Best Army Commander of the WW2 Allies

[Ashes]

Hi again fellas.
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Generally, the armed strength of the Wehrmacht at the start of Operation Barbarossa is listed as some 3,400,000 men compared with the 4,700,000 men of the Red Army. You're right to dispute Godofthunder's claims as although the Red Army was numerically superior, it only had some 178 divisions on it's western front on June 22nd compared with some 153 German and 47 Satellite divisions. However, the Red Army did have a big numerical advantage in tanks and overall was some 1,300,000 men stronger. Moreover, the Red Army reserves were larger than those of the Wehrmacht, which was already getting to it's operational limit. So in the overall scheme of things the Germans were outnumbered and this became steadily more important as the war went on.
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I came across a site that had the numbers of the peak strength of armies, and casualty lists of every war and conflict of the 20th century.

It took figures from up to 5 or 6 reputable sources, and almost every time the figures didn't tally.
In fact, sometimes the figures were so far apart, I wondered if they were talking about the same war.

Probably just a waste of time citing just one set of figures, suppose we should put up several differing sources, but then who do you believe?







___________________________________________________________________________________________I
It's a little bit naughty to include the Finns, as they were only concerned with reclaiming territories lost during the Winter War and really did not support Army Group North much at all. Also, the performance of the German satellite divisions were generally inferior to the German ones, with 3 satellite divisions required to do the job of 2 German ones.
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Well,i'm not sure about that Doppleganger, as you say, the Finns may have just been trying to reclaim lost territories, but those 400,000 men,led by a pretty good commander in Mannerheim, [ who wasen't an allied conmmander by the way ] aided by Von Falkenhorsts German divisions, may not have been under direct control of Army Group North, but they were supporting the Germans in fighting, killing, and tying down 15 Russian divisions.





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By the time Zhukov arrived with the 25 Siberian divisions the Wehrmacht had already lost the chance to take Moscow in 1941.
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Cripes, you make it sound as though Zhukov just strolled in at the head of the Siberian divisions when the battle was over.
You stated in another post " Zhukov played a vital role at the Battle of Moscow, so I give him full credit for that ".
From the info I have, he was organising the defenses that stopped the Germans around Moscow from October 7th.

As Clarke states,
Although the Germans were closest to Moscow in the north and centre, the real danger for the red army was farther south, where the country was more open, and where almost without tanks, Zuhkov was faced by the whole of Guderian's 2nd panzer army. At this stage in the battle Zuhkov had only one independent tank force left, the 4th Armoured brigade of Colonel Katukov.

Katukov took on the 4th panzer division and chopped it up, and Gurderian was stopped near Tula.
The first Siberian divisions started to arrive in November, just in time for the Germans last lunge at Moscow.





The reasons Germany lost the war. ____________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Hitler's delay in launching Barbarossa until June 22nd.

2. Hitler's decision to divert Army Group Centre away from Moscow to assist Army Group South to capture the Ukraine in August.

3. Hitler's decision not to put German industry on a war footing as he wanted to 'spare the German people the rigours of war."
___________________________________________________________________________________________


Yes,Hitler interfering are the most often quoted reasons, but quoting Clarke once more,
It is often asked could the Germans have won the war if they had not made certain mistakes.
The general answer I believe is that the Russians also made huge mistakes.
Which is the more absurd....to allow, with the wisdom of hindsight, an immaculate German campaign against a Russian resistance still plagued by those blunders and follies that arose in the heat and urgency of battle, or to correct both and to reset the board in an atmosphere of complete fantasy, of each side making the correct move like a chess text, when " white must win "? "


Some commanders say that defeating as much of the enemies army as possible on the field is the most important thing, while others [ including yourself by all accounts ] believe that territory and major objectives are more importent.

And what may have happened if the Germans succeeded in breaking in to Moscow?
A larger Stalingrad perhaps?


***********************************************************




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The problem with the official numbers for the Red Army is simple: The USSR lied. We do not have a reliable source for the numbers on the Red Army. Strange at it may seem, the German tally was the best resource for guessing their actual numbers
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And you dont think the Germans may have fibbed, or 'guessed' wrong at times.

After all, the Third Reich, under Hitler, made up some of the biggest lies and deceits in history.





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Estimated numbers on the Red Army as of the beginning of Operation Barbossa: 14,000,000 in manpower, 21,000 tanks, 15,000 combat aircraft. Some of that was deployed to counter operations by the Japanese, but the vast bulk of that force was deployed in the East _

In 1941, the Wehrmacht enterned the USSR with a maximum of 4,000 tanks, 4,000 combat aircraft and roughly 3,500,000 in manpower. In that year, they accounted for at least 6,000,000 Russian POW's, a minimum of 17,000 confirmed tank kills and a minimum of 12,000 confirmed combat aircraft kills. Some tallies of POW are more towards the 9,000,000 man mark, but those may be counting a full year period and not just 1941. Still, 6,000,000 is the minimum number for 1941 alone. Those are Red Army regulars and that does not represent the full total of for the Red Army deployed on the Eastern front throughout 1941 combat.


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As I was saying to Doppleganger, figures vary all the time, be very hard to get exact
numbers.
I think your estimated figures might be a tad high, if the Russians lost 9,000,000 men as prisoners alone, in 41/42, then you add those killed, missing and wounded, you're looking at a pretty way out grand total.

The Collins Atlas of the Second World War says that the wartime mobilization of major countries were... U.S.S.R, 20 million. Germany, 10.8 million. German allies, 4.5 million. Japan, 6 million. U.S.A, 12 million. U.K., 4.5 million.

It also says that Russia lost a total of 5 million prisoners for the whole war, and 4 million died in captivity.
As I said, how accurate differant figures are, who knows?

 

[godofthunder9010]

____________________________________________________________________________________________

The problem with the official numbers for the Red Army is simple: The USSR lied. We do not have a reliable source for the numbers on the Red Army. Strange at it may seem, the German tally was the best resource for guessing their actual numbers
____________________________________________________________________________________________

And you dont think the Germans may have fibbed, or 'guessed' wrong at times.

