapers – and by the Germans, who used a specifically edited version as propaganda. Montgomery was rapidly made aware of the furore he was causing; on 14th January he sent a letter of apology to Bradley. He was at last beginning to understand the difficulties which could be caused by his ill-considered statements. The main reason, however, why he was so alert to the harm he had done at his press conference was that in the last days of December he had precipitated a crisis which almost led to his own removal. The events of the Battle of the Ardennes and Montgomery’s reaction to them at finally snapped the long thread of Eisenhower’s patience.”

Chalfont goes on to discuss Monty’s determination to have the command structure changed and his near sacking.

I’ll make a quick comment on George Patton.

He certainly had his dark side. Eg slapping, punching and threatening to shoot shell shocked soldiers and calling them cowards. At one stage the word around was that a lot of American soldiers would have been happy to ‘shoot the bastard’.

He was accused of giving orders to soldiers under his command to shoot prisoners (WHICH SOME DID!). The charges were dropped because it was feared by Eisenhower that if he was found guilty Patton would probably have to be sent home. Eisenhower considered him too important to the war effort to risk a trial.

Patton was made military governor of Bavaria at the end of the war. He was sacked due to his comments in support of rearming the Germans and going after the Russians.
 
aussiejohn said:
schoolnoob said:
Aussie John - I like your suggestion on books about Patton. I never quite thought of that. Perhaps i could also look at books on Ike and other US generals.

I've been sifting around for material on key battles involving Monty. So far ive found plenty on D-day and El Alamein but books on Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge come up short. It seems to me that a lot of them are narrative books dealing with soldiers experiences rather than an analytical book which accounts for the battle and offers opinions on certain leaders etc. Any Suggestions.

I certainly agree to the point that market garden may be the reason why US does not like Monty as it was a dismal failure and in my opinion an ill conceived plan. Not too sure about the Bulge, i dont quite know enough about his role there.

btw, what exactly did Monty say about the American high command?
Click to expand...

Sorry about the delay!!!!!!!! You wanted information on Monty’s insensitive press conference in January, 1945.

I will quote directly from the paperback edition of Alun Chalfont’s book “Montgomery of Alamein”. Chalfont served in the British Army but never under Monty. It’s a great book and easy to read.

There should be other sources on this press conference about on the internet. I haven’t looked as yet.

While reading the following, please keep it in context with the other troubles occurring between Monty and Eisenhower during these months. Monty wanted Eisenhower to change the command structure, including the idea that he should take over a larger northern front, from the Ardennes to the sea. He was so thoughtless in the way he pushed this idea, particularly during the “Battle of the Bulge” that it nearly got him the sack.

P.305-307

“There is no doubt that Montgomery enjoyed the Ardennes campaign. It was the type of battle for which he was ideally suited, with the accent on defence; and his liaison officer system gave him a constant and accurate view of the situation. He awoke from the torpor which had seemed to take hold of him during November, and was radiant with the challenges he faced. On 18 December, de Guingand described his chief as being at the ‘top of his form’ when he spoke to him on the telephone.

On 13th December he had pleaded to be given just the command which he had held from the 20th; he felt that the “Battle of the Bulge” proved his case conclusively. And so when he appeared at Hodge’s headquarters on 21st December with his Union Jack and his outriders, he gave an impression of having come like Christ to cleanse the temple. On this occasion the feelings of the Americans were further alienated when the Field Marshal, as usual, refused to have lunch in the mess, but ate sandwiches in his car outside. Any bruised feelings during the actual fighting of the battle, however, were dwarfed by comparison with two problems which arose out of Montgomery’s attitude to the lessons to be learnt. One of these, perhaps the less important of the two, was caused by a press conference he held on the 7th January.

Montgomery was dressed in red beret and paratroop combat jacket, and in buoyant mood. Perhaps understandably, he overestimated the role of the British Forces. And he implied that he and his 21st Army Group had had to save the Americans. ‘General Eisenhower placed me in command of the whole northern front. I enjoyed the whole available power of the British group of armies. You have this picture of British troops fighting on both sides of American forces and who have suffered a hard blow. This is a fine Allied picture.’ A ‘fine Allied picture’ it might have been, but this view displeased Bradley immensely. Bradley was smarting in any case because he had, against advice, pitched his own headquarters so far south that he had lost contact with Hodges as soon as the battle began. He complained that Montgomery was making him look ridiculously unprepared when in fact the British were just as unready (Montgomery was playing golf when the offensive began, and his message to the troops on 16th December had read: ‘The enemy situation is such that he cannot stage major offensive operations’).

