Doppleganger
Active member
You might be right but it was the only real play they had. They can't win any other way.
USA WW2 Lend Lease
German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had no more reserves and thus would be unable to stage a counteroffensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalin transferred > 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East, relying on intelligence from his spy, Richard Sorge, which indicated that Japan—preparing for the Pearl Harbor attack—would not attack the Soviet Union. It was only after this conclusion and the addition of the troops from the Far East that Stalin was able to launch a counter offensive that otherwise wouldn’t have been possible. Also there were limits to this victory. The Red Army's winter counter-offensive drove the Wehrmacht from Moscow, but the city was still considered to be threatened, with the front line relatively close.
So had the attack on Moscow occurred earlier not only would the Wehrmacht not have suffered from the cold and lack of lubricated (regardless if the reason for this was poor planning or a breakdown in the supply chain, it wouldn’t have mattered since it wouldn’t have been cold enough to have mattered). The Reds wouldn’t have had enough forces to have successfully defended Moscow. As a result the Red army almost certainly would have been defeated and Moscow would have fallen. So yes the Red came very close to being defeated at Moscow and due to the back and forthing between Smolensk and Kiev lost their chance.
The only thing the battle of Moscow cost the Germans was a relatively quick victory. German industry, it’s continuous introduction of new weapons and the strength and tactical success of its soldiery showed that Germany was much more elastic and adaptable as the war continued.
It was only by the combined industrial might of the US, the British Common Wealth and the Soviet union as well as the combined militaries of these 3 powers that over time and thru attrition brought about an end to the German Reich.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Ah the Siberian divisions myth again...
Only 14 divisions transferred west from August to December 1941, (these are the only divisions that could possibly have been influenced by any information from Richard Sorge’s spy ring (going back as far as early August 1941).
Of these 14 divisions, two were small mountain cavalry divisions from Central Asia, while the three tank and mechanised divisions were very new and had very little (if anything) to do with Siberian personnel. The 58th and 60th tank divisions had only started forming in March-April 1941.
Of the rifle divisions, three arrived in August and September and were sent to 11th Army defending the southern approaches to Leningrad or 7th Army defending the far north against the Finns.
Only six rifle divisions arrived in October and four of these went to an Army that could be even remotely linked to defending Moscow against Army Group Centre.
These were the 32nd, 93rd, 78th and 238th Rifle Divisions. Of these only the 32nd and 93rd Rifle Divisions had a significant proportion of Siberian personnel, while the 238th had only started forming in March 1941 in Central Asia.
In short, of all the divisions transferred west after August 1941, only three rifle divisions originated with Siberian personnel and only two went into the Western Front defending Moscow.
Only 14 divisions transferred west from August to December 1941, (these are the only divisions that could possibly have been influenced by any information from Richard Sorge’s spy ring (going back as far as early August 1941).
Of these 14 divisions, two were small mountain cavalry divisions from Central Asia, while the three tank and mechanised divisions were very new and had very little (if anything) to do with Siberian personnel. The 58th and 60th tank divisions had only started forming in March-April 1941.
Of the rifle divisions, three arrived in August and September and were sent to 11th Army defending the southern approaches to Leningrad or 7th Army defending the far north against the Finns.
Only six rifle divisions arrived in October and four of these went to an Army that could be even remotely linked to defending Moscow against Army Group Centre.
These were the 32nd, 93rd, 78th and 238th Rifle Divisions. Of these only the 32nd and 93rd Rifle Divisions had a significant proportion of Siberian personnel, while the 238th had only started forming in March 1941 in Central Asia.
In short, of all the divisions transferred west after August 1941, only three rifle divisions originated with Siberian personnel and only two went into the Western Front defending Moscow.
On 27 november 1940,Halder wrote in his diary (KTB II,P 198) that" the daunting scope of commitments around Europe suggested a limitation of operations in the East to the Dvina-Dnjepr line and that starting from there, one could attempt an envelopping operation,but in the endless expance of space,THIS WOULD HAVE NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESS."
Source : operation Barbarossa and the German defeat in the east P 76, note 25 .
Source : operation Barbarossa and the German defeat in the east P 76, note 25 .