After all, the Third Reich, under Hitler, made up some of the biggest lies and deceits in history.





___________________________________________________________________________________________

Estimated numbers on the Red Army as of the beginning of Operation Barbossa: 14,000,000 in manpower, 21,000 tanks, 15,000 combat aircraft. Some of that was deployed to counter operations by the Japanese, but the vast bulk of that force was deployed in the East _

In 1941, the Wehrmacht enterned the USSR with a maximum of 4,000 tanks, 4,000 combat aircraft and roughly 3,500,000 in manpower. In that year, they accounted for at least 6,000,000 Russian POW's, a minimum of 17,000 confirmed tank kills and a minimum of 12,000 confirmed combat aircraft kills. Some tallies of POW are more towards the 9,000,000 man mark, but those may be counting a full year period and not just 1941. Still, 6,000,000 is the minimum number for 1941 alone. Those are Red Army regulars and that does not represent the full total of for the Red Army deployed on the Eastern front throughout 1941 combat.

Therein lies the problem. Exactness for the Eastern Front may well be an impossible goal and you see a lot of educated guesses, with their information based on differing sources. Most experts have based much of their writing with the believe that the USSR was being more truthful about their numbers. Consider the fact that they wrote Operation Mars out of existence. The disaster with K19 was erased from existence, although rumors did persist throughout the Cold War. After the Cold War, numerous facts have come to light. I was frustrated at first when I found giant discrepencies in the numbers reported from the various sources.

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As I was saying to Doppleganger, figures vary all the time, be very hard to get exact
numbers.
I think your estimated figures might be a tad high, if the Russians lost 9,000,000 men as prisoners alone, in 41/42, then you add those killed, missing and wounded, you're looking at a pretty way out grand total.

The Collins Atlas of the Second World War says that the wartime mobilization of major countries were... U.S.S.R, 20 million. Germany, 10.8 million. German allies, 4.5 million. Japan, 6 million. U.S.A, 12 million. U.K., 4.5 million.

It also says that Russia lost a total of 5 million prisoners for the whole war, and 4 million died in captivity.
As I said, how accurate differant figures are, who knows?

The problem with the the mobilization number listed for USSR for mobilization is that according to some sources, they took over 19 million military casualties total ... again the data available to Collins was likely the modified numbers provided by the USSR shortly after the war. That would have left them with less then 1 million after they took Berlin. We know that wasn't the case.

Again, when you trust a source for its numbers, you make conclusions based on those numbers. You annalyze and make conclusions. You make assumptions. You write numerous books with the assumption that the sources you used were truthful. Unfortunately, the USSR lied about the numbers to the point that what they actually had no longer resembled the historical reality. The domino effect of Soviet Propaganda and their modification of the facts has made studying the Eastern Front very very messy.

 

[Doppleganger]

Hi again fellas.
___________________________________________________________________________________________I
It's a little bit naughty to include the Finns, as they were only concerned with reclaiming territories lost during the Winter War and really did not support Army Group North much at all. Also, the performance of the German satellite divisions were generally inferior to the German ones, with 3 satellite divisions required to do the job of 2 German ones.
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Well,i'm not sure about that Doppleganger, as you say, the Finns may have just been trying to reclaim lost territories, but those 400,000 men,led by a pretty good commander in Mannerheim, [ who wasen't an allied conmmander by the way ] aided by Von Falkenhorsts German divisions, may not have been under direct control of Army Group North, but they were supporting the Germans in fighting, killing, and tying down 15 Russian divisions.

Heh I am pretty sure that the Finns did little to assist the Germans in Barbarossa. The Finns were concerned only with securing the right bank of the River Svir', securing the Karelian Isthmus which they had conceded in 1940 to the USSR. They did not advance any further than this and this may have been a big factor as to why Army Group North was unable to take Leningrad. Mannerheim was a very good commander agreed.

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By the time Zhukov arrived with the 25 Siberian divisions the Wehrmacht had already lost the chance to take Moscow in 1941.
____________________________________________________________________________________________


Cripes, you make it sound as though Zhukov just strolled in at the head of the Siberian divisions when the battle was over.
You stated in another post " Zhukov played a vital role at the Battle of Moscow, so I give him full credit for that ".
From the info I have, he was organising the defenses that stopped the Germans around Moscow from October 7th.

As Clarke states,
Although the Germans were closest to Moscow in the north and centre, the real danger for the red army was farther south, where the country was more open, and where almost without tanks, Zuhkov was faced by the whole of Guderian's 2nd panzer army. At this stage in the battle Zuhkov had only one independent tank force left, the 4th Armoured brigade of Colonel Katukov.

Katukov took on the 4th panzer division and chopped it up, and Gurderian was stopped near Tula.
The first Siberian divisions started to arrive in November, just in time for the Germans last lunge at Moscow.

Hardly Ashes! I know Zhukov was in the area from October onwards but by November the Wehrmacht was reaching as Von Claustwitz put it, "the limit of strategic consumption". It was exhausted, spent, battered after months of constant combat, ill-equipped for winter warfare and woefully short on supplies. In short it was there for the taking and the arrival of fresh Soviet Siberian divisions designed and trained for winter warfare meant that a victorious Soviet counter-offensive was a foregone conclusion. I can't see how this can be the mark of a great commander when he had such a superiority, not so much numerically but in the quality, morale and condition of his troops. I think that even Budenny would have pushed the Germans back had he been in command!

The reasons Germany lost the war. ____________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Hitler's delay in launching Barbarossa until June 22nd.

2. Hitler's decision to divert Army Group Centre away from Moscow to assist Army Group South to capture the Ukraine in August.