The American generals were also aware that, privately, Montgomery was very critical of their command structure and the way it dealt with the break-through. He wrote to Brooke as the Battle was opening: ‘The situation in American area is not – not – good’. On 25th December he told the CIGS: ‘The American armies in the north were in a complete muddle.’ American officers found many of his remarks at the press conference a thinly veiled version of this.

So although the New York Times said that ‘no handsomer tribute was ever paid to the American soldier’, the account of the opening of the battle caused grave offence. So did Montgomery’s version of the way the Germans were halted. He said he had put his men ‘into battle with a bang’. But he did not begin offensive operations until 3rd January – twelve days after Patton, from the south, had counter-attacked, and effectively sealed the fate of the German armies.

As the news of his overall command in the northern theatre was not publicly released until 6th January, this press conference was seized on by the British and American newspapers – and by the Germans, who used a specifically edited version as propaganda. Montgomery was rapidly made aware of the furore he was causing; on 14th January he sent a letter of apology to Bradley. He was at last beginning to understand the difficulties which could be caused by his ill-considered statements. The main reason, however, why he was so alert to the harm he had done at his press conference was that in the last days of December he had precipitated a crisis which almost led to his own removal. The events of the Battle of the Ardennes and Montgomery’s reaction to them at finally snapped the long thread of Eisenhower’s patience.”

Chalfont goes on to discuss Monty’s determination to have the command structure changed and his near sacking.

I’ll make a quick comment on George Patton.

He certainly had his dark side. Eg slapping, punching and threatening to shoot shell shocked soldiers and calling them cowards. At one stage the word around was that a lot of American soldiers would have been happy to ‘shoot the bastard’.

He was accused of giving orders to soldiers under his command to shoot prisoners (WHICH SOME DID!). The charges were dropped because it was feared by Eisenhower that if he was found guilty Patton would probably have to be sent home. Eisenhower considered him too important to the war effort to risk a trial.

Patton was made military governor of Bavaria at the end of the war. He was sacked due to his comments in support of rearming the Germans and going after the Russians.
Click to expand...

This terrific information Sir. You are have made a real study of Montgomery.

But I do believe you are a little hard on him though. He had a great military mind and was a wonderful planner.

I look forward to more of your comments. :)
 
Thanks Strongbow.

If you have read through the posts you would have seen that I have been very fair to him.

Checkout some of the books I have suggested.

I agree with some of the things you have said. He was good at planning a campaign but I think he lost the plot in Holland (Market Garden). :)
 
Was Montgomery really overrated in WW2?

In my youth I read that Monty was brilliant. Things I read later in life were critical of him. Films such as "Patton" and "A Bridge Too Far" treat him as little more than a fool.
The last book I read was Max Hasting's account of Normandy.
Hastings book frankly related the faults in Monty - the most obvious was his attempt to convince everyone that the British assaults in Normandy were clever feints to pull the weight of German armour away from the Americans.
That is what happened but it was not what was intended. Monty wanted to break out of the German defensive ring and force them to retreat. In the event his continued attacks burned away the German strength. When Bradley launched Cobra it was against weak and fluid German defences. Though I doubt if that was how the Americans at the sharp end found it!
Although it was not the original plan what transpired was more effective. The continued British and Canadian assaults fatally weakened the Germans - but it cost the Allies casualties. My father was one - he was wounded as an infantryman near Caen.
Monty extended the D-Day beaches from three to five. And he considered the battle of the build-up vital to eventual success.
He did not have a perfect army - he realised this. Nor did Bradley - and he realised that fact too.
But they had to use the armies they had - and these armies proved effective and competent.
As Max Hastings put it in his summary of Normandy - they were not there to prove that an individual American, British or Canadian soldier was better that an individual German soldier.
They were in Normandy to effect the defeat of the German army in Normandy.
And, with the Allied air forces and navies, that is what they did.
 
