Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Media: The Associated Press
Byline: By ROBERT H. REID
Date: 23 October 2006
The search for an end to Iraq's violence is being complicated by an
electoral system that empowers religious and sectarian leaders who see
little gain in offering concessions to rivals or cracking down on factions
that put them in power.
That makes it tough for the U.S. to steer Iraqi leaders toward the kind of
political compromise that American military commanders believe is the only
way to guarantee long-term stability.
President Bush reviewed Iraq strategy Saturday with top commanders and
national security advisers, but there was little sign of any major changes
in American policy.
In fact, U.S. options are limited.
The levers of power are firmly controlled by Shiite Muslim religious parties
and Kurdish ethnic movements. Many of them see no advantage to concessions
that could defuse the predominantly Sunni Arab insurgency, which gave rise
to Shiite militias and triggered the worsening sectarian bloodletting.
The unpleasant truth is that the two national elections of 2005 _ widely
hailed at the time as triumphs of democracy _ solidified sectarian and
ethnic divisions and helped set the stage for the political deadlock
propelling Iraq toward all-out civil war.
Many Iraqi leaders know what steps must be taken to avoid disaster. They
just don't know how.
"Iraq has been painted into a corner by the particular electoral and
parliamentary system chosen for it by the U.S. and United Nations," said
Juan Cole, a Middle East expert at the University of Michigan. "There was
never all that much hope that parliamentary politics could fix things, but
this way of doing things makes them worse."
Much criticism has focused on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, for
his failure to crack down on Shiite militias and reach a compromise with
Sunni Arabs.
But that's not easy under the current power alignment.
Al-Maliki's Shiite alliance controls 130 of the 275 parliament seats. But
the alliance is divided among several factions.
Al-Maliki's maneuver room is constrained by the power of two nominal allies
within his alliance _ Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, head of the biggest faction, and
Muqtada al-Sadr, a radical anti-U.S. cleric.
Both al-Hakim and al-Sadr control armed militias and together hold more
seats than al-Maliki's faction. Al-Maliki was chosen for the top job in
large part because neither of the other two Shiite heavyweights wanted a
prime minister from the rival faction.
Any move against militias without the support of al-Hakim and al-Sadr would
threaten the prime minister's power base. And cracking down on the militias
would require all the political cover al-Maliki could get. He would have to
rely on the mostly Shiite army and national police, many of whose members
support the very armed groups they would be ordered to suppress.
In an effort to get around the political impasse, Iraqi Shiite and Sunni
religious leaders issued a declaration last week in Islam's holiest city,
Mecca, forbidding sectarian violence. Similar agreements have not lasted,
though, and without progress toward a political settlement, prospects for
this one are uncertain.
The stage for the current impasse was set when the Iraqis opted for a
proportional representation system promoted by U.N. experts and accepted by
the United States in late 2004.
During the first parliament election in January 2005, religious and ethnic
parties formed alliances that fielded lists of candidates nationwide. Voters
across the country cast ballots for the same lists, and the number of seats
awarded to each alliance depended on its percentage of the vote.
Candidates popular locally but not affiliated with a big nationwide alliance
stood little chance. Faced with lists of candidates they barely knew, Iraqis
voted for parties based on their sectarian or ethnic identification.
That enabled Shiites, about 60 percent of Iraq's 28 million people, to sweep
to power in partnership with Kurds. Sunnis Arabs, many of whom boycotted the
first election, felt marginalized.
"The problem with proportional representation ... is that it encourages
populism and empowers ethnic and sectarian leaders. It encourages
politicians to be more accountable to party leaders rather than their
constituents," said Michael Rubin, a former political adviser in Iraq.
For last December's elections, the Iraqis adopted a mixture of proportional
representation and representatives chosen by district. That approach
resulted in Sunni Arabs gaining more parliament seats, but did little to
lessen the sectarian focus _ the only major bloc that ran on an inclusive,
nonsectarian platform won only 25 seats.
And while Sunni Arabs increased their number of seats, many believe the
result still doesn't reflect their influence in society, where their
minority traditionally provided the ruling and commercial elite before
Saddam Hussein's ouster.
Sunni Arabs form only about 20 percent of the population, however, so their
numbers in parliament will always fall below those of the Shiites. Many
Shiites and Kurds also blame Sunni Arabs for the abuses inflicted on their
communities by Saddam's regime, and hard-line Shiite parties consider
compromise as giving the Sunnis more than they deserve.
This month, Shiites and Kurds rammed legislation through parliament allowing
creation of self-ruled regions over objections from Sunni Arabs, who fear it
will splinter the country and deprive them of a share of Iraq's oil wealth,
which is concentrated in the Kurdish north and the primarily Shiite south.
Sunnis thought they had a deal to defer consideration of the bill until
after a review of the new constitution.
Passing the legislation sent a message to the Sunnis "that they will lose
every political battle in a country with a Shiite majority _ forever," Cole
said. "They aren't going to put up with that."