3. Hitler's decision not to put German industry on a war footing as he wanted to 'spare the German people the rigours of war."
___________________________________________________________________________________________


Yes,Hitler interfering are the most often quoted reasons, but quoting Clarke once more,
It is often asked could the Germans have won the war if they had not made certain mistakes.
The general answer I believe is that the Russians also made huge mistakes.
Which is the more absurd....to allow, with the wisdom of hindsight, an immaculate German campaign against a Russian resistance still plagued by those blunders and follies that arose in the heat and urgency of battle, or to correct both and to reset the board in an atmosphere of complete fantasy, of each side making the correct move like a chess text, when " white must win "? "


Some commanders say that defeating as much of the enemies army as possible on the field is the most important thing, while others [ including yourself by all accounts ] believe that territory and major objectives are more importent.

And what may have happened if the Germans succeeded in breaking in to Moscow?
A larger Stalingrad perhaps?

I believe that the destruction of enemy armies in the field is very important but yes, the capture of major objectives such as towns which are often the hubs for transport and supply routes as well as being politically valuable assets are the most important goals.

I'm not one of those people who see Hitler as an idiot with no grasp of strategy. This is not true at all. However, he was wholly responsible for the 3 decisions that I listed and those decisions did have a major impact on Barbarossa in 1941. The biggest mistake the USSR made was one of naivety by Stalin when refusing to believe a German attack was imminent. I don't think you acknowledge that even a well prepared Red Army would still have been soundly beaten by the Wehrmacht because of Blitzkrieg tactics. I mean, the British, French, Dutch and Belgian armies were ready and prepared yet they were outfought, out-thought and out maneuvered by the Wehrmacht. Why would the response of the Red Army have been any different?

 

[Pete031]

What about MacArthur?

 

[FO Seaman]

George S. Patton, Jr.

 

[godofthunder9010]

What about MacArthur?

I meant to add him the next day along with Bradley and several others but the system wouldn't let me ... and at this point the poll is too far along.

 

[Ashes]

Hi again fellas,
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I'm not one of those people who see Hitler as an idiot with no grasp of strategy. This is not true at all. However, he was wholly responsible for the 3 decisions that I listed and those decisions did have a major impact on Barbarossa in 1941. The biggest mistake the USSR made was one of naivety by Stalin when refusing to believe a German attack was imminent.
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Fully agree that those decisions by Hitler certainly didn't help Germanys cause,
although the mistake by Stalin in refusing to believe the date of the attack, was only one of several big mistakes on Russias side.

First mistake was ripping the heart out of the officer corps.

Only Budenny and Voroshilov survived out of 5 Marshals.

only 5 out of 80 members of the Military districts.

2 out of 15 army commanders.

28 out of 85 corps commanders.

186 out of 406 brigade commanders.

And thousands of junior ranks executed.

Don't think that was an ideal preparation to take on the best war machine in the world, was it?
Or, put it the other way around, if it happened to the German army, how do you think they would have fared? A Manstein, or a Guderian etc might have karked it.

Second mistake was Stalin interfering just as much as Hitler, at least Hitler made Corporal. [LOL]
If commanders like Zhukov, Vasilevski, Konev, Rokkasovsky, etc, were in full command, instead of the imbecile Budunny and Voroshilov, and with no interference from Stalin, it might have been a little different.

Third mistake was poor forward defensive positions.
The Russians were spread dangerously thin along the whole front, and the Germans, having the advantage of when and where to attack, brought the full weight of the Panzers to bear.
As i've said, Zhukov wanted positions further back so they could'nt be instantly overrun.

And the Russian fighter forces were forward and caught on the ground, further back and at least they would have gotten into the air. [ the Russian bomber force largely survived, having airfields further back from the front line. ]

And of course what you say about Stalin, having the dispositions of the forces fronting him, the date, and I think even the time of the attack, on his desk and ignoring it.

So, expanding on Clark's thesis, if on one hand you think that the Germans would have done better without those mistakes, I think you have to be fair, and do the same for Russia.

I have a feeling that if both the Germans and the Russians didn't make the mistakes we've quoted, that things would have ended up just about the same.





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I don't think you acknowledge that even a well prepared Red Army would still have been soundly beaten by the Wehrmacht because of Blitzkrieg tactics. I mean, the British, French, Dutch and Belgian armies were ready and prepared yet they were outfought, out-thought and out maneuvered by the Wehrmacht. Why would the response of the Red Army have been any different?
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Yes, you're right.
The Russians would probably have been beaten, [ but perhaps not so soundly ] like they were often beaten in the first 6 months of the war, but still come back and win the war.
I think the biggest mistake the Germans made was on June 22nd '41.
Invading Russia.

After all, history wasn't on the Germans side.
Charles the second invaded Russia, won battles...lost the war. Napoleon...ditto. THe Kaiser...ditto, and Hitler...ditto.
See a trend here....invade Russia at your peril.

At least Napoleon captured Moscow, which the Germans could'nt do, but it didn't do him much good.

It's ironic isn't it? The Brits invented the tank, had two of the foremost exponents of tank warfare in Fuller and Liddel Heart, but it was commanders like Gurderian and Manteuffel who took their teachings on board, and the British and the French fought the war as though it was a continuation of the first world war, with many French divisions entrenched in the Maginot line, hardly firing a shot.


Anyway, I think we may have got off godofthunders original thread a bit, but it's very interesting discussing these topics with you blokes.

Cheers Ashes.

 

[godofthunder9010]

Germany definitely underestimated the Soviet Union, but they could have made a solid run at actually destroying most of what the USSR used to turn the tide. If Hitler had not redirected Army Group Center away from its original objective of taking Moscow, things would definitely have played out differently. Without Moscow, Leningrad would have been impossible to keep resupplied or supported, Stalingrad would not have been likely to succeed because the operation was heavily dependent upon resupply coming from the logistical heart of Russia - Moscow.

This is where Hitler did not understand his enemy but many of his generals did. Moscow was the the center hub of railways, roads and of critical industrial importance. Why did Leningrad hold out? Largely, because Moscow was there. Why was the Red Army successful at Stalingrad? Quick reinforcement and resupply via Moscow was an enormous part of why they won that battle.