Re: Was Montgomery really overrated in WW2?

armchairal said:
In my youth I read that Monty was brilliant. Things I read later in life were critical of him. Films such as "Patton" and "A Bridge Too Far" treat him as little more than a fool.
The last book I read was Max Hasting's account of Normandy.
Hastings book frankly related the faults in Monty - the most obvious was his attempt to convince everyone that the British assaults in Normandy were clever feints to pull the weight of German armour away from the Americans.
That is what happened but it was not what was intended. Monty wanted to break out of the German defensive ring and force them to retreat. In the event his continued attacks burned away the German strength. When Bradley launched Cobra it was against weak and fluid German defences. Though I doubt if that was how the Americans at the sharp end found it!
Although it was not the original plan what transpired was more effective. The continued British and Canadian assaults fatally weakened the Germans - but it cost the Allies casualties. My father was one - he was wounded as an infantryman near Caen.
Monty extended the D-Day beaches from three to five. And he considered the battle of the build-up vital to eventual success.
He did not have a perfect army - he realised this. Nor did Bradley - and he realised that fact too.
But they had to use the armies they had - and these armies proved effective and competent.
As Max Hastings put it in his summary of Normandy - they were not there to prove that an individual American, British or Canadian soldier was better that an individual German soldier.
They were in Normandy to effect the defeat of the German army in Normandy.
And, with the Allied air forces and navies, that is what they did.
Click to expand...

Great post Sir!
 
"When Bradley launched Cobra it was against weak and fluid German defences."

Oh yeah, sure it was.
 
In reply to Cannoneers comment to my remarks about weak and fluid German defences I do not intend to demean the American effort during the "Cobra" assault. That was why I added that the Americans at the sharp end of Cobra would not have felt that they were opposed by weak forces.
But is it not the case that at this stage in the Normandy campaign the Germans were unable to defend strongly everywhere? They were coming to the end of their resources - and many must have known that Normandy as a defended front would soon break.
Most of the German armour faced the British and Canadians. The Germans believed the threat in Normandy was from the British. The continued British assaults confirmed this in their minds.
The Germans could not hold their line forever. The British strength was waning - but would hold. The Americans would have the greatest strength in Normandy - and when they advanced the Germans would not be able to stop them and hold off the British and Canadians as well.
So I think it is not unfair to describe the German defences in the American sector as being weaker than those in front of Caen and, later, those put in place to hold the British.
Normandy depended on the working of the war time alliance.
Take one nations contribution away and you probably wouldn't have Overlord at all - and if you did it would be severely punished by the Germans and would probably fail.
I doubt if most British and Americans in Normandy argued as to which of them was the better and which did more and endured more.
I believe they realised that American, British and Canadian armies were needed to fulfill Overlord.
I think that most of the bitterness and recriminations about lost opportunities and comparisons between individual nations efforts came after the war.
 
"The Germans believed the threat in Normandy was from the British."

Oh come on. Yeah the Americans faced soft units and we weren't the threat. Uh huh sure. :roll:

Look you're obviously proud of your nation. You don't have to be so at the expense of the honor of Americans who fought serious opposition and who provided the vast bulk of the men in the field not to mention the equipment and logistics.
 
Well ya know. Monty's run across France..................... Wait that was Patton my bad :oops:
 
Charge_7 said:
"The Germans believed the threat in Normandy was from the British."

Oh come on. Yeah the Americans faced soft units and we weren't the threat. Uh huh sure. :roll:

Look you're obviously proud of your nation. You don't have to be so at the expense of the honor of Americans who fought serious opposition and who provided the vast bulk of the men in the field not to mention the equipment and logistics.
Click to expand...
This is a case of 'shooting the messenger' when you don't like the message :roll:
Its a historical fact that the German High Command were dismissive of the capabilities of the American military at the start of the invasion.
Why?
The answers quite simple.
The German High Command in northern Europe had had little experience of fighting against US forces so they had little knowledge of their capabilities. While they did have knowledge of the capabilities of the British and Commonwealth forces and how formidable they could be.
The statement that the Germans underestimated the capabilities of the US forces is not an insult to the said forces, but yet another example of the stupidity of the German High Command.

ps, before the break-out over two thirds of the total number of German Panzer divisions in Normandy were fighting in the British Commonwealth sector
 
Can anyone explain why Monty was loved by his men,and why Patton was hated by his?
 
"The German High Command in northern Europe had had little experience of fighting against US forces so they had little knowledge of their capabilities."

Wrong. Sicily and Italy had already occurred long before Normandy. In fact, Rome was captured within days of Normandy.

Patton was so highly regarded by the Germans that they kept a special file on him. They knew about us - you bet!
 
