I also talked about the pressure some countries support to say yes to UN resolution 181:
The partition resolution required a 2/3 majority to pass, and it became evident that due to Arab pressure and resistance to the US by third-world countries, it might not pass. On November 25, a Tuesday, UN General Assembly members, acting as an ad hoc committee on Palestine, voted. The partition resolution passed the "committee" vote, twenty-five to thirteen with seventeen abstentions. However, this vote was one one short of the 2/3 majority that would be needed to pass the General Assembly itself.
The vote was postponed from Wednesday, giving the lobbyists Thursday, the Thanksgiving holiday, to change votes. The Arab countries exerted pressure against partition. Pressure from Zionists, US officials and former officials was brought to bear on countries that were intending to vote against partition. Greece was threatened with loss of foreign aid. Apparently on the prompting of former Secretary of State Stettinus, tire manufacturer Harvey Firestone threatened Liberia with a rubber embargo. Paraguay, the Philippines, Haiti and other countries reversed their positions and voted for partition. Though newspapers accused State Department officials of acting against partition, at least some State department officials were directly involved in lobbying for it. Dean Rusk, head of the State Department's UN desk in Washington, later wrote, "when President Truman decided to support partition, I worked hard to implement it....The pressure and arm-twisting applied by American and Jewish representatives in capital after capital to get that affirmative vote are hard to describe." The vote was again postponed to Saturday November 29, one more day, at the request of the Arabs. Greece voted against partition anyway, but other countries changed their vote. The partition resolution was duly passed.
As soon as the resolution passed however, the State Department went to work systematically to undo it. The Palestine problem was dwarfed by the problems arising in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, where country after country was falling under Soviet influence. The US was demobilizing rapidly and had to decide whether to maintain a military footing to counter the USSR, and to face the possibility of another war, that would increase US dependence on Arab oil. Truman was deluged with memoranda about the situation in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Greece, as well as with the Palestine question. The Presidential staff in those days was tiny, and Truman had to read each and every one of these documents.
Palestine was a side show, so the State Department could act more or less independently in many ways, and despite official support for partition, most State Department officials remained opposed. On December 5, the US declared an arms embargo in the Middle East, which prevented the Jews from getting arms, but did not affect contracts of the Arab states with Great Britain. The stand of President Truman on this embargo is unclear. Having withdrawn the means of defense, the State Department then tried to prove that the Jews would not be able to defend themselves in case of Arab attack. A secret memo on December 17 called for the US to renounce partition as impractical and asked that the US should convene a special session of the UN General Assembly to work out a "middle of the road" solution that would win support from Jews and Arabs. If this would be impossible, the US should favor a trusteeship plan, an idea that was favored by Loy Henderson, and that had been incubated for several months in the State Department.
http://www.mideastweb.org/us_supportforstate.htm