One point of clarification. World War II was not capture the flag. Taking the Moscow/Gorky area would not have ended it. The USSR still would have had Tankograd and other industrial sites from which they could have continued to fight. The sheer size of the Soviet Union is daunting and it may have taken several years for all mop up operations to be completed. But make no mistake about it, losing Moscow and Gorky in 41 would have crushed their upper hand in Industrial production, it would have greatly reduced the numerical advantage the Russians had as well. In a conflict with enormous distances, success was very heavily dependent on logistics. Failing to take out the logistical center-point of the USSR was a fatal mistake. The loss in their capability to quickly reinforce and resupply would have been HUGE. Even if German was only able to hold Moscow intermittently, it would have decapitated them in the long term.

True that we're wandering off topic here. Things went that direction by trying to discuss Zhukov as a commander, so the relevant question is this: How much credit does Zhukov truly deserve for Soviet victory on the Eastern Front??

 

[Ashes]

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Germany definitely underestimated the Soviet Union, but they could have made a solid run at actually destroying most of what the USSR used to turn the tide. If Hitler had not redirected Army Group Center away from its original objective of taking Moscow, things would definitely have played out differently.

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I think Iv'e more or less answered that hypothetical with Doppleganger.

And as you posted earlier, quote, 'The Germans failed to destroy the whole Red Army 1941 for simple enough reasons: There was too much to destroy and it was deployed over such a gigantic area. It was probably logistically impossible to completely destroy the Red Army in 1941.'

Amen to that.

___________________________________________________________________________________________
True that we're wandering off topic here. Things went that direction by trying to discuss Zhukov as a commander, so the relevant question is this: How much credit does Zhukov truly deserve for Soviet victory on the Eastern Front??
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An immense amount.

The key man for helping defeat the Germans in Russia, and following on that, in Europe.

 

[Doppleganger]

____________________________________________________________________________________________

Germany definitely underestimated the Soviet Union, but they could have made a solid run at actually destroying most of what the USSR used to turn the tide. If Hitler had not redirected Army Group Center away from its original objective of taking Moscow, things would definitely have played out differently.

____________________________________________________________________________________________


I think Iv'e more or less answered that hypothetical with Doppleganger.

And as you posted earlier, quote, 'The Germans failed to destroy the whole Red Army 1941 for simple enough reasons: There was too much to destroy and it was deployed over such a gigantic area. It was probably logistically impossible to completely destroy the Red Army in 1941.'

Amen to that.

It wasn't necessary to completely destroy the Red Army in 1941, although the Germans had a good stab at it. The Red Army suffered more casualties in 6 months than any army in history but Moscow was the key to victory. Cut off the head of the snake and the body dies. Thus, by capturing Moscow, the Wehrmacht in effect would have beheaded much of the command and control and logistical centre of the USSR, as well as a good deal of the political apparatus.

__________________________________________________________________________________________
True that we're wandering off topic here. Things went that direction by trying to discuss Zhukov as a commander, so the relevant question is this: How much credit does Zhukov truly deserve for Soviet victory on the Eastern Front??
____________________________________________________________________________________________

An immense amount.

The key man for helping defeat the Germans in Russia, and following on that, in Europe.

Ashes, surely you know the key man for defeating the Germans in Russia was paradoxically Hitler, rather than any Soviet personage. And I'd even say that Stalin had a bigger impact than Zhukov. Stalin's stirring speech on October 7th, 1941 had a tremendous impact on Soviet morale and stiffened resolve and the will to resist of the ordinary Soviet citizen. Stalin was a tyrant and a sadist but he played a big part in the survival of his nation.

You still haven't provided any evidence as to why Zhukov was as great as you claim. Can you even convince me that he was better than Marshall Konev?

 

[godofthunder9010]

Dopp, both Hitler and Stalin were central to their nations' victories and defeats. Both enforced stupid policies -- like killing your soldiers if they retreated and such.

Zhukov was willing to play by Stalin's rules, so we might assume we are able to blame some of his wastefulness on Stalin himself. When we take a closer look, we find Zhukov doing it of his own accord. That comes down as a bad mark on him.

Zhukov was brilliant when things went as planned. He was relentlessly one-tracked in his thinking and often refused to adjust to unexpected changes.

 

[serbianpower]

Dopp, both Hitler and Stalin were central to their nations' victories and defeats. Both enforced stupid policies -- like killing your soldiers if they retreated and such.

Zhukov was willing to play by Stalin's rules, so we might assume we are able to blame some of his wastefulness on Stalin himself. When we take a closer look, we find Zhukov doing it of his own accord. That comes down as a bad mark on him.

Zhukov was brilliant when things went as planned. He was relentlessly one-tracked in his thinking and often refused to adjust to unexpected changes.[/quot

I can agree about everythig you said. zhukov`s lack of operational and practical flexibility is why I would not vote for him.
the finn, manerheim was not allied comander.
patton was good soldier but probably crazy and rasist.
monty was arogant, egoist...
I vote for eisennhower. I am not sayng that he was extraordinary tactician, but his ability to chose right people to work with and give them practical freedom in the field, deal with generals personal conflicts(patton- monty), and detailed planing is realy something. that is kind of comander I like.

if I would have to vote for most important army comander in ww2 I would say zhukov with no doubts.

 

[Ashes]

Hi Fellas.
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It wasn't necessary to completely destroy the Red Army in 1941, although the Germans had a good stab at it. The Red Army suffered more casualties in 6 months than any army in history but Moscow was the key to victory. Cut off the head of the snake and the body dies. Thus, by capturing Moscow, the Wehrmacht in effect would have beheaded much of the command and control and logistical centre of the USSR, as well as a good deal of the political apparatus.
____________________________________________________________________________________________

I think the world of 'what ifs'' was pretty well explained by Clarke.
The Germans taking all the right options, and the Russians just keep taking the wrong ones.
Seems unfair to me.

Anyway, in this 'what if' say that Guderian was given his head and made for Moscow.
Does it follow that he, and army group center would have without a doubt taken Moscow?

But lets say he got there with his Panzer army, then what?
Quickly take the city?