When some of Pattons units came up against determined German resistance they were stopped as effectively as Montgomery. For some, including Bradley at first, Patton was charging around France gaining mostly empty territory. The name of the game was the defeat of the Germans. They were the professionals.
The battle of the build-up was for me the next most important thing to the securing of the beaches, the move inland and the creation of the bridgehead in Normandy. And it was the Americans who showed how this could be done across the beaches.
We needed the Americans.
They needed us.
The British had long realised that they would produce no army that would re-enter Europe on it's own. There was no American army that would do the same in this year.
It was an allied effort. American, British, Canadian. And the Poles and the French.
 
To Strongbow;
Thank you for your comment. I would point out however that I am an extremely chairbound general and most of my thinking on this matter is from books and I should take little credit for it.
As a schoolboy I was taken to an army camp in Chepstow (UK).
A disgruntled squaddie advised me that I should not join "this f_-____ army.
So I didn't!
 
"When some of Pattons units came up against determined German resistance they were stopped as effectively as Montgomery."

Wrong again. Patton swept through the Germans at every stand and only stopped when he ran out of fuel as it had been given to Montgomery who then sat on it. At the Battle of the Bulge Patton moved an entire Army virtually overnite from one heated engagement in the Ruhr to relieve Bastogne in another. They traveled more than a hundred miles. A feat that nobody thought could be done. Montgomery was the master of the set piece battle but he was no assault force commander of instant decision and lightning speed - Patton was. It wasn't all "open ground" either that he took his men through. It may be comforting to you to think you won the war all on your lonesome and that the US was a bunch of amatuer hangers on, but history knows better. There was afterall another army there besides the British and the Americans - ask the Germans they know who was their main threat.

You are entirely correct, however, that both the Americans and the British needed each other to win the war. We just did alot more than be "masters of the build-up". Your army fought bravely and well, your intelligence was first rate, and your people offered us your hearts and your homes. I find it unfortunate that in defending Montgomery you felt it necessary to denigrate the American commanders and soldiers.

Britain did have an assault force commander of decision though in the person of General Slim. It was a mistake to venerate Montgomery because he gave you a victory at El Alamain when you desperately needed one and have largely forgotten Slim who did so much more. Many historians feel that that is so only because Slim was from the British Indian Army and Montgomery from the regulars. The Indian Army was considered of much lower distinction and merely by serving in it Slim was cheated out of the laurals he deserved.
 
Monty lacked a lot of imagination in his attacks at Caen- "Epsom", "Charnwood" and "Goodwood" but these attacks did draw off much of the German armour from the Americans who were building up their bridgehead.

On the 10th of June Rommel wrote a summary for those directing the battle from far- distant headquarters.

"The enemy would hold the bridgehead between Orne and Vire, and attempt to widen it through the capture of the Contentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg. They would then fill it with troops and equipment to the point where it overflowed into France."

"There air superiority had crippled the German attempts to mount a counter-attack; in the approach marches, the formation for attack, and the attack itself. The only hope was to bring in sufficient infantry to hold the line, thus releasing the panzer forces for another more concentrated effort. If the attack was to be mounted it should be against the weaker Americans".

Even after "Charnwood" the Germans believed that another major invasion was going to happen north of the Seine. Thats why they didn't use more of their armour at Caen.

The Americans did face some excellent units such as Panzer Lehr commanded by Bayerlein but on July 25th Operation Cobra was launched. The four- mile stretch of front running west of St Lo to held by Panzer Lehr was attacked by over 2000 American bombers to a depth of 2 miles. Each bomber had only to plough a strip some ten feet wide. Bayerlein's division was virtually annihilated.

The above is from The Devil's Virtuosos: German Generals at War 1940-1945 by David Downing. A fabulous book from the German perspective.

A book called "Das Reich" about the "Das Reich" SS Panzer Division in France (can't remember the author) makes it very clear that the fighting men in this division were not worried about the allied soldiers but they were very worried by the weight of material that they had to face when they reached Normandy and the constant air attacks along the way.

Even before Normandy, Patton's reputation worried the Germans quite a lot. (numerous sources back this claim).
 
Thank you for your insights, AussieJohn.

One point however:

"There air superiority had crippled the German attempts to mount a counter-attack; in the approach marches, the formation for attack, and the attack itself. The only hope was to bring in sufficient infantry to hold the line, thus releasing the panzer forces for another more concentrated effort. If the attack was to be mounted it should be against the weaker Americans".

By "weaker" it could just as easily mean weaker in that specific area of the battle, and not mean _anything_ about the Americans as a whole. Without the full context that observation is just conjecture.
 
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