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
I'm not really convinced the Germans lost the war at Moscow. The Germans had lost the war anyway, but where was the tipping point? The army group south still had some momentum and continued the offensive, when they decided to split the army group south into a two prong offensive toward Stalingrad and Caucasus the Germans weakened their own offensive capability. I also believe the Germans were slowly draining themselves of resources on the way to Stalingrad, Moscow and even to Leningrad. When some divisions reached a major battle, they were already weakened.
An additional aspect to all of this is the winter, the German equipment and the men were not suited for the winter. When it gets really cold, even well prepared troops will face the impact of the cold. It is really draining to spend weeks and months exposed to the climate. When the majority of the Germans soldiers did not have winter clothing when the mercury is dropping, not easy to stay motivated and even surviving it.
An additional aspect to all of this is the winter, the German equipment and the men were not suited for the winter. When it gets really cold, even well prepared troops will face the impact of the cold. It is really draining to spend weeks and months exposed to the climate. When the majority of the Germans soldiers did not have winter clothing when the mercury is dropping, not easy to stay motivated and even surviving it.
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{If I had to choose a turning point I think it’s going to be a very obvious one: the Battle of Stalingrad. The Battle of Stalingrad is not a turning point necessarily in strategic terms because a lot more has to be done before the Soviets can be certain of defeating Germany. The West has still got a lot to do to get its act together properly. But it’s the extraordinary symbolic power that Stalingrad has for the Soviet people and it’s the point at which they suddenly begin to believe in themselves, and suddenly historic Russia has been saved. Suddenly the Germans are vulnerable. And this is a message that goes round the world, much more than Alamein, which was important for British pride after two years of defeat.
Stalingrad goes round the world and comes to symbolise this extraordinary thing. And I think it links back in a sense to the early stages of the war when people saw this now as Armageddon, a real battle between the forces of light and darkness. Stalingrad has all the ingredients for that. And a comprehensive Soviet victory at Stalingrad was important for everybody, but it’s very important for the Soviet people and very important for the Soviet armed forces who’d been led badly throughout the early part of the war and suffered terrific losses. The encirclement of Paulus and the defeat of the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad is evidence of a mature operational art. The Red Army has come of age after 20 years when there have been lots of question marks about its capacity}
Quote from Professor Richard Overy
Stalingrad goes round the world and comes to symbolise this extraordinary thing. And I think it links back in a sense to the early stages of the war when people saw this now as Armageddon, a real battle between the forces of light and darkness. Stalingrad has all the ingredients for that. And a comprehensive Soviet victory at Stalingrad was important for everybody, but it’s very important for the Soviet people and very important for the Soviet armed forces who’d been led badly throughout the early part of the war and suffered terrific losses. The encirclement of Paulus and the defeat of the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad is evidence of a mature operational art. The Red Army has come of age after 20 years when there have been lots of question marks about its capacity}
Quote from Professor Richard Overy
Doppleganger
Active member
The tipping point was the failure of Barbarossa and the realization that the Soviet Union would not be quickly knocked out of the war. This began an extended war of attrition from which only one side would ever emerge the victor.
It doesn't matter that the Germans still have some operational successes in 1942 and 1943.
It doesn't matter that they generally inflict substantially heavier losses in each engagement.
It doesn't matter that they push deep into European Russian and the Caucasus region.
It doesn't matter because the Red Army/VVS can replace their losses whereas the Ostheer/Luftwaffe cannot. In this situation, there is only one winner.
It's true that in some aspects the Russians were better suited to fighting in winter conditions. However, these advantages were not decisive and winter affects men regardless of who they fight for. What was more problematic for the Germans was the autumn rasputitsa as it slowed down the speed of their advance.
The only chance the Germans had after Moscow was to bleed the Red Army white and bring the Soviets to the table. However, this would not be a victory in any shape or form and would result in the very least, pre June 1941 borders being reestablished.
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Up to Kursk the Soviets were very concerned about the upcoming German summer offensive for 43. I can't quote it but I seem to remember that the Reds were willing to give up the Baltic states, eastern Poland and parts of western Ukraine to establish a peace with a Germany that still scared the pants off them. Hitler would have none of it.
An interesting thought is how well would the Wehrmacht done if it could go flat out against the USSR the same way Stalin could concentrate all his resources against Germany? German troops - resources were needed for N. Africa, Malta Italy, the U-Boat war, the bulk of the Luftwaffe had to stay east to defend Germany, etc.