I dont think the Russians would give up without a fight, do you?

A pretty good army, the 6th, [quoted by Hitler talking to Von Paulis ''with an army like yours you could storm the heavens''] made a pigs ear of ''taking'' Stalingrad, didn't they,
and this was against what you said was ''a desperate Soviet defense''
In my ''What if'' is it not even slightly possible that Moscow could have turned into another Stalingrad, or even worse, another Verdun?

And another thing, on 23/8/'41 when Guderian met hitler and failed to persuede him to attack Moscow, he pleaded with Hitler, as he stated 'not to split my Panzer group as was intended but to committ the whole group to the operation'.

Clarke asks to what extent this decision to make the whole panzer group march south instead of husbanding some of the divisions to rest at the center, was responsible for the failure of the attack on Moscow when finally it was launched is hard to determine.

Halders view was that it was a bribe by Hitler to induce Guderian to acquiesce in the plan.


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Ashes, surely you know the key man for defeating the Germans in Russia was paradoxically Hitler, rather than any Soviet personage. And I'd even say that Stalin had a bigger impact than Zhukov. Stalin's stirring speech on October 7th, 1941 had a tremendous impact on Soviet morale and stiffened resolve and the will to resist of the ordinary Soviet citizen. Stalin was a tyrant and a sadist but he played a big part in the survival of his nation.

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If you mean by Hitler invading Russia in the first place, I entirely agree.

If, on the other hand, you mean Hitler interfering in the campaign, well, I refer you back to Clarke.

Stalin interfered, and was a millstone around the Russian armys neck, every bit as much as Hitler was to the German army.

And I find it hard to believe you're serious when you say that Stalin's stirring speech had more impact then Zhukov's efforts in Barbarossa.

Your not pulling my leg are you?

Do you think that without that speech the Russians were going to roll over and give up?
Or without Churchills speeches Britain would give up?

Dont think i've ever heard or read a politician's speech that ''stirred'' me.
And that includes Johnny Howard, George W, or Blair.

All Stalin did, especially early in the war, was almost bring Russia down, so much so that it seemed he was helping the Wehrmacht more then Russia.

The one thing Stalin did right was to put Zhukov in command.

Just in time.


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You still haven't provided any evidence as to why Zhukov was as great as you claim. Can you even convince me that he was better than Marshall Konev?
____________________________________________________________________________________________


{Probably not, given your apparent disdain for Zhukov, [although i've never really claimed that he was "great" so much as extremely important, and the first commander to turn Russias fortunes around.}

{I think we're starting to go around in circles here, but I refer you to my first post on this thread}

If that doesn't convince you, I guess i've failed.

All kind of reasons [ or excuses ] can be attributed to Germany's defeat by Russia, but brilliant commander or just a dill, Zhukov was in place at the decisive battles of the 20th century, perhaps the most decisive of all time, and if he was'nt there just because of his good looks [lol] in my book at least, he was the right man at the right time.

 

[Doppleganger]

Hi Fellas.
___________________________________________________________________________________________

It wasn't necessary to completely destroy the Red Army in 1941, although the Germans had a good stab at it. The Red Army suffered more casualties in 6 months than any army in history but Moscow was the key to victory. Cut off the head of the snake and the body dies. Thus, by capturing Moscow, the Wehrmacht in effect would have beheaded much of the command and control and logistical centre of the USSR, as well as a good deal of the political apparatus.
____________________________________________________________________________________________

I think the world of 'what ifs'' was pretty well explained by Clarke.
The Germans taking all the right options, and the Russians just keep taking the wrong ones.
Seems unfair to me.

Anyway, in this 'what if' say that Guderian was given his head and made for Moscow.
Does it follow that he, and army group center would have without a doubt taken Moscow?

But lets say he got there with his Panzer army, then what?
Quickly take the city?

I dont think the Russians would give up without a fight, do you?

A pretty good army, the 6th, [quoted by Hitler talking to Von Paulis ''with an army like yours you could storm the heavens''] made a pigs ear of ''taking'' Stalingrad, didn't they,
and this was against what you said was ''a desperate Soviet defense''
In my ''What if'' is it not even slightly possible that Moscow could have turned into another Stalingrad, or even worse, another Verdun?

And another thing, on 23/8/'41 when Guderian met hitler and failed to persuede him to attack Moscow, he pleaded with Hitler, as he stated 'not to split my Panzer group as was intended but to committ the whole group to the operation'.

Clarke asks to what extent this decision to make the whole panzer group march south instead of husbanding some of the divisions to rest at the center, was responsible for the failure of the attack on Moscow when finally it was launched is hard to determine.

Halders view was that it was a bribe by Hitler to induce Guderian to acquiesce in the plan.

Hi Ashes. Good to cross swords again. I just wanted to say that you appear very dependant on one source of information. In my experience it is better to get information from several sources and then weigh it up.

Firstly as you may know by now it's my opinion that Barbarossa was launched 6 weeks or so too late. Because of that fact, it was imperative that Moscow be taken as quickly as possible to secure the city before the onset of winter. Any delay, such as a diversion to take the Ukraine was fatal.

It is possible that Moscow could have been another Stalingrad although I don't think it would have transpired that way. You see, there wasn't the same volume of Soviet forces around Moscow that there was around Stalingrad towards November and December '42. However, I can't rule out a desperate fight to take and hold the city from either side.

Don't you think Guderian knew what he was doing when he pleaded with Hitler to strike for Moscow and keep his Panzer Army intact? We are talking about the man who created the Panzerwaffen in the first place. Don't you think he had a better idea than Hitler, or Clarke for that matter, what the best option for his Panzer Army was? Trying to assume you know better than Guderian about armored warfare is like your average physics teacher trying to tell Albert Einstein about quantum physics. Would you honestly take Halder's view over Guderian's?