Byline: By ROBERT H. REID
Date: 23 October 2006
The search for an end to Iraq's violence is being complicated by an
electoral system that empowers religious and sectarian leaders who see
little gain in offering concessions to rivals or cracking down on factions
that put them in power.
That makes it tough for the U.S. to steer Iraqi leaders toward the kind of
political compromise that American military commanders believe is the only
way to guarantee long-term stability.
President Bush reviewed Iraq strategy Saturday with top commanders and
national security advisers, but there was little sign of any major changes
in American policy.
In fact, U.S. options are limited.
The levers of power are firmly controlled by Shiite Muslim religious parties
and Kurdish ethnic movements. Many of them see no advantage to concessions
that could defuse the predominantly Sunni Arab insurgency, which gave rise
to Shiite militias and triggered the worsening sectarian bloodletting.
The unpleasant truth is that the two national elections of 2005 _ widely
hailed at the time as triumphs of democracy _ solidified sectarian and
ethnic divisions and helped set the stage for the political deadlock
propelling Iraq toward all-out civil war.
Many Iraqi leaders know what steps must be taken to avoid disaster. They
just don't know how.
"Iraq has been painted into a corner by the particular electoral and
parliamentary system chosen for it by the U.S. and United Nations," said
Juan Cole, a Middle East expert at the University of Michigan. "There was
never all that much hope that parliamentary politics could fix things, but
this way of doing things makes them worse."
Much criticism has focused on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, for
his failure to crack down on Shiite militias and reach a compromise with
Sunni Arabs.
But that's not easy under the current power alignment.
Al-Maliki's Shiite alliance controls 130 of the 275 parliament seats. But
the alliance is divided among several factions.
Al-Maliki's maneuver room is constrained by the power of two nominal allies
within his alliance _ Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, head of the biggest faction, and
Muqtada al-Sadr, a radical anti-U.S. cleric.
Both al-Hakim and al-Sadr control armed militias and together hold more
seats than al-Maliki's faction. Al-Maliki was chosen for the top job in
large part because neither of the other two Shiite heavyweights wanted a
prime minister from the rival faction.
Any move against militias without the support of al-Hakim and al-Sadr would
threaten the prime minister's power base. And cracking down on the militias
would require all the political cover al-Maliki could get. He would have to
rely on the mostly Shiite army and national police, many of whose members
support the very armed groups they would be ordered to suppress.
In an effort to get around the political impasse, Iraqi Shiite and Sunni
religious leaders issued a declaration last week in Islam's holiest city,
Mecca, forbidding sectarian violence. Similar agreements have not lasted,
though, and without progress toward a political settlement, prospects for
this one are uncertain.
The stage for the current impasse was set when the Iraqis opted for a
proportional representation system promoted by U.N. experts and accepted by
the United States in late 2004.
During the first parliament election in January 2005, religious and ethnic
parties formed alliances that fielded lists of candidates nationwide. Voters
across the country cast ballots for the same lists, and the number of seats
awarded to each alliance depended on its percentage of the vote.
Candidates popular locally but not affiliated with a big nationwide alliance
stood little chance. Faced with lists of candidates they barely knew, Iraqis
voted for parties based on their sectarian or ethnic identification.
That enabled Shiites, about 60 percent of Iraq's 28 million people, to sweep
to power in partnership with Kurds. Sunnis Arabs, many of whom boycotted the
first election, felt marginalized.
"The problem with proportional representation ... is that it encourages
populism and empowers ethnic and sectarian leaders. It encourages
politicians to be more accountable to party leaders rather than their
constituents," said Michael Rubin, a former political adviser in Iraq.
For last December's elections, the Iraqis adopted a mixture of proportional
representation and representatives chosen by district. That approach
resulted in Sunni Arabs gaining more parliament seats, but did little to
lessen the sectarian focus _ the only major bloc that ran on an inclusive,
nonsectarian platform won only 25 seats.
And while Sunni Arabs increased their number of seats, many believe the
result still doesn't reflect their influence in society, where their
minority traditionally provided the ruling and commercial elite before
Saddam Hussein's ouster.
Sunni Arabs form only about 20 percent of the population, however, so their
numbers in parliament will always fall below those of the Shiites. Many
Shiites and Kurds also blame Sunni Arabs for the abuses inflicted on their
communities by Saddam's regime, and hard-line Shiite parties consider
compromise as giving the Sunnis more than they deserve.
This month, Shiites and Kurds rammed legislation through parliament allowing
creation of self-ruled regions over objections from Sunni Arabs, who fear it
will splinter the country and deprive them of a share of Iraq's oil wealth,
which is concentrated in the Kurdish north and the primarily Shiite south.
Sunnis thought they had a deal to defer consideration of the bill until
after a review of the new constitution.
Passing the legislation sent a message to the Sunnis "that they will lose
every political battle in a country with a Shiite majority _ forever," Cole
said. "They aren't going to put up with that."