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I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
General Heinz Guderian said that had they treated the occupied peoples differently they would have won. They were originally welcomed as liberators in the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Caucus regions.
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Umm you guys seem to be overlooking the fact that the war in the east was essentially a war of extermination, what you are asking is like wondering if the outcome of the Superbowl would have been different had they played tennis instead.
It would have been no different at all, it would not have mattered if the Germans could have applied its entire military to one task as the failure was more than just logistics, to be able to field more troops you not only need troops and supplies but also the ability to move them and the transport infrastructure of the Soviet Union was simply not up to it so the only outcome would have been more troops and supplies waiting to move to the front and not being able to.
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The USSR teetered on the brink of disaster up to Stalingrad. Had they more troops, planes, AFV's, troops though this period Germany would have likely knocked the USSR out of the war. Stalin was quoted as saying if we are pushed back past the Volga where do we have to go? In other words controlling the USSR Volga lifeline and the Caucus oilfields (which my sources say supplied 70% of Soviet oil) would have been a virtual victory in itself. The Germans came very close to meeting these objectives regardless of a sometimes flawed supply system. Had they not had to devote resources to Africa, Italy, Malta the Atlantic, the sky's over Germany, etc. these additional forces would have likely tipped the balance to a point that the Soviets would not have been able to recover from the German onslaught.
It should be noted that the Reds had to use this same infrastructure when moving west from 43 on and were able to do so with an army that was ~ 2ce the size of that of Germany and allies. They moved with speed, although this was in part due to the lend lease trucks received from the US, the Dodge 3/4 ton and Studebaker 2½ ton were easily the best trucks of the war.
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That the Caucasus oil fields supplied 70 % of the Soviet oil,can NOT be used as an argument ,because it is ignoring the question of how much did the SU need oil,and how much the oil of Baku .
The oil production of the Caucasus dropped during the war to 50 % of the prewar figure and this did not prevent the Soviets to advance to Berlin .
Besides, a German occupation of the Caucasus does not mean that the Germans would be able to hold the Caucasus .
About the trucks : these were used for short distances only :for long distances,supplies were transported by rail .
Many Germans were also not happy about their government .
And in both situations,this did not result in mass surrenderings .
In the winter of 1940 there were some mass surrenderings by the Italians in NA,but these did not happen in 1941 and 1942,thus they were not caused by hostility to the regime .
I still have to see one exemple of mass surrenderings that were caused by the civilians not being happy about their own government .
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
It is more of a speculation if the Germans have dropped the racial rubbish the Nazi ideology has. A similar speculation would be; how would Europe look like if the Germans had never attacked Soviet Union.
The Germans were very supportive of Hitler (many not knowing the extent of his atrocities). He revived > 90% of the vote in a open election back in the 30's. Also even as the Germans became disillusioned with the war their loyalty never wavered (except for a very few).
This was not the case with Chechens, Ukrainians, Balts, Belorussians, most Cossacks. Who hated the Stalinist regime and in some cases actively opposed it.
This is certainly an interesting thought. Had Hitler somehow restrained himself from his desire for Lebensraum Nazi Germany might have been around for quite a bit longer? No dought the US would have gotten involved, but one can only speculate as to the outcome.
It may have been harder for the Allies to get a toehold on northwest Europe with the additional German forces that would have been available. As it stood the Allies drew away ~ (>15 to 35) % of the German forces - resources from the Eastern front (depending on what time period one looks at).
Some speculate that Stalin would have eventually attack Germany. However one has to look at the fact that Stalin also greatly feared Hitler. So this theory that the USSR would have eventually attacked Germany is hypothetical as well.
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
The Balts viewed the Germans as liberators after being occupied by the Russians, many Ukrainians shared the same feelings toward the Germans, especially after the imposed famine in Ukraine. The Baltic support might have not made any difference in the long run, but the Ukrainians could have caused huge problems for the Russian war effort.
War is also a psychological act and not only the tools. How people perceive the war is very important for how the population will react to the hostile act by somebody. The Russians changed their perspective of the Germans after Stalingrad. After Stalingrad, the Russians viewed it as the tide has turned and they were able to defeat the Germans.
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