6th Army was the most powerful German Army in the field in 1942. However, by the time it started to drive towards Stalingrad Hitler was essentially calling most of the shots in OKH. 6th Army actually had the chance to take Stalingrad virtually unopposed in August, but Hitler wanted to secure the Caucasus oil fields first. Had Hitler listened to his Generals who stated that whoever holds Stalingrad holds the Caucasus then who knows what might have happened. You say it made a 'pigs ear' of taking the city but truth is, from October '42 until January '43 this 'pigs ear' of an Army tied up no less than 61 Soviet formations. 'Pigs ear' you say yet look at the casualty rates 6th Army inflicted upon the the Red Army notwithstanding.

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Ashes, surely you know the key man for defeating the Germans in Russia was paradoxically Hitler, rather than any Soviet personage. And I'd even say that Stalin had a bigger impact than Zhukov. Stalin's stirring speech on October 7th, 1941 had a tremendous impact on Soviet morale and stiffened resolve and the will to resist of the ordinary Soviet citizen. Stalin was a tyrant and a sadist but he played a big part in the survival of his nation.

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If you mean by Hitler invading Russia in the first place, I entirely agree.

If, on the other hand, you mean Hitler interfering in the campaign, well, I refer you back to Clarke.

Stalin interfered, and was a millstone around the Russian armys neck, every bit as much as Hitler was to the German army.

And I find it hard to believe you're serious when you say that Stalin's stirring speech had more impact then Zhukov's efforts in Barbarossa.

Your not pulling my leg are you?

Do you think that without that speech the Russians were going to roll over and give up?
Or without Churchills speeches Britain would give up?

Dont think i've ever heard or read a politician's speech that ''stirred'' me.
And that includes Johnny Howard, George W, or Blair.

All Stalin did, especially early in the war, was almost bring Russia down, so much so that it seemed he was helping the Wehrmacht more then Russia.

The one thing Stalin did right was to put Zhukov in command.

Just in time.

Stalin was gravely at error for discounting the overwhelming intelligence presented to him about the imminent attack of Germany. Aside from that, what else could he have done in 1941 after the war had started?

Also, if you are not in the situation of the average Soviet citizen in 1941, knowing that a mighty, seemingly unstoppable army is rolling relentlessly towards your home, how can you possibly tell how much a speech by your leader might stir you? You and I have both never been in the path of an invading army that seems unstoppable (at least I hope you haven't). Don't underestimate the impact of propaganda, especially in that time when media coverage and information was far less widely available than it is today.

Ok. I don't think you can seriously argue that in WW2 Stalin was as much a millstone around the Red Army's neck as Hitler was to the Wehrmacht. This is simply not true and I'm sure you know that Stalin allowed his Marshalls to generally fight the war, especially from 1943 onwards. Conversely, Hitler went the other way and insisted on micro-managing the whole campaign after mid 1942 and history shows what happened. The Wehrmacht, aside from flashes of brilliance demonstrated by von Manstein, was not the same fighting force as a result.

By all accounts there was a sense of panic gripping the entire USSR in 1941. Stalin seriously considered moving from Moscow at one stage. So his speech on October 7th '41 was vital and proved critical in bolstering the morale of the average Soviet citizen. I have no trouble in believing that the Soviet soldier generally had no such need of any bolster to fight and die for his country. I've already stated several times how incredibly brave and stubborn the average Red Army soldier was. But for the non-combatant; the farmer, the factory worker, the housewife there was a real need for Stalin to show true leadership and this he did.

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You still haven't provided any evidence as to why Zhukov was as great as you claim. Can you even convince me that he was better than Marshall Konev?
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{Probably not, given your apparent disdain for Zhukov, [although i've never really claimed that he was "great" so much as extremely important, and the first commander to turn Russias fortunes around.}

{I think we're starting to go around in circles here, but I refer you to my first post on this thread}

If that doesn't convince you, I guess i've failed.

All kind of reasons [ or excuses ] can be attributed to Germany's defeat by Russia, but brilliant commander or just a dill, Zhukov was in place at the decisive battles of the 20th century, perhaps the most decisive of all time, and if he was'nt there just because of his good looks [lol] in my book at least, he was the right man at the right time.

I don't have any disdain for Zhukov. Just because I dispute his standing and legacy doesn't mean to say that I don't have a good opinion of him. Hell, I've stated several times during the course of this discussion that I thought he was a very fine commander - how is this showing disdain? I'm not one to blindly believe what I read without doing some checks of my own though. Once I did this, I discovered that Zhukov's greatness was not all that it was cracked up to be. I mean, if I just believed what I read/heard without question I'd still believe that Rommel was the best German commander of WW2. :roll:

I'd still like you to:

1. Counter my argument about the fact that at the Battle of Moscow victory for the Soviets in the winter counteroffensive was foregone because of the state of their respective forces.

2. Acknowledge that Operation Mars was fully a Zhukov disaster and that this should have an impact on his overall reputation. Hardly anyone outside having a specific interest in this subject knows anything about it. You do, yet you seem to act like it doesn't matter.

3. Explain to me why Zhukov is so much better than Konev. I believe he is better but not that much better. Konev isn't so far behind.

You're coming across as biased towards the Soviets in general and Zhukov in particular. Prove me otherwise.

 

[godofthunder9010]

I concur with the point about expectations and hype. Zhukov is made out to be so great and wonderful that "nobody was skilled enough to stop the Germans but Zhukov." As you learn more, you tend to become disillusioned.

That doesn't mean that he wasn't a good commander.

 

[Ashes]

Sorry i'm late again, Cricket commitments.
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Hi Ashes. Good to cross swords again. I just wanted to say that you appear very dependant on one source of information. In my experience it is better to get information from several sources and then weigh it up.
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Yep, good to pick up the cudgel again.

Do you mean Glantz or Clarke?
If you mean Clarke, he's a great conduit to many other sources, he backs his arguments up with about 460 notes from, among others, Bayerlein, 'with the Panzers in Russia''. Bormann, 'the Bormann letters'. Chuikov, 'beginning of the road'. Churchill, 'second world war' Cianos, 'diaries' Goebbels 'diaries' Guderian, 'Panzer leader' Halder, 'diaries' Hitler, 'table talk' Liddell Hart, 'the other side of the hill' Manstein, 'Memoirs' Trevor Roper, 'the last days of Hitler.'and dozens more.

Also, like you I suppose, i've read mountains of books, articles, magazines and watched enough doco's on the history channel, plus Cricket of course, to give me square eyes.



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Firstly as you may know by now it's my opinion that Barbarossa was launched 6 weeks or so too late. Because of that fact, it was imperative that Moscow be taken as quickly as possible to secure the city before the onset of winter. Any delay, such as a diversion to take the Ukraine was fatal.
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I agree.
It was a mistake.
Thank God for Mussolini and the Greeks, ANZACS, Brits, and General Boris Mirkovic of the Yugoslavian air force, for leading the coup in Yugoslavia.


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Don't you think Guderian knew what he was doing when he pleaded with Hitler to strike for Moscow and keep his Panzer Army intact? We are talking about the man who created the Panzerwaffen in the first place. Don't you think he had a better idea than Hitler, or Clarke for that matter, what the best option for his Panzer Army was? Trying to assume you know better than Guderian about armored warfare is like your average physics teacher trying to tell Albert Einstein about quantum physics. Would you honestly take Halder's view over Guderian's? ___________________________________________________________________________________________

I think you've misunderstood me there, perhaps I didn't explain too well..

I didn't mean split Guderians forces for the attack on Moscow, I meant for the attack South.
By all accounts the whole of Guderians Panzer army wouldn't be needed for the operation, and OKH wanted to overhaul some units and rest the crews for Moscow, but Guderian didn't want any of his Gruppe to be taken from his command.

Clarke asks to what extent this decision to make the whole panzer group march south instead of husbanding some of the divisions to rest at the center, was responsible for the failure of the attack on Moscow when finally it was launched, is hard to determine.

And I didn't realise it was off limits for anyone to question Guderian on any of his tactics or decisions, he was good, but not infallible.



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6th Army was the most powerful German Army in the field in 1942. However, by the time it started to drive towards Stalingrad Hitler was essentially calling most of the shots in OKH. 6th Army actually had the chance to take Stalingrad virtually unopposed in August, but Hitler wanted to secure the Caucasus oil fields first. Had Hitler listened to his Generals who stated that whoever holds Stalingrad holds the Caucasus then who knows what might have happened. You say it made a 'pigs ear' of taking the city but truth is, from October '42 until January '43 this 'pigs ear' of an Army tied up no less than 61 Soviet formations. 'Pigs ear' you say yet look at the casualty rates 6th Army inflicted upon the the Red Army notwithstanding.
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I'm afraid you're misinterpreting my words here, I never said that it was a "pigs ear" of an army, or that it didn't inflict heavy casualties on the Russians, but that it failed in it's objective, which was to capture Stalingrad.


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Stalin was gravely at error for discounting the overwhelming intelligence presented to him about the imminent attack of Germany.
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Well, would'nt you agree that his failure to do so was possibly one of the gravest errors made by either leader throughout the entire campaign?
His failure to believe his own intelligence, and not even bothering to pass it on as a warning to his front commanders,of the date, time and whereabouts of the German attack, was an act of criminal stupidity, and just one of many mistakes that almost ruined Russia.


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Aside from that, what else could he have done in 1941 after the war had started?
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As i've stated before, put Zhukov in command, and let him run the show.


___________________________________________________________________________________________

Also, if you are not in the situation of the average Soviet citizen in 1941, knowing that a mighty, seemingly unstoppable army is rolling relentlessly towards your home, how can you possibly tell how much a speech by your leader might stir you? You and I have both never been in the path of an invading army that seems unstoppable (at least I hope you haven't).


By all accounts there was a sense of panic gripping the entire USSR in 1941. Stalin seriously considered moving from Moscow at one stage. So his speech on October 7th '41 was vital and proved critical in bolstering the morale of the average Soviet citizen. I have no trouble in believing that the Soviet soldier generally had no such need of any bolster to fight and die for his country. I've already stated several times how incredibly brave and stubborn the average Red Army soldier was. But for the non-combatant; the farmer, the factory worker, the housewife there was a real need for Stalin to show true leadership and this he did.
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He was virtually a nervous wreck on the verge of skedaddling, don't know who, or what, gave him a bit of backbone, that he decided to stay a bit longer.

As you point out, the Russian soldier was fighting and dying in their tens of thousands for the Mother country well before his speech, so they needed no exulting.

As for the farmer, factory worker and housewife, how many Germans were they going to kill?

The factory workers were working their butts off, many behind the Urals in primitive conditions.

Morale is important of course, but it amounts to nothing if pathetic commanders in the field are making the wrong decisions and you're being overrun and slaughtered.



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Ok. I don't think you can seriously argue that in WW2 Stalin was as much a millstone around the Red Army's neck as Hitler was to the Wehrmacht. This is simply not true and I'm sure you know that Stalin allowed his Marshalls to generally fight the war, especially from 1943 onwards.
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Well, as you said'' Stalin was gravely at error for discounting the overwhelming intelligence presented to him about the imminent attack of Germany''.

And that is just one of many grave blunders he made in the first 6 months of the campaign, when the war was up for grabs, and when the most carnage was inflicted on the Red army, it was Stalin by a country mile, seemingly doing everything he could to help the Germans.

Perhaps it was just a coincidence, but when Stalin at last put Zhukov in command, things started to turn around for the Russians.

Stalin learned his lesson, and as you say, mostly left it to his Marshalls from '43.
But the blunders he made in the initial, and perhaps most important days, were immense.



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I'm not one to blindly believe what I read without doing some checks of my own though.
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Same with me.

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1. Counter my argument about the fact that at the Battle of Moscow victory for the Soviets in the winter counteroffensive was foregone because of the state of their respective forces.
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Things were bad for the Germans, no doubt, but Bock thought they could still take Moscow, and virtually said 'when the going gets tough, the tough get going'.

Bock reminded his staff of the battle of the Marne which was given up for lost when it might have been won.
He said both opponents are calling on their last reserves of strength and the one with the more determination or will should prevail.

And General Alfred Philippi took another tack, putting a lot of blame on lying Nazi propaganda, he said.....

"More serious however was the fact that the fighting spirit of the troops had suffered. The boasts of the National Socialist propaganda that Russia was already prostrate had proved an illusion, for the reorganisation of the Soviet army groups on Oct. 10 and the appointment of Zhukov to the command of the 'west front' [ on both sides of Moscow ] and General Konev to the command of the Kalinin front had infused the Soviet forces with a new spirit of initiative.
Soviet resistance was stiffening and counter attacks were increasing in intensity."


The Russians, after their initial staggering losses, were scraping the bottom of the barrel.
Raw recruits, with hardly any training, were rushed to the front line, along with the lucky survivors of Briansk/Vyazma, light on tanks and artillery in some sectors, taking on nearly a million German veterans.

These were the men that initially stopped the Germans, until the Siberian divisions were unleashed.

As I said the Germans were in a bad way, but it didn't mean that they were totally incapacitated.

If they virtually couldn't fight at all, how the heck did they stop the Russian counter attack, led by the Siberian divisions with T-34's?

It took a lot of fit fighting men with a lot of usable firepower to do that.

Almost all German accounts i've read say it was almost entirely down to the weather, nearly all Russian reports say it was the determined resistance from their soldiers.

The truth may be somewhere in the middle.


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2. Acknowledge that Operation Mars was fully a Zhukov disaster and that this should have an impact on his overall reputation. Hardly anyone outside having a specific interest in this subject knows anything about it. You do, yet you seem to act like it doesn't matter.
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I thought I already had acknowledged that, i've said that Mars was a serious setback for Zhukov and Russia.
And it should have an impact on his overall reputation, as i've already stated more then once, I certainly dont think he was infallible.


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3. Explain to me why Zhukov is so much better than Konev. I believe he is better but not that much better. Konev isn't so far behind.
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I repeat again,I dont think Zhukov was a military genius, he was just the winning commander of the most decisive battles of the war.


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You're coming across as biased towards the Soviets in general and Zhukov in particular. Prove me otherwise.
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That's a strange choice of words, I don't see where having a different opinion can be called biased [ and I don't think i'm any more so then yourself toward the Germans for that matter ] I may be seeing it more from the Russian perspective, but only as a counter balance to the many who seem to think that the German commanders, particularly Manstein and Guderian, could do no wrong.
Having said that though, I stand firmly behind everything i've said about Zhukov and his importance to the Russian war effort.

As i've been at pains to point out, I don't classify him as the greatest, but he was the man who was involved, to varying degrees, in all the major operations that first halted, and then finally defeated, the German invasion. After all,they were the reason the war in Europe was won, if not for them taking on and causing over 80% of total German casualties, where would Europe be today?


De Gaulle said it was almost a miracle that the Germans got so far, but perhaps Russia recovering from the disasters that befell them, and winning the war, was an even bigger miracle.

Cheers, Ashes.

 

[Doppleganger]

Ashes

Ok, fair enough mate. You've got a decent knowledge of the subject and it's always a pleasure to arg...er I mean debate with one who understands and appreciates the topic at hand!

Zhukov was indeed a fine commander and was involved in pretty much all of the big battles that drove the Germans back to Berlin. In my eyes he's certainly above the likes of Monty and Eisenhower for different reasons. Zhukov in many ways was similar to Patton although operating at a different level. He was a fighter and Stalin needed fighters and his flaws notwithstanding, he got the job done.

I think Bock was unaware of the Soviet forces in front of him, or still displaying the stupid contempt for the Soviet soldier when he thought the Germans could still take Moscow in late November/December. Perhaps he was just motivating his men to greater heights like any good leader would. Weighing up different sources and accounts it's clear to me that the Germans clearly were reaching their operational limit and needed to withdraw to a defensible line to wait out the worst of the winter, allow resupply and combat replacements to reach them and to repulse the Soviet counteroffensive. Had they done this early enough, they would have been in an even better position than they were historically in 1942.

As for how the Wehrmacht stood firm I think it's probably a combination of superior German professionalism, initiative and tactical skill, a degree of luck and a degree of failure on the part of the Soviets. Although to be fair the Soviets did push the Germans back quite a bit and would have destroyed much more German material had sensible German commanders like Guderian not ordered their armies to retreat to more defensible positions. I think determined resistance from the Soviet defenders did play a large part in repulsing the last German attacks, although it's also hard to ignore the plentiful photographic evidence of the extreme weather conditions. The Germans unfortunately happened to encounter the coldest Russian winter for 140 years, with unusually heavy autumn rains which before the frost had turned the steppes into seas of mud.

As for De Gaulle's comments I have little time for them, or the man himself. I guess it must have seemed like a miracle how German armies with mainly light training panzers totally humiliated his nation. Like all new styles of warfare it must have felt like magic, like a miracle had taken place. I just think it was down to the right tactics at the right time with the right leaders in place.

 

[godofthunder9010]

The poll ought to be redone with a better list of options. Mannerheim is amazing, but he doesn't count. Finland was Axis all the way. Here is what we have so far:

Montgomery
Patton
Zhukov
Eisenhower
MacArthur
Konev
DeGaulle (not sure on this one)
Bradley

Who else ought to be added? I seems strange that there are no options for the Japanese side of things (other than MacArthur). I am looking for Battlefield commanders, so no Air Force and no Navy. I would also like to think that there are some other notable British and Soviet commanders.

Also, if any moderator feels that recreating the topic would be bad, then of course I won't do it.

 

[Zucchini]

I think you do need a new poll.

Ike and Patton aren't in the same category.

General Kuribayashi's defense of Iwo Jima was masterful.

 

[godofthunder9010]

I think you do need a new poll.

Ike and Patton aren't in the same category.

General Kuribayashi's defense of Iwo Jima was masterful.

His being a general for the Axis Powers rules him out of course, but I agree with you.